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This dissertation seeks to clarify the moral and political shape of economic exchange 
with an intellectual history of capitalism at its eighteenth-century inception.  It seeks 
to avoid the familiar polarities of Marxist and capitalist economic ideologies by 
framing the ethical questions of economic exchange in historical terms: Why does 
the modern economic order seem to create moral contradictions and undermine 
political institutions? In response to this question, the thesis recovers the 
contributions of the Scottish historian and moral philosopher, Adam Ferguson (1723-
1816).  Because modern economy had not yet taken on its modern abstraction and 
was still a thinkable reality, Ferguson’s treatment on history, action, and political 
institutions provide a fertile starting point for envisaging a distinctly moral 
configuration of the economic sphere.  He prepares ground for a critical assessment 
of the political and economic relationship by criticizing the ideal of progress and 
emphasizing the need for dignified human exertion. His claim is that the liberalized 
marketplace undermines political institutions—especially law—to the extent that is 
leaves a people enslaved both to their own dependencies, as well as to other nations 
for whom commercial luxury is not a vice.  My argument carries Ferguson’s claim 
forward by asserting that the Market itself now tyrannizes and enslaves in much the 
way Ferguson imagined a military despot would tyrannize unprepared societies of 
the eighteenth-century.  Eighteenth-century theology is, in many respects, a period of 
relative theological austerity; so it is therefore unsurprising that a morally confused 
political instrument (capitalism) would emerge in an age largely devoid of 
theological imagination or conscience. Jesus Christ is no longer the origin, end, or 
meaning of history; co-creation is no longer the principal object of human action or 
labour; and the means of Christ’s rule through the political order are rejected in 
favour of luxuries and conveniences of modern commerce.  The marketplace now 
embodies all the fears eighteenth-century theorists reserved for despots, tyrannizing 
western societies and threatening the resolve of already fractured political 
institutions.  





They speak of human pursuits as if the whole difficulty were to find something to do: 
They fix on some frivolous occupation as if there was nothing that deserved to be 
done: They consider what tends to the good of their fellow-creatures as a 
disadvantage to themselves: They fly from every scene in which any efforts of vigour 
are required or in which they might be allured to perform any service to their 
country.  We misapply our compassion in pitying the poor; it were much more justly 
applied to the rich, who become the first victims of that wretched insignificance into 
which the members of every corrupted state, by the tendency of their weaknesses and 
their vices, are in haste to plunge themselves.1 
 -- Adam Ferguson on the ‘Corruption Incident to Polished Nations’ 
‘They,’ ‘they,’ ‘they,’ ‘they.’ Adam Ferguson’s ardent repetition raises the 
natural question of just who ‘they’ might be. His conclusion at the end of the passage 
offers a clue, of course, but the reader of Ferguson’s Essay will by this point have 
already known who the ‘they’ are. Ferguson’s concerns have been made plain; the 
‘rich’ are identified explicitly as those citizens who seek actively to forsake political 
(especially martial) participation in favour of opulent passivity. He has in mind, 
perhaps, the polished gentry who wish to flaunt publicly the true extent of their 
private leisure. Yet his criticism of the indolent and bored seems to apply even more 
broadly and appositely as it extends across the centuries between his time and ours. 
Presently, ‘they’ could represent almost anyone, regardless of wealth. The rhetorical 
humour of Ferguson’s colourful pronouncement is a fruit of its prophetic 
truthfulness. His frustration imparts wisdom late-moderns can readily identify, and 
thus we glimpse here a flicker of what is to come, both for our inquiry into 
Ferguson’s moral and political thought-world, as well as for his pronouncements 
upon modern commercial society. The ‘they’ he chastises as pitiable may in many 
respects include late-modern societies within that broad third-person plural! 
This particular example captures the wider, more generic aim of the essays that 
follow: to work our way conceptually inside Ferguson’s mind and allow his insights 
                                                
1 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, F. Oz-Salzberger ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 246. 
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to illumine perennial questions. Opening widely the window to his mind we will 
want to note the arrangement of his intellectual furniture, what it is comprised of and 
what priorities are revealed by its arrangement. But peering intrusively into this 
window will not tell us everything about how or why the concepts we find there 
originally found their place. We also need to know how this room joins up with other 
rooms, where the house itself is situated, and in what neighbourhood.  
For the purposes of this introduction it would be best to start on the wider view 
and move forward incrementally, contextualizing each step along the way till we 
reach Ferguson himself. As a means of orientation, the central question this thesis 
seeks to resolve is as follows: What kinds of moral and political tension did the 
reorganization of economic goals introduce to early-capitalist societies? Each chapter 
of this thesis takes a different approach to this question by focusing on Ferguson’s 
dominant theoretical interests—history, action, and political institutions. To 
understand why the period, place, and people in question merit our attention and to 
set the stage for the chapters to come it would be useful to take preliminary account 
of why our inquiry has settled on this particular conceptual territory. This 
introduction affords me opportunity to justify why, exactly, the question has been 
phrased as it has, why eighteenth-century Scotland is an optimal context for this 
study, and why, of all people, is Adam Ferguson most appealing. My qualifications 
begin from a wider view and proceed to the more narrow.  If moral and political 
implications of early capitalist societies are of foremost interest to this inquiry, 
readers may ask, why focus on a comparatively neglected theorist of eighteenth-
century Scotland? 
So, first, why eighteenth-century Britain? This particular period of British history 
is unquestionably among its most distinguished. Intellectually and culturally the 
nation pulses with enthusiastic expectation. The popular feeling was that the country 
had made a political and social turn, entering a favoured position historically and a 
new era of civil liberty; the Glorious Revolution, union of parliaments, and fiscally 
secure Hanover monarchy achieved over a twenty-year period also doubly reinforced 
this sense of stability and promise. On an economic plane, stability is the fertile soil 
in which commercial life is rooted, and promise is the water that continually 
nourishes it.  Stability and promise mutually foster one another in the garden of 
society. With this growth we find, unsurprisingly, sustained and notably widespread 
discussion of economic policy. The self-fortifying nature of the stability/promise 
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duality in the eighteenth-century heralds a shift in the way politics is thought about: 
from consideration of governmental modalities to consideration of politico-economic 
modalities.  
Political thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been largely 
concentrated on questions of authority, order, and functions of government; now the 
tide has shifted and weighing most heavily on the mind of eighteenth-century Britons 
is the authority, order, and function of political economy. Yet it is still reflected upon 
as a subject of philosophic interest. Political economy had not yet been 
mathematicized and would remain a subject of prudent deliberation, not of 
quantification. By late century, however, especially after the publication of Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the primacy of philosophy in commercial theory would 
begin to give way, but not until. That gradual transition was aided by increased 
acceptance of a Newtonian world-picture.  ‘Natural’ theories and designations enter 
their ascendancy and eventually subsume the discipline of philosophy itself to pure 
natural authority. By the mid eighteenth-century ‘natural’ authority had also become 
the rubric of political economy, and political economy in turn had become the 
supreme demonstration of natural authority. This mutual self-justification would 
have its most significant impact on how the organic relation between private pursuit 
of wealth and public pursuit of justice was understood. Division between public and 
private dissolves in the economic sphere and the two are consistently thought to co-
mingle; that is, private commercial pursuits are viewed as publicly advantageous, just 
as public pursuits would be viewed as privately advantageous.  Thus, in response to 
the question of ‘why eighteenth-century Britain?’ my justifications are threefold—a 
popular sense of entering a new political era of liberty, a shifting of attention from 
governmental to politico-economic modalities, and a breakdown of divisions 
between private pursuit of wealth and public pursuit of justice.  Each of these themes 
will be taken up extensively in the chapters to come. 
Interestingly, the ascendance of natural authority did not at the same time subvert 
habits of framing political questions in broadly theological terms. In fact, doctrines 
of providence became the centripetal force of eighteenth-century theology to the 
extent that each theorist attempted to come to terms with the idea of a God who 
works within the necessity of a Newtonian world. Natural theology needed natural 
foundations and natural legitimacy. Nevertheless, one of the overarching concerns in 
this thesis will be to rebut the popular characterization of the eighteenth-century, 
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particularly of Britain, as an age of enlightened deism. Isolated figures of 
prominence, like Samuel Clarke for instance, obviously exhibit certain deistic 
commitments. But as will be seen in several of the chapters to come, there is no 
reason to think this the dominant or even popular theological point of view.2 Details 
of that argument will be rehearsed later. For now I wish simply to note that 
philosophical inquiry of the period retained theological shape and did not altogether 
jettison its Christian heritage. Arguments were still required to show some degree of 
theological fidelity, even if the object and method of philosophy had become 
‘natural’ and less ‘revealed.’ 
Having offered a few qualifications for the question of ‘why eighteenth-century 
Britain?’ it would be useful now to consider the narrower question of ‘why 
Scotland?’ To begin with, it must be said that I do not mean to include in this 
question the whole of Scotland, but primarily the university towns of Aberdeen, 
Glasgow, and Edinburgh. The term ‘vibrant’ is a particularly apt description in this 
regard, as Scotland had benefited richly from the constitutional changes inaugurated 
at the century’s turn by the union of parliaments.3 The country had prospered 
politically and economically under these new constitutional provisions and would 
lead naturally to an enrichment of philosophical reflection. Of course, Scotland’s 
philosophical tradition was already of some repute; the new commercial confidence 
enjoyed at mid-century simply gave this tradition its needed relief and leisure. 
Naming a few members in this talent pool vividly illustrates the nation’s philosophic 
eminence: Gershom Carmichael, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, 
Henry Home (Lord Kames), Thomas Reid, George Turnbull, George Campbell, 
                                                
2 Characterization of this century as an age of enlightened deism has been repeated most forcefully by 
Charles Taylor in both Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) and A Secular 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). Karl Barth intimates similarly in the first chapter 
of Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1972). On a separate track, 
many intellectual historians have utilized this presumption of latent deism as a sign of democratic 
replacement of hierarchical structures, whether ecclesial or civil. See, for example, ‘Scepticsm, 
Priestcraft, and Toleration’, in Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought, M. Goldie 
and R. Wolker eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and J. G. A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). An alternative interpretation of 
the ‘long eighteenth-century’ I follow closely throughout this thesis is J. C. D. Clark’s meticulous 
study in English Society: 1660-1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For an example 
of the deism mentioned above see Samuel Clarke, The Works, (New York: Garland Publishing Co.). 
3 A brief retelling of the unification story is offered at the end of chapter one. 
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Hugh Blair, James Beattie, Alexander Gerard, Dugald Stewart, Adam Ferguson, and 
a host of politicians and armchair intellectuals trained in the humanist arts.4  
By the 1760’s and 70’s Scotland had become the epicentre of philosophical 
engagement and, significantly, almost all the names included in the list above dwelt 
in Edinburgh at one time or other, some permanently. Edinburgh was the place to be 
for intellectual stimulation.5 As a city of much notoriety, achieved through the help 
of a new constitutional order and political consciousness, Edinburgh serves as an 
intense microcosm of the period’s unique cultural fixtures. Given this cultural 
activity it is therefore unsurprising that improved economic conditions would lead 
philosophers to contemplate the nature of political economy itself. How were 
circumstances once so dire—failed colonial charters, domestic famine, constant 
threats of rebellion—commercially transformed in less than three decades? Scotland, 
and Edinburgh in particular, readily became the epicentre for working out how the 
nation and city became a commercial success story, and its philosophers would 
interrogate the material causes of commercial growth with matchless ability and 
breadth. We must not forget, moreover, that these are immensely practical theorists 
who wish to know why life is lived as it is and how its conditions might be improved 
upon. Such practicality explains the comparatively wide-ranging intellectual 
curiosity that defines the period in question.  
So, my response to the question of ‘why Scotland?’ is twofold: its unique 
commercial advantages stimulated a new political consciousness that would lead 
naturally to a concentration of philosophical reflection on political and economic 
questions of the day. The Scottish Enlightenment is, after all, an exceptional 
phenomenon indebted to political stability and organized around philosophical 
personalities; an ideal setting for examining the moral and political tensions of early 
capitalist society. How well the philosophies emerging from these circumstances 
were reinvested into Scottish life is touched upon indirectly in chapters two and four. 
Of those distinguished Scottish philosophes listed above, why select Adam 
Ferguson as a conversation partner for this study? To this question I wish to pose a 
                                                
4 Francis Hutcheson, of course, immigrated to Scotland from Ireland, which may also speak to 
Scotland’s wider philosophical attraction. 
5 Edinburgh’s intellectual prominence was arguably preceded historically b Aberdeen and Glasgow; 
however, Edinburgh’s establishment as nation’s capital and bastion of political intrigue that ultimately 
sanctified it as a place of substantive intellectual activity. 
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question of my own: why, exactly, has he remained so inconspicuous? Why is he a 
surprise selection? This thesis offers a litany of reasons why he should not have been 
so marginalized by modern moral and political historiography and places him, 
alternatively, among the earliest modernity critics. Perhaps he has been marginalized 
or overlooked because his criticisms did not ‘win the day.’ Nevertheless, it is the 
cautious subtlety of his thought, the sheer radiance of argument resistant to the 
popular norms of British moral and political theory, which makes him an 
extraordinary figure of the period. Where his peers are optimistic, he is often 
pessimistic; where his peers see wealth, he sees slavery; where his peers see 
progress, he sees decay. Indeed he tended regularly to see things his own way.  
To get a better sense of his general placement within the wider tapestry of 
eighteenth-century Scotland, however, it would useful here to offer a few brief 
biographical remarks.6 Adam Ferguson was reared in a Kirk minister’s family on the 
invisible Perthshire border between the Scottish highlands and lowlands. His position 
of birth, both familially and geographically, would prove crucial to his professional 
career, furnishing him a rigorous classical education and the vital advantage of 
family connections on his mother’s side. By the time of his matriculation to St. 
Andrews in the early 1740’s he spoke both Gaelic and English fluently—an ability 
that would later secure his placement as chaplain to the Black Watch—and was 
steeped in Greek and Latin classics. Upon completing his St. Andrews degree at 
nineteen years of age he relocated to Edinburgh to continue studies in Divinity. Here 
he would forge life-long friendships with churchman peers and receive his first 
introductions to methods of modern philosophy. His studies would be cut short, 
however, by a prompt appointment to the 43rd Highland Regiment (Black Watch) as 
deputy chaplain. A Gaelic speaking ordinand of exceptional ability with Hanoverian 
sympathies proved the ideal candidate for such a strategic post. His Sermon in Ersh 
delivered to the Watch on the eve of the 45’ Rebellion is a marvellous example of 
mid-century political theology.7 He intended upon his decommission from the Watch 
to accept ministry of a Kirk parish outside Edinburgh, but after a failed application 
and the death of his father in 1754 he was eventually forced to accept an offer as 
                                                
6 All such remarks are derived from Jane Fagg’s invaluable biography of Ferguson in Correspondence 
of Adam Ferguson, Vol. I , V. Merolle (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1995), xix-cxvii. 
7 For an introduction to and transcription of this Sermon see Matthew Arbo, ‘Adam Ferguson’s 
Sermon in the Ersh Language: A Word from 2 Samuel on Martial Responsibility and Political Order’, 
in Political Theology (Forthcoming, September 2011). 
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tutor to a young Scottish lord on continental tour. Upon return to Scotland, Ferguson 
had inadvertently entered a tumultuous shifting of social and ecclesial tides. He 
swiftly became engrossed in civil debates over militia policy and Kirk debates over 
the morality of stage-plays; in particular, the public scandal surrounding the 
‘Douglas affair.’ Although he would eventually lose the debate over establishing 
militias, his support of stage-plays on moral and biblical grounds held sway by 
making it clear that the arts both form and express civil society simultaneously.8 By 
positioning himself on the side of his friend and Douglas playwright, John Home, 
Ferguson joined the swelling ranks of what has been described as a group Scottish 
moderates.9 Their victories here and on future issues would alter the course of many 
theo-political Kirk trajectories. 
Ferguson’s appointment as Advocates Librarian in early 1757 at David Hume’s 
recommendation would be the first step in a long and distinguished academic career.  
Roughly two years later, and again at the recommendation of Hume, Ferguson was 
appointed to the Chair of Natural Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. This 
appointment brought to rest temporarily his many years of wandering and confirmed 
his academic, not ministerial, vocation. This appointment and confirmation did not 
halt his faithful service to the church, for he served continually as an elder and 
Assembly representative throughout the 1760’s and 70’s.  In any event, it was not 
until his appointment to the more fitting Chair of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy 
that he published his more reputable treatises, which include An Essay on the History 
of Civil Society (1767), The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman 
Republic (1783), and Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792). Each of the 
texts was well received at the time of their publication, though it would be the Essay 
that ultimately secured his place in the history of political thought. Socially Ferguson 
was very much the man about town, involving himself with various Edinburgh 
societies and supporting various political causes. He was a coveted conversation 
partner described amiably by all who knew him. Political involvement would 
eventually secure his invitation to join the Carlisle Commission as a negotiator to the 
recently victorious American colonies. But having failed even to make an appearance 
before the Continental Congress, the Commission returned to Britain just in time for 
                                                
8 Adam Ferguson, The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered (Edinburgh: 1757). 
9 Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1985). For the general purpose it serves, the term (‘moderate’) more or less works. 
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Ferguson to fall terribly, almost fatally, ill.  Shortly after his recovery he resigned his 
Chair and retired to the countryside to try his hand (again) at farming the Scottish 
borders. Eight years later, at the age of seventy, he embarked on a long-awaited trip 
to the continent for his induction into the Berlin Academy of Sciences and 
subsequent tour of Italian states. Returning to Britain he farmed his plot on the 
borders countryside another ten years before admitting, at age 87, that he had become 
too feeble to maintain his estate and would retire to St. Andrews for its convenient 
proximity to family.  Adam Ferguson died there on February 22, 1816, aged 93, and 
was buried in the old cathedral grounds along the northern wall. His unusually long, 
energetic, and eclectic life tells a great deal about the sort of character considered in 
this thesis—a practical man with practical concerns, whose ideas and sensibilities are 
derived from concrete experiences of political life. At various junctures of life Adam 
Ferguson was a Classicist, chaplain, tutor, traveller, librarian, elder, professor, 
diplomat, farmer, and socialite. Given his cautious and questioning view of new 
theoretical orthodoxies and eclectic life experience, the philosophic and contextual 
relevance of Ferguson for the central question of this thesis is suitably assured. He 
speaks to the central question when and where the question was of central interest. 
So, having responded to a series of preliminary ‘why?’ questions concerning the 
legitimacy of this inquiry, the next relevant question pertains to how, 
methodologically, this thesis will be undertaken. Interrogating the moral and political 
tensions of early-modern commercial theory at the point where standard policy and 
procedure began to be called into question can isolate and illumine crucial ethical 
questions emerging from the present configurations of our economic order. In the 
course of this thesis it will become evident that some of these questions are 
perennial, while others remain unique to the eighteenth-century Scottish experience. 
It is my belief that the broader contours of arguments considered here can, if 
considered carefully, usefully inform moral deliberation over the origins, means, and 
ends of modern economies. Now, having said that, it is equally essential that I give 
some indication of how this historiographic program will be conducted. To prevent 
entanglement in overly complex methodologies I have enlisted Adam Ferguson as 
my conversation partner and guide.  I have attempted to view the questions and 
circumstances of the period through his eyes, empathizing with them when possible, 
engaging the figures he engages, and familiarizing myself with his way of seeing. 
Thus my overarching arguments will be deeply indebted to Ferguson’s own discrete 
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insights. In other words, I have tried to understand what Ferguson would speak to 
contemporary states of affairs were he given the chance. 
Before rehearsing the planned outline for this thesis, which will likely clarify any 
lingering methodological confusion, allow me to make three additional qualifications 
concerning recurrent tactical decisions. First, throughout this thesis I consult modern 
thinkers who do not necessarily ‘belong’ to the eighteenth-century world.  Martin 
Heidegger, Robert Spaemann, and Reinhart Koselleck, for example, make occasional 
appearances to demonstrate why Ferguson’s problems are not entirely unique and 
also to help build an interpretive framework for understanding what is theoretically 
at stake. Connections between such thinkers and our eighteenth-century subjects will 
vary in strength; sometimes the connection will seem at best tacit, while at others the 
connection will seem direct. In every case, however, the aim is to widen momentarily 
the picture we are considering to include voices that may help us better understand it.  
Second, there is the issue of eighteenth-century writing styles. In this age 
concision and elegance are united to the enhancement of both. John Locke and David 
Hume emerge as stylistic exemplars in this respect; their prose transmits lucidity in 
every turn of phrase. Well-placed irony, too, is strategically utilized, and typically 
with colourful or elaborate idioms. Aptitude for stretching sentences to their 
maximum potential also seems to have been especially prominent in the long 
eighteenth century. Often the relief of arriving at a sentence period feels not unlike 
coming up for air at the end of an underwater swim! Such length, along with the 
necessary support of seemingly innumerable commas for parsing clauses, makes the 
task of quoting these figures with brevity inordinately difficult to achieve. I have 
therefore adopted the technique of breaking quotations into parts so as to convey the 
intended argument as clearly and succinctly as possible without losing the 
fundamental spirit of the given passage.  To have left each of these passages intact 
would require an excessive number of block quotes, which in turn would labour the 
momentum of the essay and burden the reader with vastly more detail than 
necessary. And seeing as Ferguson is especially appreciative of commas and clauses, 
this tactic will be most evident in densely expositional sections of chapters two 
through four.  
Third, and lastly, allow me to qualify the use and non-use of certain economic 
terminology. Despite Adam Smith being heralded as the father of modern economics, 
and despite the Scottish Enlightenment’s role as incubator of early capitalism, the 
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word ‘capitalism’ as an economic signifier does not appear in the literature treated by 
this thesis. Neither does the term ‘economy’ for that matter. The transliterated 
œconomy makes rare appearances here and there, harkening to ancient notions of 
household management and agricultural trade, but its eighteenth-century meaning 
lacks most of the conceptual freight of contemporary references. ‘Commerce’ is their 
word of choice and I have tried to follow them in using it, though, admittedly, the 
terms above are also occasionally employed when most fitting to the case. This care 
with economic terminology has been equally applied to other conceptual genres. 
The five chapters of this thesis are intended to contextualize historically 
Ferguson’s philosophical contributions, bring focus to his dominant concerns, and 
affirm his defence of Christian metaphysics. Chapter one begins by isolating key 
contributors to early eighteenth-century commercial theory—John Locke, Bernard 
Mandeville, and George Turnbull—and highlights their unique interpretations of 
how providence and commerce are thought to belong to one another. This question 
then also serves to orient the debate between select figures of the Scottish 
Enlightenment—Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith—who bring the 
discussion into closest proximity with Ferguson. The chapter concludes by reviewing 
several significant events of the century’s first fifty years. Chapter two is largely an 
exposition of Ferguson’s philosophy of history. It begins with a brief rehearsal of his 
Scottish peers’ understanding of history’s progress and concludes with Ferguson’s 
critique of conjectural models. Special attention is given in this chapter to the 
relevance these models have for growth variables in modern economics. Chapter 
three is also predominantly expositional, outlining in detail Ferguson’s theory of 
action. As before, the aim is to distinguish him from his contemporaries and to 
demonstrate how his theory of action squares with certain Christian commitments. 
Particularly interesting on his account is the negative impact of much commercial 
practice upon human initiative and genuine exertion. In chapter three I focus almost 
exclusively on Ferguson’s moral and political critique of popular economic policy 
advanced in his Essay. His preoccupation with establishing militias remains central 
to his wider political intentions, on my view, for as the defining issue of his early 
political pamphlets it extends to the mutual corroboration of commerce and 
militarism outlined in the Essay itself. Upon rehearsing these arguments I then apply 
Ferguson’s pessimistic conclusion to contemporary economic realities. Lastly, in 
chapter five, I identify three of Ferguson’s metaphysical opponents—determinacy, 
universality, and romanticism—and affirm his suspicion that when incorporated 
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philosophically each distorts an authentically Christian vision of reality and the 
moral order upheld by it. 
Each chapter of this thesis builds upon the next to support something like the 
following argument: The goals of modern commerce and the methods used to 
achieve them generate irresolvable moral and political antinomies—to the extent that 
modern economies remain inherently progressive—by inhibiting or altogether 
eliminating authentic human action and by undermining the very political institutions 
intended to sustain commercial life. The several premises supporting this conclusion 
are articulated in each chapter. If the poignancy of Ferguson’s judgment occasionally 
takes the reader by surprise, you are not alone; this recognition serves as testimony to 
how little has changed since the late eighteenth-century, and its challenge of moral 
contradictions in the modern marketplace speaks as truthfully to our perils as it did 
three hundred years ago to the Scot. This poignancy will repeatedly validate my 
contention that study of a less prominent moral philosopher of the eighteenth-century 
can offer us new insight into perennial social and political questions. If Ferguson can 
help us ask better ethical questions about modern commercial exchange, then this 
thesis will have served part of its purpose.  If it persuades the reader that Economy 
can itself become a tyrant, negating the freedom and abundance it promises always to 
furnish, then it will have served the other part. The self-defeating nature of modern 
economy is premised on the antithesis between means and ends—false ends 
inevitably undermine even the most precise means. And thus an increasing number 
of ‘theys’ are swept up into the abstract confusion of economic misdirection and left 
scratching their heads over which exchanges are truly worth transacting and how 
they ultimately contribute to the common good. Such confusion is perhaps the final 
product of having misplaced treasure: for where your treasure is, there will your 
heart be also (Matt.6:21). 




God and Commerce, 1700-1764 
 
When sitting down to a well-prepared fillet of fish, the attentive diner will note 
an intrinsic complexity to what is savoured.  Temperature is detected almost 
immediately, then texture and consistency, and then perhaps different flavours 
afforded by both the fish itself, its oils and acidity, as well as by the selected method 
for cooking.  If especially thoughtful, a fine white wine matched precisely for the 
occasion might unlock still more palatal experiences.  In a similar way this chapter 
invites the reader to savour a fifty-year sliver of the eighteenth-century; to pay close 
attention to its complex flavour, texture, and consistency as a period of historical 
interest.  History deceives us if we think of it as a static artefact laying patiently for 
our archaeological discovery.  We often find at the uncovering of an historical 
artefact a far more complex, fragile, and unpredictable relic than anticipated.  History 
constantly surprises us; we think we have grasped its meaning firmly, then it slips 
uncontrollably between our fingers.  This is not to say that history is essentially 
unfactual, of course; it is simply not the type of history we are concerned with here.  
Statistical or objective “facts” of history provide a skeletal frame for interpreting 
intellectual history but cannot wholly prevent our expectations from becoming 
shipwrecked on the dunes of historical uncertainty.  The dating of parliamentary 
union in Britain, for example, is a fundamentally different question than that of why 
the idea of union arose in the first place or what enabled its success.  This chapter is 
concerned with the latter type of historical inquiry.  Yet, the accuracy or success of 
this intellectual history will depend to a large extent on the object under inquiry, as is 
par for the course.  What sorts of questions need asking?  How should the questions 
be put?  What are the historical inquiry’s limits?  How might the various contours, 
dimensions, layers, and spirits that constitute the shape of history be identified and 
their consistency articulated? 
The aim of this essay is to discern how God and commerce are thought to belong 
to one another in early-eighteenth century moral and political philosophy.  The 
eighteenth-century is, after all, a peculiarly philosophical period and its philosophical 
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method very much the fashion of the day.  Even much theology of the period sticks 
to the rules of the philosophical game, avoiding critical accusations of preachiness.  
Questions of what God is like or how God acts, for example, are commonly 
responded to in moral and political terms.  And for that matter the same goes for 
questions of commercial order and historical meaning.  Ordinarily history is 
summoned to reinforce arguments that already appear empirically conclusive.  
Commerce, too, is a notably political subject addressed almost without exception as a 
moral and political idea.  To crystallize the central question of how concepts of God 
and commerce relate to one another in the eighteenth-century, therefore, this chapter 
provides a ranging exposé of early eighteenth-century philosophical engagement 
with the question of how providence governs a shifting, and in some cases fiscally 
burgeoning, commercial sphere.  The purpose of this exposé, in the end, is to offer a 
contextual backdrop against which Adam Ferguson’s contribution to this question 
might be set.  Beginning this account at the year 1700 and concluding it at 1764 is, as 
with any divide in the history of ideas, an artificial narrowing of scope.  Many key 
seventeenth-century influences on eighteenth-century philosophy, such as Grotius, 
Hobbes, and Pufendorf will be mentioned only in passing.  Attention must be closely 
directed to the immediate context of Ferguson’s intellectual career and thus with the 
exception of these few continental theorists focus principally on the British 
constellation of moral and political thought.  Rehearsing the arguments of 
philosophers offers illuminating snapshots of the period, each taken at different 
moments but regularly capturing similar settings.  When considered collectively the 
snapshots depict crucial continuities and discontinuities, agreements and 
disagreements, receptions and rejections comprising plot points within the early-
century theo-political narrative.  If historical, moral, and political implications of 
early eighteenth-century political economy can be mapped and its general trajectories 
underscored, then the stage will be set for Ferguson’s entrance into the late-century 
moral and political discourse.   
 
I 
The first instalment to the longer philosophic story that needs to be told here 
begins with John Locke.  Beginning the story with his starting point takes us back 
quite a long time, to the mysterious time before the flickering energy of civilization, 
the “state of nature.” He tells us that the state of nature has two perfections, “a state 
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of perfect freedom to order actions” and “a state also of equality.”10  This state of 
perfect freedom and equality is governed against excess by the law of reason, which 
“teaches all mankind [that] no one ought to harm another in life, health, liberty, or 
possession.”11  Reason, as a law, disallows actions violating the principles of liberty 
and equality.  The dictum is not radically different from the contemporary quip that 
one may do as one pleases so long as it does not harm anyone else.  But Locke takes 
the law of reason seriously, so seriously in fact that the law of reason becomes a 
command of God.  Now, the command of God is necessary in a state of nature 
primarily because nature is not intrinsically good and so cannot serve as an ultimate 
moral or political authority.  God is for Locke the ultimate authority of moral and 
political order, but for a strange reason.  God is authoritative over creatures because 
he possesses his creatures as property and directly wills that no harm come to 
persons in what they possesses.  Possession therefore confers authority.  As a 
individual possessors each is obliged to preserve what is most immediately 
possessed—one’s own life—and only as a second-order duty to preserve that which 
is possessed by another.  Thus, the state of nature is founded on the concept of 
possession initiated and defined by the Creator’s prior possession of his creation; 
because God possesses, humans possess.  In a political sphere of perfect freedom and 
equality the only means for protecting individual possessions is for all to compact on 
preventing injury one to another.  Everyone must agree not to violate reason’s law of 
freedom and equality, which would be an injury to the person so violated.  Thus, for 
Locke, built into this supposed state of nature is a power of self-possession that pre-
conditions political society as such. 
Particularly striking in this account of pre-political man is Locke’s immediate use 
of economic language.  The concept of property alone legitimates authority.  As has 
been hinted already, Locke derives his concept of private property from the 
theological idea of Creator possessing creature, which in turn authorizes the creature 
to possess as the Creator possesses—to imitate his ownership.  As Istvan Hont has 
noted, Locke departs from Grotius’ and Pufendorf’s definition of “exclusive and 
absolute right of dominion,” and instead adopts the definition of “absolute ‘right in’ 
                                                
10 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1980), II,4. 
11 Ibid., II,6 
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something.”12  The shift in Locke’s definition is toward the subjective, taking 
possession of a “right in” something.  Justification for possessing an object is derived 
from this right of self-possession.13  The sequence goes something like this: God 
possesses man, man possesses self, so therefore man may possess objects in creation.  
This raises the natural question of how to arbitrate the claim to property between two 
individuals in compact; what are we to do with “common” land, to that which is 
available to everyone as a possible object of ownership?14  Land is “common” in the 
sense that it is physically common to a community, since God has “given the earth to 
the children of men; given it to mankind in common.”15  This gift is given to man by 
God and should be made personal property in the same way God possesses man.   
Property is acquired only through human labour.  Locke rejects Pufendorf’s 
argument for a state of nature relegated to scarcity and instead envisages a state of 
abundance in which the great excess of natural resources benefits wider society.  The 
stark difference between Pufendorf’s “scarcity” and Locke’s “abundance” is a 
product of their disparate views of the Self and its possession of the world.  For 
Pufendorf, the created world holds both possibilities and limitations; for moral and 
political reasons, some material objects may or may not be privately owned.  For 
Locke, on the other hand, only other wills erect hedging limitations; unpossessed 
material objects without wills are therefore susceptible to possession.  His theory of 
property is thus wholly anthropocentric.  Those objects are mine that come into 
contact with my person and are integrated into my person by my will. Whatever is 
absorbed into the Self by labour is considered an object of property.  Locke explains: 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself.  The 
labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.  
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, 
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property.16 
                                                
12 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p.431. 
13 Ibid.  One will also notice here the radical departure from the views of the reformers, for whom 
self-possession was an strangely unchristian notion.   
14 In the few pages that follow I will refer to the ‘common’ in the same manner as Locke, often 
without a definite article (“a” or “the,” for example) in order to maintain conceptual clarity.  The 
“common” is the natural resources given by God in creation for the use and benefit of mankind.  It is 
“common” to each member of society in the sense that it was given by God to and for every member.    
15 Second Treatise of Government, V.25 (emphasis mine). 
16 Ibid., V.27. 
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On this account the “givenness” of all things to the Self is part of God’s express will 
for humankind, having “given us all things richly” (1Tim.6:12).17  Moreover, the 
history of property itself affirms distribution of common for personal possession.  
Drawing cleverly upon the biblical narratives of Cain and Abel and Abraham and 
Lot, Locke illustrates how labour increases personal property and proves that the vast 
quantity of common should be parcelled and privately possessed to avoid rampant 
waste.  God gave the world to the children of men in common, but now “we see how 
labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses.”18  
On Locke’s view the world was given to everyone but through my labour I can make 
an ever-greater part of it mine alone.  The history of property—indeed, the biblical 
history of property—becomes the story of continual accumulation of property taken 
from the common through labour.  Nevertheless, though God has given to man the 
common for his use and advantage, ownership is not without attending obligations.  
Immediately following his quotation of 1 Timothy, Locke claims that the common is 
for man to enjoy but never to the extent of spoiling detrimentally what is possessed, 
for “nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.”19  The world is open to 
all men equally but it is precisely because it is available to anyone that certain 
boundaries and limitations are necessary to ensure inequalities are not perpetuated.  
Placing limits on liberal acquisitions has the natural result of elevating principles of 
equality above that of liberty.  Inequalities deepened by unbounded liberty are 
warning signs that natural order has been violated.   
Locke’s distaste for inequality pales in comparison to his disapproval of 
covetousness, however, which thoroughly denounced in his wider critique of 
acquisitiveness and waste.  Good student of the Bible that he is, Locke recognizes the 
iniquity of covetousness.  He believes it to be “innate to human nature and not 
simply a contingent historical curse of a commercial society.”20  The fact that 
covetousness remains deeply embedded in human nature is best illustrated, thinks 
Locke, by the evolution of commerce.  Covetousness has the capacity to unmake 
persons who cannot resist her persistent temptations; she is toxic and ruinous if for 
too long indulged.  And yet covetousness applied routinely for to the betterment of 
                                                
17 Ibid., V.31. 
18 Ibid., V.39. 
19 Ibid. (emphasis mine) 
20 Jealousy of Trade, p.438 
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mankind is commendable, for “he who appropriates land to himself by his labour 
does not lessen but increases the common stock of mankind.”21  The danger of 
covetousness is that it can never be satisfied, yearning always for objects yet 
unpossessed.  Biblical condemnation of covetousness does not seem to persuade 
Locke in the slightest; the abounding benefits it brings to the “common stock of 
mankind” are demonstrably clear.  Dangers arise only when equality is threatened.  
Why Locke felt that property and not equality should become a rightful object of 
covetousness remains unclear. 
Property and labour share reciprocal utility—increased labour means increased 
land and increased land means increased labour.  The more labour invested and 
reinvested in land, the more the land yields; surpluses are redevoted to the purchase 
and development of more land and the process is initiated all over again.  Coming at 
the problem of private property from a Christian point of view, which Locke 
doubtless believes himself to be doing, the best solution to economic injustices 
would be to avoid “situations of grave necessity altogether.”22  Moral complications 
involved in property ownership and labour are made manifest by poverty.  The only 
way to avoid situations of “grave necessity,” however, is to put men to work and let 
their hands become instruments of civil improvement.  Labour relieves poverty by 
generating something valuable, something tradable.  Having become a commodity it 
can then lead over time to the possession of productive property.  Theologically, this 
idea more or less corresponds to God’s providential care, who having given the 
world to humankind for its subsistence and comfort also demands “sweat of the 
brow” for creation’s maintenance (Gen.3:19).  An authentic conception of 
Providence is subsequently overshadowed, however, not merely by Locke’s reliance 
on useful covetousness, but by reversing the political priority of labour and property.  
For philosophers of the past, especially the scholastics, “property is a moment arising 
within the act of communication, in which something that is ours becomes mine in 
order to become ours again.”23  For Locke, on the other hand, the common is that 
which should be privately possessed so yet more can be possessed individually and 
                                                
21 Second Treatise of Government, V.37.  In this vein, Hont suggests that “Locke and Pufendorf took 
it for granted that economic allocation was best served if someone’s need was another’s gain.” (JT, 
95). 
22 Jealousy of Trade, 95. 
23 Oliver O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s Publishing, 2005), 279. 
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less possessed collectively.  Hence the total loss of common land and Locke’s to see 
that “both work and property acquire meaning only as part of a wider social 
communication.”24 
Before concluding this treatment of Locke’s doctrine of Providence, it would be 
useful first to review his critical response to the early eighteenth-century threats of  
“scepticism” and “enthusiasm.”  Scepticism is rebutted by the supreme rational 
coherence evident in the naturally ordered world.  Natural law being teleological in 
orientation means that—for whatever else humanity may accomplish—nothing can 
detract from the genius of the Creator and Lawgiver, who has built into the world a 
way for man to make something for himself, just as God has.  The sheer ordered 
brilliance of the natural world disproves the sceptic’s claim of not “knowing” the 
purposes of God in nature.  The second threat, the threat of “enthusiasm,” is 
addressed by appeal to intellectual principles (epistemology) and thus to what can be 
rightly claimed on theological grounds.25  “Enthusiasm” is an eighteenth-century 
label applied to religious emphasis on personal experience of God through channels 
of pietistic devotion.  Enthusiasts seek the direct affection and immediacy of God. 
The trouble with enthusiasm on Locke’s view is that religious experience is 
categorically not the type of experience that translates into knowledge, as the only 
fact about God that can be truly known is the proposition that God exists.26  
Moreover, not only is religious experience a matter of opinion (doxa), and not of 
knowledge, but “no man inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to 
others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or 
reflection.”27  If God did in fact directly reveal simple ideas to a specific individual 
in history, the content of that experience could not possibly be communicated 
adequately for everyone’s edification.  If a revelation does not meet the standards of 
reason, thinks Locke, then of all the things this special communication might be, it 
surely cannot be revelation.28  Thus the logic of providence follows strictly from the 
content of human perception.  We perceive the way things are in the world and when 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 John Locke, Letters on Toleration (London: Alexander Murray, 1870). 
26 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, x, 2.  For more on Locke’s moral and religious 
epistemology see Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 125. 
27 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV.xviii.2. 
28 Ibid. IV.xviii.8. 
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described those descriptions define how providence oversees the world.  Natural law 
becomes in Locke’s theory an explanatory device containing within it all that is 
necessary for understanding how societies are to thrive in the natural world.  His 
version of providence has both an unexpected element both of faith and of hope.  We 
take the present state of affairs to be the result of providence, assuming all the while 
that the natural law disclosing this truth is sanctioned by providence.  Those queer 
states of affairs that seem somehow problematic, wrong, or wicked, one can only 
hope will soon be corrected or redeemed.  Providence either already has established, 
or will establish a perfect order.   
In any event, returning again to Locke’s commercial theory, we notice that the 
next step in his argument identifies natural justice with socio-economic equality.  As 
was seen above, labour begets property when integrated into the body, and property 
begets labour by employing more hands in the pursuit of abundance.  Both labour 
and property are social foods for which all members of society perpetually hunger. 
God’s command “from the sweat of they brow” shall sustenance come and “you shall 
have dominion” over all the earth become unqualified justification for labouring and 
possessing on ever larger scales.  The “common” which was given by God to man is 
to be made mine so that more can be made mine and more hands can be put to 
work—the growth-cycle is limitless.  More begets more, extra begets extra in a 
providential order of ceaseless acquisition.  How this property-labour interplay leads 
to the ideal equality desired for mankind is never quite substantiated, though one is 
left with the optimistic view that, given the vast quantity of common available for 
private possession, all the extra labour will eventually spill-over into greater benefits 
to all.  Classically Christian moral concepts such as “goodness” and “love” are on 
this view replaced by the ideals of perfect freedom, dominion, and equality.  On the 
political plane the hand of providence sanctifies the labours of society and gives it 
license (even blessing) to increase property and exploit God’s given abundance; 
providence has become less provisional and more permissive.  This switch is clearly 
evinced in Locke’s consecration of covetousness, and this despite the Christian 
tradition’s warnings and denunciations.  Covetousness and envy perform useful tasks 
in commercial society, on Locke’s view, by spurring citizens toward further 
accumulation; indeed commercial growth itself is premised on their affective power.  
Providence authorizes and encourages the inherently progressive and equalizing 
forces of commerce.  The history of commerce proves that the object of providence 
is progress itself.  That his doctrine of providence has been cast entirely in economic 
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terms, that God’s will and governance are expressed by certain commercial 
functions, does not seem to have dissuaded Locke in the slightest; providence simply 
rubber-stamps the natural laws of commerce. 
Bernard Mandeville made similar moves to redefine the basic moral and political 
configuration of commercial life.  As is typical of eighteenth-century moral 
discourses, Mandeville wishes to describe what man is as a human being, not as he 
ideally should be.29  What commonly frustrates readers of the Fable is its elusive and 
somewhat playful literary style; The Fable of the Bees is exactly that, a fable of 
moral intrigue.  And yet he makes the fable work form him in a way that has 
purchase in concrete human affairs.  If his fable can persuade readers to think more 
deeply about their place within the structures of civil society, then the fable will have 
served its purpose.  His starting point, like Locke, begins with a state of nature 
characterized by self-love.  With this line of argument Mandeville pits himself 
directly against the view held by Lord Shaftesbury that understands the state of 
nature as intrinsically altruistic and benevolent.30  Shaftesbury had invented a faculty 
affectionately referred to as the Moral Sense; a faculty functioning much like other 
sensory faculties—sight, smell, touch—but with exceptional moral sensitivity.  The 
moral sense serves to ground the multiplicity of affections that constitute moral life.  
What we are asking when we inquire about the morals of an action is whether the 
emotional cause or character of the action is praiseworthy or blameworthy.  Passions 
are the energetic source of action and as such become the object of moral 
interrogation.  Shaftesbury, against the standard Protestant account of post-lapsarian 
corruption, stressed the naturally benevolent posture of mankind, seeing as this 
posture overtly beneficial to wider society.  Or perhaps such an altruistic posture 
depends ultimately on the independent response of self-reflective subjects, each with 
a view to their own self-love and altruism.  In either case, Mandeville is concerned to 
show that man’s natural inclination to self-love is ultimately much more beneficial to 
commercial society than benevolent altruism. 
                                                
29 On this point see the “Introduction” to the Fable in Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. 
F. B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).  A similar method is employed later by Hume. 
30 Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  For an interpretation of Mandeville’s thought as 
largely reactive to Shaftsbury, see Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics (New York: 
Touchstone, 1966), 162. 
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Every person is held in constant tension between self-love and neighbourly love, 
but why is it that self-love seems always to dominate the polarity?  For Mandeville, 
the only reason one person is self-interested is because everyone is self-interested.  If 
the proportion were inversed and most members of society naturally altruistic, things 
might well be different.  But that is to entertain a fruitless counter-factual; humans 
are simply and essentially self-interested.  God is not blamed for his design of 
inherently self-interested human beings because man is in this state of nature 
“ignorant of the true Deity.”  To have knowledge of God, on the other hand, would 
mean that the state of nature had been left and thus can make a real difference in 
one’s moral life and in the life of political society.  To know God means you are not 
alone.  The only sensible way to understand the Self therefore is within a context of 
social relations.  Mandeville’s account of sociality is further supported by his 
reflections on virtue and vice.  Virtue “arises when, contrary to nature, man 
endeavours to benefit others, or from the conquest of his own passions out of a 
rational ambition of being good.”31  Any action that overcomes self-interested 
passions and benefits society is considered virtuous; whereas vice signifies every 
action that disregards the public or in some way injures social cohesion.  Because all 
are naturally inclined toward vice—toward socially injurious self-interestedness—the 
only way for each to act virtuously is to restrain harmful passions.  This raises the 
question of whether our notions of virtue and vice are derived from politics or from 
religion.  Mandeville dismisses both, arguing instead that virtue and vice are 
institutions constructed by and for civil society and thus, paradoxically, society both 
forms and is formed by the unpredictable and often erratic effects of vice and virtue. 
Yet virtue always implies a degree of pride.  A precondition to the pursuit of 
virtue is a desire to be virtuous.  Far from being relegated to the category of damning 
vices, pride is the most amiable of all vices and regularly bears greatest resemblance 
to virtue.  Pride is not a real virtue, as in metaphysically real, but merely resembles it 
in public appearance.  The fact that pride is a vice mankind holds in common, and 
because God is provident over all human affairs, pride must be capable of serving the 
good of civil society in some publically recognizable way.  Hidden pleasures latent 
in pride are released and actualized by the positive recognitions of society; pride’s 
publicity being the key that unlocks vice’s pleasure.  Everyone understands that the 
                                                
31 “An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” in Fable of the Bees, 49 
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reward of a virtuous action—public recognition itself—actually consists in the 
contemplation of one’s own worth.  The reward of virtue is therefore discovered in 
the joy of imagining the praise of others; the unparalleled rapture of realizing public 
appreciation.  Pleasure is to pride, explains Mandeville, as paleness is to cold or 
trembling is to fear.   
When applying this notion of pride to the commercial order a noticeable tension 
arises between the motivations for economic exchange and the conditions for doing 
so truthfully.  The allure of commercial gain tends to subject moral goodness to the 
irresistible demands of pride, steering market-goers toward still deeper levels of 
hypocrisy and self-deception.  The marketplace blurs moral distinctions between 
advantage and disadvantage, pride and humility, selfishness and benevolence, 
making commercial gain a temptation that distorts public understanding of how to 
exchange wares for the common good.  Identifying this problem of moral vagueness 
in commerce is, in fact, the whole purpose of the Fable.  “The design of the fable,” 
explains Mandeville in his Preface, “is to show the impossibility of enjoying all the 
most elegant comforts of life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and 
powerful nation, and at the same time be blessed with all the virtue and innocence 
that can be wished for in a Golden age.”32  The tension is expressed as follows: 
enjoyment of luxury and the pleasure of virtue are morally incompatible.  Pride, the 
vice traditionally associated with the real undoing of any morally ordered 
commercial sphere, is for Mandeville simply the beginning of new possibilities and 
the very fuel of commerce.  The real undoing of commerce is not pride, but 
indulgence, where unrestrained passions are gratified at the expense of society.  But 
because pride supports the pursuit of virtue it must also have a cohering power 
within civil society.  Pride is essential to great societies because it is evident that 
without pride wealth could not be sustained or increased—their pride is causally 
what makes them great.  This is not to say that pride is not morally blameworthy in 
some way, but that it plays an important motivational role in national economy.  
Mandeville illustrates this tension between virtue and commerce ironically with a 
caricature of London’s “dirty streets.” The opulent complain that the streets of 
London are far too dirty and must be thoroughly cleaned when the fact of the matter 
is that London’s streets are dirty precisely because the opulent in their commercial 
                                                
32 Ibid., 6. 
   12
schemes filthy them, and scarcely for any other reason.  Mandeville goes so far as to 
suggest that it is not the poor that stand in the way of the rich but the rich that stand 
in the way themselves. 
It is often argued, as it is argued by the editor of the Fable volumes, B. B. Kaye, 
that Mandeville’s thought serves as a precursor to laissez-fair economics and to the 
immanent triumph of capitalism.  This claim is inaccurate for several reasons.  First, 
as some commentators have argued, Mandeville remained mercantilist in the sense of 
being “intensely concerned with the importance of regulating a country’s trade 
balance with the rest of the world for the purpose of assuring an excess, in value 
terms, of exports of imports.”33  But if Mandeville’s theory represents a mercantilist 
position, what exactly is the role of government, seeing as his theory is neither 
interventionist nor laissez-faire?  A potential answer lay in his concept of social 
evolution: “human institutions are not to be regarded as the product of human 
ingenuity…[but] the fruits of a long and gradual growth process.”34 What has helped 
precipitate this progress most effectively?  Stable political institutions overseen by a 
“dextrous” manager who establishes “an environment of such a nature that the 
individual’s attempt to gratify his passions will result in actions which are 
meritorious.”35  If the manager’s government must intervene and rectify political 
wrongdoings the aim should be to create a society which would run itself; that is, 
intervention should not repress human passion but provide proper channels down 
which passion may usefully travel.36  “For a society where each individual’s pursuit 
of his self-interest is made to harmonize with the interests of other individuals—such 
a society is, itself, the product not only of historical evolution: it is also, in a very 
meaningful sense, the creation of wise governments.”37  Wise laws and political 
intelligence remain essential to the continued order of commercial society.  All 
societies wish to avoid arbitrary governmental interference in economic affairs, while 
at the same time desiring government to involve itself when injustices arise.  
                                                
33 Nathan Rosenberg, “Mandeville and Laissez-Faire,” in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 24, No. 
2 (Apr.—Jun.,1963), 183-196. 
34 Ibid., 186.  An interesting study at this juncture would be to explore the agreement between 
Mandeville and Pufendorf’s respective theories of social evolution, but an impossible venture under 
the present scope. 
35 Ibid., 189. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 191 
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Mandeville seems to have believed that “the most vital aspect of any society—its 
success or failure generally—depends upon the skill with which it is able to direct 
men’s passions toward the achievement of goals defined by a larger collectivity.”38 
This argument would explain the first sentence of Mandeville’s Preface to the 
Fable, where he claims “laws and government are to the political bodies of civil 
societies, what the vital spirits and life itself are to the natural bodies of animated 
creatures.”39  Law and political authority are the life-blood that makes community 
possible.  With them society is able to address the tension between commerce and 
virtue.  Although the tension cannot be altogether eliminated from the human scene, 
pride can, by the power of institutions, be prudently and intelligently directed to the 
common good.  It is in this light, the strongly institutional, that Mandeville’s faint 
Christian commitments are lifted from the shadows: institutions are for him a gift of 
Providence.  Humans were designed for societies governed by providence as 
expressed in wise law and intelligent political authority.  The many evil vices that 
commonly affront society, regrettable as they may be, are providentially ordered to 
the best possible result.  In an important sense Mandeville would seem to affirm the 
biblical idea “what man meant for evil, God meant for good” (Gen.50:20), while 
altogether ignoring the words of Christ, “you cannot be a slave both of God and 
money” (Matt.6:24). 
George Turnbull offered one of the more ingenious responses to Mandeville’s 
moral-commercial tension.  For Turnbull, we derive our understanding of the 
commercial order and of how it ought to be ordered from our understanding of the 
natural law disclosed to humanity as the will of God.40  Rather than pit self-love 
against benevolence—as was the tendency of Shaftesbury, for example—Turnbull 
substitutes the principle of benevolence with a principle of action.  This principled 
distinction is not so much an either-or as it is a both-and. Human beings possess a 
relentless desire for happiness that steers exertive action toward its intended object.  
Affections cannot remain objectively detached and must always have an object in 
which to rest, but because the relation between affection and object is not and cannot 
be immediate, reason must bridge the gap to secure the truthfulness of affection’s 
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40 George Turnbull, The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, ed. A. Broadie (Indianapolis: 
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expression as well as the object’s worthiness.  This explains why, on Turnbull’s 
account, reason directs human actions and why he emphasized so strenuously the 
importance of education, the end of education being the production of “love and 
patience of thinking.”41  Apart from active exertion in pursuit of an object the 
attainment of authentic goods is impossible.  Deductively speaking this means that 
goods are not intrinsic to human being but are instead that for which every human 
strives.  Inactivity, thinks Turnbull, leads inevitably to self-ruination and to the 
wasting of potential.  Only the active person can be genuinely happy and self-
approving: “this therefore is one characteristic of our proper happiness, that it consists 
in a course of industry to attain ends which reason approves, under the direction and 
guidance of reason, as to the use of means.”42  The course of human action should 
take the path of Industry, which represents a diligent and socially focused 
characterization of categorically commercial actions.  The social orientation of 
industry implies that action is wedded to a principle of sociality that offers natural 
limits and meaning to what is performed.  Isolated activity without a mediating 
society is meaningless.  Civic participation is essential to human industry because 
“the chief article of our pleasures…consists in mutually giving and receiving.”43  As 
creatures of interdependency it is also crucial that natural differences between 
members of society remain intact.  Everyone is necessary in a particular way.  Each 
person is for everyone and each must accept this purpose as intrinsic to society’s 
teleological ordering.  Self-love should have no purchase; its hypocrisy and implicit 
jealousy disallowed from severing community.  Natural law reinforces this fact, 
thinks Turnbull, since it is for one’s generosity that one is praised and appreciated by 
peers; the field-hand is thanked for his harvest, the teacher is praised for his 
instruction, and the pastor is honoured for his service—each authentic contribution to 
the common good lauded by all.  The decency of interpersonal differences, from 
vocation to property ownership, should have no real bearing upon our sentiments: I 
am for this industry, you are for that.  Turnbull seems to have believed that the 
cohesive effects of this difference in property and status, combined with the duty of 
each citizen to labour for the good of the community, uncovers principles of action—
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in this case, love of fame and love of power—that are natural to the endeavours of 
mankind, “for what else is at bottom but desire to expand and enlargen ourselves, to 
dilate and widen our sphere of activity?”44 Love of fame and power energize action 
and make it capable of achieving something beyond its initial scope, and yet both 
loves do so only within the given natural order, the principles of which “we cannot 
alter…but must conform [to]…in order to attain our greatest happiness.”45   
When Turnbull suggests that riches gradually corrupts the honest mind and that 
affections directed toward opulence are “absolutely condemnable,” while at the same 
time maintaining that such affections are not “absolutely pernicious,” he can say so 
consistently because of his faith in the powers of reason and benevolence to keep the 
corruptions of luxury in check.46  Natural law orders commercial society in such a 
way that the distribution of property and wealth becomes predicated on the merit of 
the individual.  The direct link between morals and property was applied equally to 
forms of government where Turnbull, following Harrington, suggested that a nation’s 
form of government corresponded to the proportion of property owned.47  If one 
person owned most of the property, then the political form would be monarchical; if 
most property were owned only by a privileged few, then the form would be 
aristocratic; and if property was owned by a wide range of citizens, then the nations 
would be democratic.  On the human scale, at any rate, morality might be 
advantageous to personal economic flourishing but that does not mean actions 
motivated by love of fame or power are necessarily virtuous. By bracketing 
providence, justice, and sin within the descriptive and prescriptive power of natural 
law, and by making mankind responsible for adjudicating the mandates of natural 
law, Turnbull has created a tension wherein one is often left to judge between what is 
naturally good for oneself and what appears naturally good for society. It may well be 
true that fame and power enliven active industry, but it remains highly doubtful that 
such principles of motivation do not at the same time become its ends.  In other 
words, it does not seem likely that the pursuit of fame and power in industry can be 
defeated or overcome merely by rational precision or sympathetic benevolence. How 
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exactly is one to accept one’s place in stratified society and yet shun envying 
another’s position?  Indeed, how is this possible when, as Turnbull admits, everyone 
is enlivened by dominion, enlargement, and the insatiable thirst for more?   
 
II 
As we approach Ferguson’s immediate context it is crucial that we now narrow 
our focus to the Scottish tradition of moral and political thought represented by 
Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith.  In the case of the former, 
Francis Hutcheson, we will want to avoid a redundant rehearsal of his attempt to 
synthesize Locke’s political and Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy, though this will be 
to some degree unavoidable, and instead make the distinctiveness of his moral and 
political contribution clear in theological terms.  Theologically speaking, what role 
does God play in Hutcheson’s moral and political thought?  In response to this 
question of Hutcheson’s theological attentiveness, the aim will be to isolate 
foundational principles supporting the architecture of his moral and political 
synthesis, particularly those relevant to commercial exchange, and interpret them in 
light of his theological commitments. 
Hutcheson’s moral epistemology—emphasis on “epistemology,” since morals on 
his account cannot be conceived without reference to the mind—is a hybrid model of 
Lockean empiricism and Moral Sense psychology.48  Given Locke’s explanation of 
how one comes to possess knowledge and what one knows when one comes to 
possess it, acquiring uniquely moral knowledge requires that one experience the 
binding authority of the natural law.  The philosophical description of the experience 
of natural law is only understood by the Moral Sense, which functions like a gateway 
through which all moral knowledge passes.  Its task is not to be confused with that of 
reason.  For our purposes, the important point is that the moral sense provides the 
initial cause, or explanation, of both actions and judgments; responsible for initiating 
action in the social sphere, as well as passing judgements of approbation or 
disapprobation.  Following Shaftesbury, on the other hand, Hutcheson readily 
maintains that each possesses natural sentiments of benevolence and altruism toward 
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others.  To the question of “what does our moral sense lead us to approve?” he 
replies we tend to approve of happiness arising from virtue and of the “moral 
perfection of the mind possessing them.”49  The moral sense serves as a benevolent 
origin of practical judgement that approves and therefore also rewards performance 
of benevolent actions.50  All moral concepts—good, true, duty, virtue, law, reward, 
etc.—derive ultimate meaning from their relation to the moral sense and are morally 
applicable only insofar as they proceed from that moral sense.  Perception and 
judgment thus constitute the basic functions of the moral sense; observing the virtue 
or vice of an action and judging whether it is approved or disapproved of.51  For 
Hutcheson, an action’s approbation or disapprobation depends on its contribution to 
the happiness of society.  If an act encourages public happiness, then that act merits 
approval and reward.  The same goes for its opposite, disapproval.  Yet, because 
reason occupies itself purely with the adjudication of truthful propositions, and thus 
can only tell us how or whether an action conforms to law, this deliberative 
enterprise remains wholly unreasonable in Hutcheson’s theory.52  The moral sense 
alone justifies reasons for acting; whereas the faculty of reason can only detect the 
shape of objective relations by drawing comparisons.53  Thus, in assigning standards 
of judgement to the moral sense and charging it with the task of evaluating the 
character of actions, Hutcheson has vested this (internal) faculty with total authority 
and can therefore conclude that “morality is a matter of qualities in persons.”54  
When he also locates the natural law in the moral sense, one can easily understand 
why, given his primary agenda to point has been organization of morality around the 
apex of a newly contrived moral apparatus.55 
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Morals are not observable “out there” in reality, but within the mind.  Since the 
authority of natural law has already been made subject to the mind, the end of the 
natural law will always remain the acting subject and his relation to civil society.  
This leads us to consider briefly Hutcheson’s view of subjective rights, and in 
particular, how these rights relate to political authority as such.  In his Inquiry 
Hutcheson asserts that it is from the moral sense that we derive our idea of rights.56  
As a thoroughgoing contractarian he considers individual possession of subjective 
rights to be the common social object anchoring public happiness.  Rights are 
political claims we all possess in common.  Social contracts are forged in civil 
society as a means of protecting and preserving those rights.  The reason our 
contracts have binding authority over our commercial exchanges, for example, is 
because the contracting action has been approved as benevolent by moral sense and 
directed toward the wider happiness of society.  On this view the moral sense 
sanctions social contract.  Our contracts, regardless of their precise form, enshrine 
personal rights.  The difficulties in accounting for individual verses public happiness 
are patently evident but wholly unquestioned by Hutcheson.  In any event, the crucial 
point for our purposes is that rights are the naturally binding authority of contracts, 
ensuring every “person has a natural right to perform every action [to] best maximize 
the common good.”57   
Returning to our central concern, Hutcheson’s theological consistency, there 
seems an irreconcilable difference between what he himself thought about the Deity’s 
role in his system, and what role the Deity can actually play.  On an affirmative note, 
he argues that the moral sense is an institution of Providence implanted naturally in 
humankind to act always for the greatest good of society.58  The natural law 
implanted in the moral sense integrates human faculties and makes each capable of 
becoming worthy of approbation.  Yet, in expounding this naturalistic account of 
morals he has, at the same time, constructed a theoretical device that renders the 
Deity inessential.   This uncomfortable position is illustrated nicely by the basic 
arrangement of An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, where he feels 
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obliged to explain at book’s closure “how far a regard to the Deity is necessary to 
make an action virtuous.”59  In the last sentence of that treatment, moreover, the 
reader is told “particular actions may be virtuous [even] where there is no actual 
intention of pleasing the Deity.”60  Virtue may therefore share no relation to divine 
commands.  Nevertheless, it is also true for Hutcheson that the law hangs upon the 
words of Christ, whose command it is to love God and love one’s neighbour as one’s 
self (Lk.10:27).  Neighbourly love absorbs self-love.  The instruction of Jesus Christ 
as revealed in the gospels is moreover affirmed by the created order but does so in a 
way that renders Christ’s instruction purely descriptive.  So, is God essential or 
inessential to morals?  Is he the Author of morality, or the immanent Lawgiver?  A 
possible solution to this tension might be that God is simply presumed, or latent, in 
Hutcheson’s theory, meaning God provides the cohesive power that confers all 
authority, even to the moral sense itself.61  Perhaps Hutcheson’s “theological 
perspective on morality is, so to say, the completion of morality.”62  Politically, too, 
God’s appears immanent.  Recall the above tension concerning individual rights 
claims versus contribution to the common good.  One can easily envisage numerous 
actions that may first appear to express benevolent intentions but that do not actually 
contribute to the good of wider society.  A stockjobber purchases shares in the East 
India Company because he believes it will service broader society, when in fact the 
purchase has thickened only his own pocketbook, devastated the entrepreneurial spirit 
of competing companies, and increased unemployment.63  Hutcheson’s way of 
resolving this tension between individual and communal goods comes by appeal to 
natural theology, claiming that “in principle there is no conflict between common 
good and individual good” because Providence has seen to it that these conflict as 
little as possible.64  But how, under a (Lockean) contractarian civil constitution, can 
this be an enduring or reasonable solution?   
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If our contract to respect individual rights determines social relations, then what 
institutions has God consecrated to preserve order and protect goods held in 
common?  Hutcheson’s response to this question engages interpersonal negotiations 
within the commercial sphere.  Commercial life, like political life, is held together by 
the contracting will of marketgoers.  Each marketgoer must recognize the basic rights 
of fellow marketgoers if economic exchange is to succeed nationally.  So far, so 
Lockean.  Hutcheson then departs from Locke, however, by rejecting the right of 
self-preservation as basic and positing instead a “right to hazard” on behalf of the 
public.  This hazard, as Stephen Buckle has explained, “may require not only that we 
risk our lives, but that we surrender our liberty, to the extent of abandoning power 
over our lives to the authority of others.”65  It is under this basic right to hazard that 
Hutcheson envisages participation in the marketplace, where entering the 
marketplace implies that each is willing to give something up on behalf of another.  
To make his moral and political theory compatible he must insist that individual 
pursuit of industry is always ultimately an endeavour on the part of wider society.  
Self-interest, self-preservation is not a sufficient commercial motivator.  Neither is 
one’s industriousness simply a matter of obeying God’s command to labour, as it 
was with Locke, but also of judging what is good for society.  Only when 
industriousness is in conformity to the command of natural law is it good for society. 
Property is a public necessity on Hutcheson’s view because of population 
growth, which induces scarcity and intense competition over limited resources.66  He 
turns the Lockean labour-for-property formula on its head, making property the 
location of labour for the common good and thus making room for additional 
property possessors.  Yet he also maintains consistently that labouring for the 
common good is not a solitary commercial motivation; everyone also labours for the 
rewards, or fruits, it earns—“benevolence alone is not a motive strong enough to 
industry” and therefore requires incentives to prompt industry toward the common 
good.67  Industry dries-up when separated from the promise of reward, for “depriving 
any person of the fruits of his own innocent labour takes away all motives to industry 
from self-love.”68  What he means here about industry deserving certain rewards is 
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evident enough.  Less clear, however, is why, unlike before, he seems suddenly 
malcontent with benevolence as a key motivator to commercial participation.  His 
reason appears to be that relying exclusively on the affection of benevolence in 
commerce leaves it vulnerable to the preying apathy of slothful vagrants who 
suffocate industry and pit “self-love against industry.”69  If after labouring nothing 
returns to you, then labouring always on behalf of others will naturally corrode the 
useful passions of industry and eventually exhaust itself.70  This balancing act 
between miserliness and generosity is itself grounded in the unity of contracts, or 
covenants; because God covenanted with humankind we are able to see how 
covenanting with others establishes the formal shape of personal allegiances.   
Political society emerges, therefore, from a mould pre-cut by commercial 
enterprise.  In book three of his System, Hutcheson begins his assessment of civil 
polity by delineating the duties and rights inherent to three dominant forms of human 
relationship: husband to wife, parent to child, and master to slave.  Each of the 
relations is defined by its natural appearance in the world.  This assemblage of 
relations then leads Hutcheson to consider why, if these relations constitute the basis 
of society, civil government is necessary in the first place.  If we all observe the 
rights of others and attend to our own personal duties, why is oversight still required?  
With unexpected Protestant bravado he suggests that its necessity arises “either from 
the imperfection or depravity of men, or both.”71  Although mankind joins together 
contractually by consent, there are often different views on the point of right and thus 
something must arbitrate politically the many competing interests.  Of significant 
interest to us at this juncture is that competing interests are the causal impetus 
summoning third-party jurisdictions.  By making covenants the most basic relation 
within political constitutions, Hutcheson has brought the political and economic 
orders into an alternative hierarchy, where the political is now pre-determined by its 
economic substance.  I have a specific trading interest that competes with another’s 
trading interest; the task of the government is to then respond to this predicament 
with prudent and just restitution.  God’s original covenant with Israel was singularly 
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political—the chartering of a nation constituted by communion with its creating and 
delivering God.  Hutcheson’s contract, on the other hand, is first an economic 
construction that then in a secondary movement employs the currency of rights to 
justify and sanctify political society.  His covenantal arrangement substitutes ethical 
goods for economic utility, identifies providence with natural law, and leaves in 
fundamental tension the self-interestedness that produces action for the common 
good.  We might therefore wish to put the question to Hutcheson: what exactly is the 
ultimate reward of an economic and political order so configured? 
Turning to David Hume is, in some respects, to reach the crescendo of our 
inquiry, but on a flat note.  Compared to our theorists above, Hume’s essays on 
commerce are vastly more sophisticated and draw much more deeply upon the 
history of political progress.  I say “flat” because, unlike the contributors above, 
Hume’s thought altogether lacks any form of theological attention or support; so, 
although his reflections are surely among the more economically exacting of the 
period, they do not come without attending drawbacks.  In reconstructing Hume’s 
theory of commerce it is important to recognize that God is only (at best) the ultimate 
grounds of existence—the Author—and plays no interesting role in domestic or 
international exchanges.  What is theologically interesting at this juncture of our 
inquiry, however, is whether an uninvolved Deity makes any significant difference to 
the ordering of commercial life around certain moral and political goods.  Does 
displacing God make a real difference to how the commercial sphere is conceived or 
to what object it is ultimately directed?  Hume apparently thinks not, and so the 
outline that follows will address primarily on his theory of justice and identify how 
“artificial” virtues are appropriated in commercial society. 
For Hume, artificial virtues of justice bridge the gap between natural virtues and 
participation in commercial life.  Having already conducted a penetrating analysis of 
the mind’s understanding and passions—a “science of man”—Hume is poised to 
characterize justice as an “artificial” virtue because justice produces “pleasure and 
approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arise from the 
circumstances and necessities of mankind.”72  Set within his wider moral argument 
valuing only the quality of motivations that cause action, justice must be designated 
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an artificial virtue precisely because of its fixed externality.  The external character 
of justice, its unnatural artificiality, makes it impossible to sentimentalize.  One feels 
the pleasure of justice or the pain of injustice and this habituates a posture of 
approval or disapproval.  The virtue of justice is its ability to evoke passion. With 
motivations of self-love playing such a dominant role in the stage-play of human 
passion, the only way for Hume to incorporate justice into his moral theory as 
anything but a stagehand is for him to default to rational deliberation.73  Because the 
feeling of justice is not a natural passion but merely a rational concept, justice is by 
definition an artifice.  A dispositional slot must be carved out for justice within the 
congregation of human affections and this is ultimately achieved by accommodating 
the moral tension between pride and sympathy.   
The energy of pride extends well beyond individual self-love or magnanimity and 
pervades the whole institutional structure of social life.  Civil cohesion is itself 
achieved through pride’s invisible bond inter-linking individuals into tighter, more 
interdependent communities.  Pride is the passion that gets things done.  Its 
usefulness to society is visible in its competence for civic improvement.  Pride 
transforms the artificial virtue of justice into what Hume calls a “jealousy.”  His 
argument associating justice with jealousy is elaborated in part three of the Treatise, 
where immediately upon describing justice as an artificial virtue he begins lengthy 
treatment of the origins and rules of property.74  He explains that “justice, in her 
decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons, but 
conducts herself by more extensive views,” and so regardless of the personal 
character of parties involved justice is equally present and equally authoritative.75  
Equity is the principle goal of justice.  The question of how equity is to be discerned 
and each citizen treated according to its ideal leads Hume to propose private property 
an external anchor to social relations that remains free of arbitrary will.  The stable 
institution of property organizes society by imposing unique boundaries and limits to 
what is mine and what is yours.  It establishes necessary contrasts between persons; a 
type of custom that sets the terms on which persons and communities enterprise 
together over time.   If another possesses more property than I jealousy is sparked 
and the competition for social ascendancy gets underway.  Property and jealousy are, 
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in this respect, mutually reinforcing.  Hume’s sense of justice is commercially 
conceived from the outset; the beginning of commerce is also the beginning of 
justice.  Commerce seems infinitely promising, as “the greatness of a state and the 
happiness of its subjects…are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to 
commerce.”76  Such greatness and happiness cannot be achieved without private 
property.  Hume’s argument departs strongly from the Lockean model of land and 
labour—that land is integrated into the person by their labour—disparaging it as no 
longer serviceable to the purposes and methods of modern commerce at a higher 
plane.  The material result of labour is not property, on Hume’s view, but the 
material result of private property is labour.   
By the mid eighteenth-century labour had diversified and could be applied to far 
more than mere agricultural subsistence.  A whole new class of merchants and 
entrepreneurs had arisen as a result of domestic prosperity able to employ new 
labourers in new trades.  Labour was by this time also industrial, which multiplied 
the amount of work available to be done and incorporated more hands to help enlarge 
revenues, and thus the cycle would continually repeat itself; more revenue would 
initiate refinements of commercial functions that make profit possible in the first 
place.  All of what Hume calls “superfluity” should be re-applied to commercial 
pursuits so that still more property can be acquired and more hands put to work.  
Calling into question certain regulative practices of the time, Hume asks rhetorically 
why extra resources earned should be put to use by the sovereign?  Why not apply 
extra resources, superfluity, toward refinements or luxuries?  In posing the question 
this way Hume indentifies a special dilemma in eighteenth-century economic policy.  
This legal and practical dilemma has to do with the accumulation of wealth: should 
monetary surpluses be channelled to royal accounts, or should they be permitted to 
multiply and disseminate to the public so as to cultivate additional refinements?  Put 
thus, the tension points toward “a kind of opposition between the greatness of the 
state and the happiness of the subject.”77  Under past arrangements, where superfluity 
resulting from labour and trade was devoted to the sovereign and subsequently 
poured into his bottomless war chest, domestic happiness and international 
ascendancy were in perpetual conflict with one another.  On the newer arrangement, 
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however, if resources could be made serviceable to the refinement of arts and luxury, 
then returns on that investment would be gleaned with interest and the refinements 
that follow would lead to still greater refinements, and luxuries to still grander 
luxuries.  Hume sharply criticizes the idea that putting superfluity into the hands of 
the sovereign makes better citizens and patriots by avoiding the corruptions of 
excessive wealth and exercising men in valorous masculine virtues which serve the 
state’s political interest.  In reality war siphons public happiness and functions much 
like a heavy tax; one vastly “less felt by those addicted to arms.”78  The political truth 
of applying superfluity to refinements is that “industry and arts and trade increase the 
power of the sovereign as well as the happiness of the subjects.”79  Commerce, if 
properly understood in terms of applying superfluity to the refinement of arts, 
actually eliminates the perennial conflict between greatness and happiness by 
promoting national greatness and increasing public happiness while at the same time 
avoiding the tragedies and expenditures of armed conflict.  Natural law works to 
distil political tensions and paradoxes into social benefits and advantages.   
The best way to multiply this coveted superfluity is by expanding international 
trade. By trading internationally a nation is likely to maintain the highest advantage in 
supply and demand ratios, while likewise avoiding the stagnation and disadvantage 
that typically defines strictly domestic exchanges.  Hume’s argument hinges on the 
usefulness of wealth: “where riches are in few hands, these must enjoy all the power, 
and will readily conspire to lay the whole burden on the poor and oppress them still 
further, to the discouragement of all industry.”80  The more widely distributed the 
wealth of any nation is among its people, the lighter the burden on each shoulder and 
the more capable it is of improving refinement and luxury.  A blow to domestic 
advantage is felt wherever the freedom to trade is limited.  But why, of all the 
reasonable commercial goals available, does Hume insist so adamantly on the pursuit 
of luxury?  The answer to this question depends in large part on what “luxury” 
actually means.  He suggests in the Essays that luxury represents “great refinement in 
the gratification of the senses [that] may be innocent or blameworthy according to the 
age, or country, or condition of the person.”81  Luxury is a relative and uniquely 
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moral subject that cannot be comfortably associated with virtue or vice, becoming 
overtly problematic only when it manifests significant excesses or deficiencies.  On 
this latter point Hume displays his Aristotelian colours—the moral texture of luxury 
is woven together by a series of personal and circumstantial conditions that depend 
greatly upon moderation and approbation.  Avoiding the dangers of wealth by 
“monkishly” renouncing it altogether is, for Hume, altogether foolish and 
categorically removes many opportunities for generosity and charity. Luxury in itself 
is “neither banal nor blessed”; neither purely mine nor purely yours, but ours to enjoy 
together. 
As a point of clarification, Hume is certainly not asserting that the morals of 
wealth are derived only from its use.  He is arguing, rather, that the morals of wealth 
apply both to what a person does with wealth as well as what wealth does to the 
person.  This leads him to “correct popular opinions” of luxury’s corruptions by 
suggesting that ages of refinement are both the happiest and most virtuous, and that 
when luxury ceases to be innocent it thereby ceases to be beneficial.82  The 
assumption behind his concept of refinement is that the more refined a people 
become, the less they indulge in excesses—refinement involves a level of 
sophistication in pleasure seeking.  One does not, for example, gamble one’s money 
away frivolously or use the better part of it on strong drink.  No, the truly refined use 
wealth for still greater refinements, not trivial rewards.  Were one to question whether 
refinement itself might over time lead to certain corruptions, Hume offers firm 
reassurance, “refinement of the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural 
tendency to beget venality and corruption.”83  Renouncing wealth voluntarily is 
therefore as imprudent as it is ignoble.   If any viciousness in luxury exists it is 
observed only when its innocence sours in toxic excesses and proves itself pernicious.  
Here again Hume draws upon the Aristotelian polarities of excess and deficiency; 
indolence, selfishness, and inattention serve to implicate luxury, whether taking the 
form of the miser in his greed or the beggar in his spending. In their embodiment of 
the Aristotelian polarity both individuals may prove useful to common enterprise to 
the extent that both possess the passion for more, despite each having wished to apply 
earnings to different ends.  Thus, Hume’s larger point is simply this: vice can be 
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advantageous.  A moderate view of luxury and refinement provide, paradoxically, the 
means for further refinements and luxuries that are not rightly attributed to modesty. 
The remainder of Hume’s economic essays—“Of Money,” “Of Interest,” and “Of 
Balance of Trade”—further outline the implications for his luxury-driven 
internationalism. 
In essence, Hume has taken the early eighteenth-century problem of War and 
Commerce—war being engaged for commercial ends and commerce being engaged 
for the ends of war—and stripped it of its impoverished circularity by elucidating 
how international trade can lead to national ascendancy and domestic happiness 
without resulting to war.84  In other words, he could perhaps be thought to say, “let 
the competitions of industry and international trade prove which nation truly has 
ascendancy!”  In the Commercial Age greatness is no longer determined by military 
might or political savvy, but by economic standing and the ability of a nation to trade 
prudently for refinements.  If we are to grant this thesis, however, by what means 
does a weak nation become strong or a strong nation become weak?  How does this 
policy improve international inequalities? The weak state, explains Hume, becomes 
strong by trading with strong states that can be routinely undersold and thus bring the 
weak state to profit.  The strong state, on the other hand, must simply take precautions 
not to risk irresponsible projects or to trade too narrowly with too few partners.  This 
unique status of international prominence actually serves to stimulate jealousies 
between nations that perpetually reignite passion of industry.  In this way trade 
between weak nations and strong serves as a natural leveller enabling justice to 
undergird commerce as a law of equity.  Commercial exchange makes justice 
possible. In his superb essay “The ‘Rich Country-Poor Country’ Debate in the 
Scottish Enlightenment,” Istvan Hont explains how Hume made use of this humanist 
“paradox” of wealth by showing how virtù and virtue cooperate in terms of “historic 
fate.”85 Like Pufendorf and Locke, Hume held that the human species individually 
and collectively progresses toward higher, more improved, and relatively superior 
states of being.86  History is a story of human progress and so therefore our present 
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age is more advanced than those temporally prior it precisely because it is not a 
society of the past.  Particularly in his History of England, but elsewhere too, Hume 
routinely asserts the empirical fact of mankind’s progressive nature.87  The exact 
character of this progressive march is typically presented in terms of procedural or 
instrumental innovation, though the most salient features of this innovative progress 
in Hume’s theory remain undeniably commercial.  One has a specific need and is 
required to join forces with other human beings in the pursuit of those needs.  Genius, 
diligence, and custom assist delicate progresses along until eventually the political 
authority is required to decide upon the greater liberation or greater regulation of 
trade. That decision was, in fact, the economic quandary of his day: should rulers 
liberate international trade, or should the rigid balance continue to be maintained?  
Hume’s advocacy was for liberty, of course, but only because the progress of trade 
would lead to greater advantages and refinements.  Progress therefore remained 
integral to the logic of Hume’s commercial theory.  Decay is simply a misnomer that 
makes its own contribution to personal and social excellences; a resistance that makes 
the muscle of economies all the stronger.  International trade was seen as a natural 
leveller with an ever-increasing capacity to promote domestic happiness and 
encourage charitable support for the poor. As Hont explains, if the rich nation 
“prospered, and let their poorer neighbours also prosper, the whole international 
trading community of nations could face the future with optimism.”88  Thus, the virtù 
and the virtue of internationalism is that it distributes wealth naturally if industrious 
citizens are afforded the freedom to embark upon the market passionately with 
moderation and refinement in mind.89 
Justice therefore uses jealousy to establish equity.  In establishing this connection 
Hume has shown how even in the external affairs of commerce passions remain the 
singular object of moral approbation or disapprobation.  When granted the freedom to 
trade and to apply superfluity in refinement and luxury, the passions that constitute 
natural and artificial virtues serve domestic needs by creating wider international 
equality.  Absolutely crucial on this view is that moderation can never be lost, or else 
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the order that morality brings to commerce becomes increasingly strained or even 
fractured.  Nevertheless, Hume maintains throughout his Essays that refinement and 
luxury encourage felicities that lead to national greatness and we need not worry 
about damages wrought upon morality.  Hume thus rejects the method of applying the 
wealth-virtue dialectic to commercial growth and decay by turning the dialectic on its 
head: the pursuit of wealth is a virtue that, when given freedom, cannot corrupt but 
only mature.  The classic and biblical notion that wealth corrupts virtue is entirely 
lost, for Hume is persuaded that wealth refines morals by deepening and enhancing 
the virtues needed to grow it.  Virtue is, as it were, wealth’s fertilizer.  The question 
then becomes whether Hume’s science of man can provide an ethic for commercial 
exchange without being forced to abandon a self-interested, passion-based theory.  
Would not a reliable or truthful ethic of commerce transcend passions?  Why should 
anyone join Hume in his “prayers” for the commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and 
France?90 
As we approach the year 1764, the last text to examine in our eighteenth-century 
philosophic overview is Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.  What interests 
us about this particular text and its bearing on the central conceptual question 
regarding commerce and theology is the role given society in a moral philosophy 
narrowed to the description of sentiments.  If ethics is fundamentally about the 
beginning and end of sentimental expressions, or about their conformity with law, or 
their intrinsic worth, how might an impassioned ethic align with proper participation 
in the commercial sphere?  Can Smith account for commercial actions merely by 
describing the sentiments that encourage them?  A potential response to this question 
can be indentified in how sentiments are formed, what determines their quality, and to 
what they are ultimately directed.  Taking this line will then lead finally to the 
question of commerce and theology, and whether Smith’s system clarifies the moral 
order or contains any form of theological support. 
Smith begins TMS with a remedy to the state of nature debate over whether 
human beings are most naturally inclined to self-love or to benevolence that suggests 
both are equally natural to human being.  No matter how thoroughly selfish a person 
might be, he explains, “there are evidently some principles in his nature which 
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interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him.”91  
This “interest” in the fortunes of others is derived from an imaginative exercise 
wherein one comes to feel sympathy for another by seeing the other as one sees 
oneself, something Smith refers to as “fellow-feeling.”  Sympathy is universal to 
humankind as a sense of “propriety,” or fittedness, because it arises from a “particular 
situation that excites it” and not from the passions only.92  Affections of sympathy 
must be externally evoked, since they are unlikely to be voluntarily manufactured.  
As an outcome of mutual sympathy, morals are scripted for society according to the 
Golden Rule; one is always being educated in how to render to others what they 
themselves would like to be rendered.  Smith’s next move is to argue that true 
propriety depends entirely on the “suitableness” or “proportion” of the affections 
preceding the sequence of actions in question.  The effects of action are then judged 
by their benefit or harm to society and in turn declared either meritorious or 
unmeritorious.93  The task for every member of society is simply to learn how to 
sympathize with one another by gauging the passions giving judgments life. 
To love one’s neighbour as oneself it is necessary to restrain the otherwise 
domineering passions of self-love that cripple sentiments of fellow-feeling at their 
beginning.  Throughout TMS it is clear that self-command, the great marvel of 
stoicism, is considered a necessary precondition to sympathetic love and by extension 
also to the cohesion of civil society.  Only when rampaging passions are brought 
under control can sensible judgments be reached on the true propriety, merit, or virtue 
of action.  Judgment is thus central to Smith’s moral theory.  Having explained why 
certain actions are approved or disapproved according to the level of sympathy they 
elicit, he then broadens the claim by insisting that society itself is founded upon flux 
of human passions.  Society, in other words, is the amalgamation of both social and 
unsocial passions, some to unity and some to disunity.  Every society strives to 
encourage social passions and thus tend toward a useful ultimate goal.  Yet, there is 
also a third category of “selfish” passions, a “middle place” between the two 
antitheses of social and unsocial.94  Selfish passions being concerned primarily with 
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happiness, and society itself being dependent on its members loving and being loved, 
senses of happiness and feeling loved must belong to one another and mean that “the 
chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved.”95  
Smith explains happiness in terms of being “conscious” of recognition—“he is 
happiest who advances more gradually to greatness, whom the public destines to 
every step of his preferment long before he arrives at it.”96  In this way happiness is 
earned and subsequently rewarded with public expressions of praise (approbation) 
that naturally marshals positive self-esteem, or indeed further happiness.  Happiness 
is therefore bound to envy from its beginning, confining true human fulfilment to an 
ever retreating yearning satiated only by the recognition of others.  People are 
naturally more inclined to sympathize with the happy and joyful than they are the 
sorrowful or angry, and this is why, thinks Smith, we  “make a parade of our riches 
and conceal our poverty.”97  Nothing is as terrifying as public embarrassment and 
nothing is so felicitous as public recognition; these sentiments cooperate to form the 
affective origin of ambition.  No one wishes to be observed in poverty and everyone 
wishes to be seen as rich.  To the former we attach shame; to the latter, pride.  But it 
is the glories of the rich, their luxuries and rank that become primary motivation for 
personal improvement: “that kings are the servants of the people…is the doctrine of 
reason and philosophy…not the doctrine of nature.”98  Society is naturally stratified.  
My aspirations differ from yours, and vary doubly in their unpredictable intensity.  
Half of all labours are devoted to improving one’s place in the social hierarchy, and 
although the wise would take no consolation in their position, the enticements of 
status beckon all persons equally, insatiable as they are for public worship. 
Yet, and this is not a tension in Smith’s mind, ambition and rank remain necessary 
to the maintenance of social order while at the same time being “the great and most 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.”99  How could something 
necessary to society also be its “great and universal” corruption?  The tension is a 
false one.  The fact that envy, ambition’s partner, powerfully integrates society 
illustrated by society’s advancement throughout history.  Like Pufendorf, Locke, and 
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Hume, Smith roundly accepts the four-state theory of history as demonstrating 
obvious empirical truths about personal and civil development.  He assumes 
individual capacities are improvable.  All human faculties can be sharpened or 
enhanced with extra vigilance.  Obvious counter-examples illustrating personal 
demise exist, of course, but on the whole it is evident, at least from Smith’s later 
reflections in his Lectures on Jurisprudence, that both individuals and societies 
maintain courses of genuine advancement.100  The four stages of this historical 
theory—Hunter, Shepherd, Agricultural, and Commercial—identify specific 
economic developments requiring special political compromises.  What led ultimately 
to the transition from Hunter to Shepherd, for example, was the notion that objects 
could be personally possessed instead of only used.  Likewise, the transition from 
Shepherd to Agriculture initiated when owners of flocks and herds realized they could 
also possess land.  Following Hume’s argument that property secures the conditions 
for justice, Smith seems to have believed not only that private property creates the 
conditions for justice, but that private property marks the beginning of civil authority 
itself.  As some members come to possess and accumulate more objects than others, 
this leads naturally to the possession of territorial lands on which to house collected 
property.  Monopolistic tendencies of accumulated property leads eventually to the 
institution of monarchy and, later, to despotic tyranny that inevitably foreshadows 
public revolution.  In any event, what concerns us here is not so much the minute 
details of each stage as the generically progressive character of history and the 
economic demands that inaugurate political change.  The story of history is the story 
of human improvement.  Individuals yearn for higher status, societies yearn for great 
luxuries, and government must accept this progression, in the end, because it is 
humanity’s natural aim. 
Social hierarchy may be a static fixture, but how one utilizes ambition to improve 
social status may vary greatly from person to person. When one discovers that riches 
and status are as respected by society as the classic virtues of wisdom and courage, 
one is faced with a dilemma; either one may take the path of wisdom that leads to 
virtue, or one may take the path of wealth that leads to (apparent) greatness.101  In 
response to this dilemma Smith’s strategy is much the same as before, commending 
                                                
100 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982). 
101 Ibid. 
   33
personal “mediocrity” that embraces the truth of both propositions, even if that means 
taking the path of wisdom for the sake of a path to wealth.  Yet if virtue is lost to the 
pursuit of wealth and status, the corrupting passions of envy and covetousness 
motivating that pursuit may simultaneously empty the honour of having arrived at the 
destination for which one so adamantly longed.  Smith sees no tension between virtue 
and wealth because of what moderation (“mediocrity”) can morally repair in 
commercial enterprise.  On this point Smith follows the Humean (and Aristotelian) 
line, enshrining moderation and the negotiated middle between two extremes. Justice, 
too, is cast in Humean terms as a “sense” that serves to integrate society and 
affections while minimizing their incompatibility.  What interests us about justice 
under this scheme is how resentment elicits public fervour to preserve justice.  On 
Smith’s view, justice is not observable in its positive ontology or shape but in its 
negative violations.  Justice serves only to hinder injuries and is mostly unimportant if 
“all the different members [of society] are bound together by the agreeable bands of 
love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good 
offices.”102  This is how society would naturally arrange itself if injustice were 
altogether removed.  The delight in love and resentment of injustice reveal nature’s 
two great purposes: the support of the individual and the propagation of the 
species.103  The complimentarity of these purposes—supporting the individual and 
propagating the species—bespeak the providence of a Deity who orders society 
according to his own design.  “Fortune,” the term used by Smith to denote those 
events that are not a direct result of human intention, constitutes the other side of this 
providential coin.  The fluctuations in circumstance, the unintended consequences of 
actions, and the multitude of various “accidents” give form to human experience 
while pointing toward cosmic governance beyond the reach of human predictability 
or control.   
Following his treatment of justice and fortune, Smith turns his attention to 
judgment and to the sense of duty that encases moral conduct.  To arrive at genuinely 
just judgments, the task is to objectify the moral self—to put oneself in the position of 
the other and reach an impartial decision based on those circumstantial contours.  
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator allows for truly impartial judgments by 
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removing all the colours of prejudice that malign authentic sympathy.  One passes 
judgment on another as one would pass judgment on oneself.  Contrary to Hume this 
means that motivations and passions are not the exclusive objects of moral valuation.  
Judgment passed on the motivation, quality, and effects of a given action are deemed 
either morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, approved or disapproved according to 
our one’s own standards of self-approbation.  This judicial office has been bestowed 
upon mankind by the Author of nature who, according to Smith, “has made man…the 
immediate judge of mankind; and has…created him after his own image and 
appointed him his vicegerent upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his 
brethren.”104  Judgements passed on others in society are softened and polished by 
comparisons to the imaginary judgments one would pass on oneself under similar 
circumstances.  The crucial point here, as above, is the centrality of the Self in 
Smith’s moral theory.  Sympathy, justice, and judgment are first conceived in terms 
of how one views oneself and in what regard the self is affected positively or 
negatively by others in society.  This explains to some extent Smith’s heavy reliance 
on the stoic doctrine of self-command.  The man of truly perfect virtue is the one who 
unites self-love with self-command and holds them in steady balance.  That person is 
perfect who flawlessly harmonizes competing affections between self and other.  
Renunciation occupies a central position in the moral constellation of civil society.  
Having established self-command as the only means to perfect virtue and thus to all 
moral beginnings, Smith introduces rules that cement self-command firmly into its 
political place.  Rules express themselves as social customs imbedded in facts of 
history, as they did for Hume, and “when these general rules have been formed, when 
they are universally acknowledged and established by the concurring sentiments of 
mankind, we frequently appeal to them as standards of ‘judgment’.”105  With time 
these rules become regarded as binding standards of duty, which evoke a sense of 
reverence compelling obedient conformity.  Reverence is an understandable posture 
to take towards the rules of morality because, as reason and philosophy confirm, 
“those important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will 
finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty.”106   




   35
But because the rules and laws of God simply describe the origin of duty and the 
binding of civil society, a theory of sentiments is needed to expound more fully how 
rules and laws are obeyed in the first place.  For Smith, the rules of morality, the 
binding commands of God, are imprinted on each and every person’s moral faculties; 
they are, as described above, the “vicegerents of God within us,” holding the 
happiness of mankind as an object of ultimate concern.  Keeping happiness as an 
ultimate end, the moral faculties “may therefore be said, in some sense, to cooperate 
with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.”107  To 
do opposite, to not act according to our moral faculties, would be the same as 
obstructing the plans our Author has established for the happiness and perfection of 
the world and to likewise declare oneself enemies with God.  In making this move 
Smith has thus eliminated the distinction between the commands of God and 
judgments of man and made the two indistinguishable.  God has commanded 
precisely what the moral faculties most naturally desire—happiness.  God’s 
involvement in the world, the very reason for his universal benevolence, is “to 
maintain at all times the greatest possible quantity of happiness.”108 
Returning, then, to the question of commerce in Smith’s TMS, it is now clear that 
commercial participation in civil society is burdened with tensions and balancing acts.  
Selfishness must cooperate with sympathy, moderation must temper ambition, and 
envy must be perpetually monitored so as to encourage enough industry to stimulate 
improvement but not so much that it corrupts the integrity of virtue.  Those moral 
corruptions that in the Christian tradition have been called sinful are on Smith’s 
account wholly necessary functions of social cohesion and personal improvement.  
These are not assigned the status of sin in Smith’s theory because each evil, whether 
of covetousness or envy, can nonetheless be made to serve the purposes of 
providence.  In addition to making sin useful, providence also confers on mankind—
with a benevolence that can only be described as universal—the greatest possible 
quantity of happiness.  If one can refrain from injuring or wronging another, then one 
should feel free to pursue any commercial goals one’s moral faculties authorize.  The 
ultimate ends of wealth, rank, esteem, improvement, and happiness are all perfectly 
justified for their own sake, granted one exercises self-control and never injures 
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another person.  In making status an integral part of ethics—indeed, the envisaged 
end of action itself—Smith establishes commerce as a necessary category of moral 
philosophy, consecrating a social hierarchy that incorporates ambition, luxury, and 
happiness into an absolute moral horizon.  Thus, the commercial sphere serves as an 
amoral institution that generates the conditions of morality by establishing a 
hierarchical social structure in which all may improve and sympathize. But if 
improvement is our task and happiness our end, how is one ever to find, as George 
Turnbull put it, “rest in the object pursued?”  Smith’s citizen cooperates with God to 
maximize a type of happiness that finds its highest enjoyment in the recognition and 
praise received from others.  Individuals find completion in the act of worship, to be 
sure; only here it is found in the worship society offers to the individual, not the 
worship of the individual offered unto God.  Is this a truly balanced view of self-love 
and benevolence?  Was not one of Jesus of Nazareth’s earliest teachings to his 
disciples that they should beware of practising piety before men in order to be seen 
by them (Mt.6:1)? 
 
III 
One need not forget that though political and economic debates of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were widely continental in nature, Adam 
Ferguson—with whom we are, in the end, ultimately concerned—was himself a 
Gaelic-speaking Scot with deep commitments to national union and to newly formed 
Great Britain.  Thus, defining the contextual backdrop to British philosophical 
discourses is crucial to discerning Ferguson’s own contribution to the tapestry.  
Moral and political questions do not arise ex nihilo, but from human confrontation 
with the complexities of real world affairs.  Events from Germany or France would 
surely have been newsworthy north of the Tweed, of course; but it can hardly be 
doubted that those events lingering longest and leaving the greatest impression on 
late-century philosophers, and Ferguson in particular, are those occurring in one’s 
own town and country.  For this reason it would be useful to conclude this contextual 
backdrop with a review of several critical events and debates of the early to mid 
eighteenth-century that have to this point gone largely unrecognized.  So far we have 
taken in the philosophic mountaintops; here we want observe the topography of the 
valleys.  Events and debates of interest cannot define comprehensively the nature of 
early-century political economy on their own merit, for that would be to expect too 
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much of them.  But they can serve effectively in tethering otherwise unfettered 
political theory.  At different heights and in different positions in the valleys we will 
want to note the following phenomenon: the 1707 Union of Parliaments, the South 
Sea Bubble, outbreaks of war, and lastly, the shape of theological debates.  Once the 
valleys have been mapped we will find ourselves in the position to turn an informed 
eye to Adam Ferguson. 
As with any period of history decisions on where properly to begin one’s 
historiography seem always to require an artificial line of demarcation.  In this case, 
to speak of the 1707 union of parliaments one feels obliged to mention the prior 
union of crowns in the same breath.  The Glorious Revolution—which hardly 
supports the ascription of “revolution,” since its beginnings were largely a matter of 
political expediency following James II abdication—initially encouraged Scottish 
hopes that their recent economic hardships might at long last find relief.  But relief 
would remain lamentably elusive, as Scotland beheld in the years that followed a 
series of investment disasters and crop failures.  National poverty quickly reached 
levels of national crisis and it became increasingly evident that the government 
would finally be forced to cast its eye beyond its borders for lasting assistance.109  
Relief came (somewhat ironically) in the form of legislation battles with the same 
English parliament that helped precipitate its fiscal struggles at the turn of the 
century.  In response to the English Act of Settlement in 1703, a bill legally 
codifying Hanoverian succession, the Scottish parliament felt obliged to pass its own 
legislative measures: the Act of Security and the Act anent Peace and War.  The 
former bill was meant to communicate the Scottish position that it would not accept 
Hanoverian succession unless its parliament, Kirk, and commerce were free from 
interference.  The latter bill, on the other hand, the Act anent Peace and War, 
promised war-making powers to parliament in the event of Queen Anne’s death.  
Neither bill was well received in London.  So, to bring the legislative exchange full 
hilt, Westminster responded with the Alien Act of 1705, which forced Scotland to 
decide upon legal incorporation with England or face subjection to the same 
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commercial sanctions as their continental neighbours.  Scotland was not in the 
comfortable position to negotiate.  English Navigation Acts put into effect several 
years prior had already placed great strain on the revenues of Scottish traders and 
tax-gathering had become so dreadfully disorganized and unreliable that low annual 
revenue figures jeopardized even the basic execution of government.  Perhaps as an 
act of desperation, or perhaps in hope of energizing an apathetic domestic economy, 
in 1695 Scotland launched its first major colonial effort under the auspices of the 
Company of Scotland.  The Darien Scheme, as it came to be called, was a famous 
and monumental disaster.  Of the roughly 1200 original settlers that set sail to the 
Isle of Isthmus approximately 300 survived to return home, a tragedy only deepened 
by the irrecoverable loss of nearly one-fifth the pledged capital for the venture.  
Meanwhile, just when the story could not seem to get any worse, four consecutive 
years of harvest failure compromised even the country’s economic mainstay, 
agriculture.  This financial blow subsequently required heavy borrowing on the part 
of Scottish nobles whose debt totals quickly bordered illegality.  At an economic 
level, Scotland lacked the free hand to disentangle its many economic bindings. 
Formal union would remain elusive during these early-century legislation battles 
not because Scottish or English representatives were opposed to union on principle 
but because the terms of union had yet to reach an agreeable compromise.  More 
often than not the terms of settlement were negotiated behind the scenes in the form 
of strategic bribes, where deeply indebted Scottish magistrates conveniently found 
the Act of Union to be both politically necessary and personally advantageous.  
Scottish parliamentarians were perhaps too frequently guilty, as the popular limerick 
chided, of being “bought and sold for English gold.”110  Yet bribery was a common 
enough political instrument—as it is now, of course—not to merit fierce disapproval; 
this is, after all, “how things are done!”  Nevertheless, it remained true that though 
union seemed inevitable on political and economic grounds, the ecclesiastical 
ramifications of union repeatedly dowsed progress at the bargaining table.  Perhaps 
more than any other singular issue the ultimate success or failure of the Treaty of 
Union depended almost entirely upon provisional legal security for the Church of 
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Scotland against absorption into the Church of England.111  The Kirk remained 
unwavering in its commitment to Presbyterian polity however, and in the end their 
resolve paid off, the Kirk was given legal status as the established Church of 
Scotland.112  Of the twenty-four articles of the Treaty of Union, only courts, church, 
and civic appointments would remain untouched by statutes of incorporation.113  
Thus, despite economic pressures compelling passage of legislative union, without 
“The Act for Securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government” 
amending the original articles, it is likely an enduring treaty may never have been 
achieved.   
The significance of Union is in what it represents: “the Treaty of Union can be 
divided into three components—the articles for constitutional arrangements, those 
for economic issues and those for preserved Scottish institutions.”114  Each 
component would uniquely transform the socio-political orientation of Scotland, just 
as each would introduce its own aftermath.  The point for our purposes is simply to 
note that the Union was a cardinal event.  In the following decades even those 
establishments the articles expressly sanctified, especially those concerning the Kirk, 
would be forced to endure reconfigurations of authority under the newly 
accommodating government of Great Britain.  It is the event in which events of later 
decades all have roots—a lens bringing clarity to ensuing political confusion.     
The South Sea Bubble is iconic primarily because of its prominence among the 
many other early eighteenth-century financial scandals.  Beginning in 1710, the task 
of expanding public credit became a central political issue and intense subject of 
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evidence provided from Kirk records makes Stephens’s account all the more compelling.  See Scottish 
Presbyterians and the Act of Union, 1707. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
113 That so little ink and so few pages would be required to legally unite two disparate parliaments 
from two distinct nations may well astonish the modern magistrate.  Treaty of Union of the Two 
Kingdoms of Scotland and England (London: Nelson, 1950). 
114 Union and Empire, 314. 
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debate among “new money” gentlemen.115  Finance reform became the coffeehouse 
problem of the day: how was domestic industry to be firmly supported when 
unreliable public credit and ongoing conflicts with France and Spain threatened basic 
solvency?  Who, exactly, originally devised the financial strategy for the South Sea 
scheme remains unknown, but there is little doubt that it would not have been 
established at all had it not been supported by several key financiers and 
parliamentarians.116  From its inception in 1710 to its legal enactment in 1711 the 
directors of the Company were ardent both in defence of its legitimacy as well as in 
promotion of its ever-increasing stock value.  Legislation establishing the Company 
in 1711 settled two critical provisions: monopoly status and annual financial support 
from the Exchequer at a sum of nearly six hundred thousand pounds.  The 
consecration of the Company reflects, as one commentator has described it, “a 
marvellous synthesis of finance, commerce, and foreign policy.”117     
Nevertheless, despite its fierce apologies and promotions the South Sea scheme 
was always only a clever veneer concealing the nasty manipulations of its handlers.  
Not only were there no uninvolved banks or parliamentary authorities overseeing or 
back-checking Company books, the central backers themselves had absolutely no 
experience whatsoever with South American or West Indian trade.118  Whether the 
company was actually successful in its trans-Atlantic exchanges remained almost 
entirely unchecked and uncontested; it seemed unlikely to most that the great 
revenues already made from South American trade would uncharacteristically seize-
up at any time in the near future.  The question of how this unique capital venture 
was to be sustained long-term was too frequently met with silence, and much to the 
chagrin of opposition party members, especially Lord Walpole.  Nevertheless, the 
scheme continued to add exorbitant sums to the purses of its directors for the better 
part of the decade; all rather conveniently overlooked while its stocks soared and 
credit increased broadly.  By the spring of 1720, however, burgeoning share values 
                                                
115 Paul Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), 309. 
116 It is possible, if not likely, that the scheme was devised by the same William Patterson that 
organized and speculated upon the disastrous Darien Scheme of the late 1690’s; though the Earl of 
Oxford is credited with the responsibility of organizing the South Sea scheme thereafter.  See John 
Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London: Cresset Press, 1960), 53. 
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ignited public alarm and an insidious run on trading that finally climaxed in August 
of that year with a yield increase of nearly one thousand percent.  When the dust 
settled it became evident that from this point there was nowhere to go but down.  
Stocks fell in incremental slumps over the remainder of the year until Lord Walpole 
and finance ministers intervened with a sophisticated plan to prosecute the principal 
directors of the Company and stabilize public credit by leaning debts on the Bank of 
England.    
The finer details of how the South Sea scheme was organized, perpetuated, and 
finally resolved are less relevant to the present inquiry than what the scheme 
discloses about the context of its occurrence.  If there is a moral to the South Sea 
story it is found in the speculative nature of business finance that characterizes 
commerce of the period.  Once the door to this brand of fiscal speculation had been 
thrown open—a brand lacking requirements of regulative oversight or even practical 
wisdom of how such a “business” was to be properly carried out—innumerable 
schemes of similar stock followed on its methodological heels.119  As a general trend, 
the years approaching 1720 made it seem “as if the whole nation had turned to stock-
jobbers.”120  The gains made by many speculators, particularly in London, quickly 
gave the appearance that anyone could surrender their monies to the trading 
companies and see a profit; dreams of effortless dividends enticed the investment of 
the lowest commoner to the highest landed gentry.  Naive journalism did not 
alleviate matters in this regard.121  Speculation entrenched itself as part of the 
commercial culture and new money-making strategies continued to find traction 
within all mercantilist political economies plump with capital until well into the 
1750’s, when desecration of mercantilism found a ready audience.  Thus, when John 
                                                
119 Charles Mackay lists no less than eighty-six different venture companies following on the heels of 
the South Sea model.  See Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. (New York: 
Metro Books, 2002), 58.  Hereafter EPDMC. 
120 EPDMC, 52.  Mackay then goes on to explain that “…the public mind was in a state of 
unwholesome fermentation.  Men were no longer satisfied with the slow but sure profits of cautious 
industry.  The hope of boundless wealth for the morrow made them heedless and extravagant for 
today.  A luxury, till then unheard of, was introduced, bringing in its train a corresponding laxity of 
morals.  The overbearing insolence of ignorant men who had arisen to sudden wealth by successful 
gambling, made men of true gentility of mind and manners blush that gold should have power to raise 
the unworthy in the scale of society.” 
121 Journalistic support and political cartoons were perhaps the greatest contributions to the 
Company’s artificially burgeoning stock.  See Carswell (p.55) and Paul Langford, Englishness 
Identified: Manners and Character, 1650-1850. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  Many of 
Langford’s texts on English commercialism in the eighteenth-century contain a variety of illustrative 
political cartoons. 
   42
Brewer describes eighteenth-century speculation as vapid, one finds it hard to 
disagree: 
The eighteenth-century speculator had all the opportunities—legitimate or 
otherwise—available to the modern ‘market-maker’: the easy raising of capital for 
public or private funds; the simple, reliable and swift purchase and sale of stocks, 
shares and securities; dealing in futures and on the margin; insider trading; the 
creation of paper companies; and the covert manipulation of stock.  Only the 
technology to speed these transactions was missing.122 
We shall set aside for the time being the philosophical interest garnered by the 
unique interdependency of war and political economy which shall directly occupy 
our inquiry later and focus primarily on the armed conflicts of the period, particularly 
the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, the concurrent War of Jenkins’ Ear, and the 
Seven Year’s war (1754-1763).  Echoing the seventeenth-century, conflict with 
Spanish or French forces reverberated throughout the early eighteenth-century.  
Many British battalions were almost permanently barracked throughout continental 
Europe for the better half of the century.  Indeed regimens were stationed all over the 
globe, from naval blockades in the south Indian to strategic fort occupations on 
remote North American frontiers, the British military, like other dominant European 
powers, sought diligently to protect and promote its interest wherever it felt 
challenged.  By consequence its domestic armies were spread alarmingly thin.   
It was precisely this domestic military scarcity that inspired the Stuarts to return 
to Britain to claim their rightful throne.  Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 are 
often characterized as the outcome of geographically divided political opposition 
between highlanders and lowlanders, the martial continuation of an embittered battle 
between Whigs and Tories.  As regards the Fifteen, while it is true that the rebellions 
hearken to a remnant of the past embodied firmly by the Stuart line, it is not at all 
clear that the Jacobite cause had only party interests as motivation.  Following the 
treaty of union, Tories faced a series of political defeats that by 1714 had seen their 
loss of power in Westminster and, in some extreme cases, prompt exile to continental 
Europe to avoid legal prosecution.  With the unexpected death of Queen Anne and 
the slow devolution of power among Tories the stage was set for the climax of 
political theatre—the act of armed conflict.  The scene would fail to materialize, 
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however, as the Fifteen was put down by the end of the year and Whigs quickly 
seized command of political advantages in Westminster.   
Risings and revolutions continued throughout subsequent decades and came to 
completion with the rise and fall of the Forty-five.  Not greatly dissimilar from the 
Fifteen, the Forty-five also sought to enthrone a Stuart monarch, only this time 
Prince Charles, accompanied by greater resources and experienced military 
strategists.  The assembled army marched through southern Scotland and northern 
England long enough for the Young Pretender’s arrogance to undermine his authority 
and be handed brutal defeat at Culloden.  This defeat, in effect, ended the threat of 
Jacobitism in Britain.  But this account slightly oversimplifies the conflict.  There 
remains an inner meaning to Jacobitism located in the deeply religious motivations 
that elevate it as a cause worth dying for.  Jacobitism is not easily reducible to tired 
disagreements between Whig and Tory, or between sympathizers of Stuart or 
Hanover lines.  Eighteenth-century Jacobitism is a question of divine right, and thus 
is not merely a story about what party or family shall rule but what counts as an 
authority.   
Ferguson’s Sermon in Ersh Language, given to the Black Watch on the occasion 
of young Prince Charles’ invasion from the north is a superb example of how debates 
surrounding rebellion were politically and theologically conceived in the eighteenth-
century.  Ferguson takes as his text 2 Samuel 10:12: Be of good courage, and let us 
play the men for our people, and for the cities of our God….  We must end the 
passage with an ellipsis because Ferguson elected not to include the end of the verse 
in his sermon—“may the Lord do as he wills.”  Given the context and underlying 
intention of the sermon, it is not difficult to see why.  Ferguson was addressing a 
regiment ordered to fight against their very own highland kin; brother against 
brother, cousin against cousin, father against son; for many in the regiment, the order 
to defend Britain against the Jacobite threat was also an order to slay one’s very own 
flesh and blood.  The young Pretender, Prince Charles, had succeeded in uniting the 
clans and had to that point executed a productive campaign in and around the border 
country.  Like his father before him, Charles couched his rebellion in terms of Divine 
Right, claiming Divine favour for his revolt and insisting upon King George’s 
prompt abdication. 
The import of Ferguson’s sermon lies in its contextual significance and in the 
subtlety of its argument.  How does a chaplain ask a soldier to slaughter an army 
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comprised partly of his kin?  What theological principles or biblical insight does one 
draw upon to persuade a clannish people to resist their own on behalf of another?  In 
Ferguson’s response, issued on a day consecrated as a “solemn day of fast,” we see 
him offer a word of exhortation and a word of instruction.  The word of exhortation 
springs from the riches of the text itself: be of good courage and let us play the men 
for our people.  He explains that “it is the duty of every man to defend his country 
when in danger,” Britain being their presumed patria.  When one enjoys the 
government bestowed by an orderly and judicious state, then one accepts tacitly that 
government and is obliged to serve it when violent circumstances arise.  To fight the 
approaching army is, moreover, an occasion to exercise noble virtues of courage and 
excellence and to uphold one’s patriotic duty.  This is civic “patriotism” in the truest 
sense of the word—a devotion to the land of one’s fathers.  His word of instruction, 
on the other hand, comes as a critique of the Pretender’s violent revolution.  What 
appears like a sensitive problem of interfamily conflict at the outset of his sermon, in 
the end, receives a rather terse refutation: “If you oppose your acquaintances, it is to 
prevent their ruin; if you oppose your relations, it is to save them and their posterity 
from slavery forever.”  Colour and flair of the sermon notwithstanding, the sharpest 
point of Ferguson’s message cuts deeply into the rationale of the Stuart’s claim: 
Providence expresses itself in government by way of order, not by right.  The 
Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745 symbolize a disagreement not merely about 
familial succession or party commitment, therefore, but about ecclesiastical 
affiliation and who truly rules the earthly kingdom. 
The Seven Year’s war and War of Jenkins’ Ear, alternatively, were far less 
theologically pregnant.  In fact, theology seems to have little at all to do with either 
war on either front.  While both wars paralleled previous conflicts in their underlying 
economic motivations, each differed slightly from past conflicts in their relation to 
political theology as such.  These mid-century conflicts helped elevate British 
military power to “its eighteenth-century zenith.”123  Prior to the Treaty of Paris in 
1763, “Britain not only managed to check French power in Europe but also became a 
great colonial and commercial power.”124  Swelling national pride organized itself 
around the perceived supremacy of British militarism and great successes of colonial 
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expansion.  That the century is at all times dominated by impending or actual warfare 
does not appear to have gravely aggravated national sentiments.  By mid-century, 
war was viewed as a necessary evil—a political fixture serving instrumental roles in 
bringing order to people and nations.  The success of the Seven Year’s war elevated 
Britain’s international dominance, yet within the broader context of the early 
eighteenth-century war remained an omnipresent theme.  This militarism, as will be 
seen below, is woven into the very fabric of politico-economic theory of the century. 
In rehearsing the theological debates leading up to Ferguson’s appointment our 
comments must remain generic and aim at parsing the layers each debate or issue 
included.  We have already noted the theo-political character of the ’15 and ’45 
Jacobite rebellions.  Included within the claim to divine right, however, is a 
covenantal supposition: the divine right of kings relies on a presumed familial 
covenant with God for its doctrinal legitimacy.  The question, as mentioned above, 
was not whether God authorized political authority, but how authority was to be 
lawfully asserted.  Covenant was therefore a lingering theological debate for the 
better part of the eighteenth-century, especially when debates skirted political 
intrigue.  Francis Hutcheson, for example, seems to have conceived of Lockean 
contract in terms of covenant, as though the two were synonymous with one another.  
Hutcheson’s conception of society is perhaps indicative of the eighteenth-century 
Protestant view of providentially authorised socio-political integrity; covenant helped 
make contract theologically palatable.  The issue of divine right and social covenant 
were, however, merely two strands of a much wider eighteenth-century debate over 
the nature and function of providence.  Newtonian world-pictures threw metaphysics 
into disfavour and initiated revisionist theories of natural law, virtue, and even divine 
redemption.  With time it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
philosopher’s use of “providence” and “natural law”; natural law seemed empirically 
to be the providential mode.  However, the deist threat had not yet been fully realized 
and would remain unrealized until the turn of the nineteenth-century.  Questions of 
God’s activity in the world bore directly on the basic religious experience of every 
believer.  If God’s will is expressed most elegantly in the natural law, then how is 
one to understand the experience of God?  “Superstition” and “enthusiasm” became 
the iconic pillars of ecclesial debates surrounding this very question.  In the former, 
experience of God is mediated through sacraments, icons, relics, or even 
pilgrimages; anything which might serve as a conduit of spiritual communication.  
Enthusiasm, on the other hand, referred to the direct and unmediated physical 
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experience of God, distilling all of the Christian life into a series of observances for 
the purpose of privileged experience.  In some extreme cases worship itself become 
associated with the sensual enjoyment of God.  As a generic summary of the 
theological debates, we might say that the tendency was to re-imagine the old in light 
of the new and to identify divine telos or commandments with the experience of 
natural law.  Creation under human dominion gradually improves and progresses; the 
tradition of Christian obedience narrows to pure conformity with the physical 
demands of natural law achieved through moderation of passions; and the binding 
authority of law and government condenses into empirically verifiable patterns of 
how the world works, and in particular, how societies unite and flourish.  The 
tendency in eighteenth-century theology is to clarify what God accomplished in his 
initial creative act by interpreting contemporary circumstances as expressions of his 
possible intentions.  Theology thus becomes worldly in all the wrong ways. 
As a way of bringing all the above events into conceptual unity it is essential to 
note that no single combination of events, no matter how sophisticated the argument, 
can alone be said to comprise or constitute the backdrop of eighteenth-century 
Britain.  Historians must content themselves with events leaving the greatest cultural 
impression, those demanding some form of intellectual response.  Truly monumental 
events invite reflection and speculation.  Although the Act of Union, South Sea 
bubble, almost perpetual warfare, and theological debates are among the more 
seminal themes of the first half of the eighteenth-century, they by no means stand-
alone.  One could go on to mention other crucially important features of the period, 
like the Patronage act of 1714, decisive parliamentary debates in Westminster, the 
catastrophic Lisbon earthquake of 1755, or the many innovations brought to 
industrial technology.125  Events being innumerable, the historian’s task is simply to 
identify what makes any event significant.  Once an event becomes the object of 
historical interpretation the task then becomes one of intellectual historiography.  
Thus, what interests us here is the extent to which early eighteenth-century events 
invite or evoke theoretical reflection, and in moving now to the conclusion of this 
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chapter it has become increasingly clear how and when events and ideas interpret and 
disclose one another.  History is neither exclusively material, nor exclusively idealist, 
but a narrative generated by the repeated communication between the two. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to address the question of theological backgrounds to 
early eighteenth-century theories of commerce.  As a way of organizing a response to 
this question we have heard from multiple voices within this tradition and have 
sought to identify the continuities and discontinuities, the receptions and rejections, 
contributing to the broader meaning of the period.  Recalling the moral and political 
philosophers of the period we have noted the theological backdrop against which the 
central concepts are defined and have sought to interpret them in light of implicit, 
pre-existing commitments.  One of my contentions has been that, with the exception 
of Hume, the moral and political thought of the period retains a great deal of 
theological attentiveness.  This thought is not without tensions or paradoxes, of 
course; but neither can it be bracketed off into pan-century descriptors.  Historical 
investigation of this roughly fifty-year period has revealed attempts to comprehend 
the shape of moral and political theology in light of natural law, and in particular, the 
increased development of commerce and industry.  More “extra” and “superfluity” 
were becoming available for an ever-greater proportion of citizens and could be 
applied to a still greater variety of “refinements.”  In this sense, then, much like other 
periods in the history of philosophy, the treatises are a product of their time.   
Providence was understood predominantly in terms of natural law established by 
the faculty of reason and by justifications derived from an original teleological 
design.  The world appears to operate in such-and-such a way and to such-and-such 
an end, and by these appearances is duly judged as natural or unnatural, providential 
or artificial.  What emerges from this view of the world is a concept of providence 
identical to human judgments upon advantages or benefits arising from the mind, 
civil society, or the natural world.  If something seems advantageous or beneficial to 
me, to civil society, or to the natural world, then that thing or event must be 
providential, seeing as every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father 
of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow of turning (Jm.1:17).  And it is 
precisely in light of this understanding of providence that what had traditionally been 
considered wrongdoing within the Christian tradition could on this account become a 
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God-send.  Envy and covetousness, for example, became viewed as essential to social 
cohesion and instrumental to the machine of industry.  Righteousness, the other side 
of the polarity, became viewed as conformity to law, a masculine virtue approved and 
conferred by the public.  Sin and righteousness were reinterpreted by many theorists 
of the period in a way categorically detached from a Christian origin or content.  Sin 
is no longer a transgression against God, but an injury to the accepted norms of public 
happiness.  Righteousness is no longer associated with salvific grace, or the heart of 
God, but with conformity to the erected standards of institutions and customs.  
Manoeuvring sin and righteousness into new positions meant that justice, too, would 
require readjustment, which it typically received in a manner of conceptual 
subordination to the possession of property.  By making property a condition of 
justice—indeed its’ very starting point—an instrument of commerce dislodged justice 
as a traditionally overarching political fixture.  Justice becomes defined in terms of 
distribution and a definite lack of moderation.  But, ironically, this notion of justice 
was by no means all-inclusive.  Some, like Turnbull, viewed equality as idealistic and 
utopian, while others, including Hume, depicted equality as a real political possibility 
created by extensive commercial growth.  By 1764, although ranks in society were 
seen as essential to its lasting cohesion, theorists could not at the same time resist the 
enchantments of equity and thus fell into the unavoidable tension of advocating a 
necessarily stratified society and its endless pursuit of equality.  Viewed historically 
this was not a tension in the slightest.  The progressive advancement of mankind 
through the ages is a story of superseding commercial epochs.  For Hume and Smith, 
concepts like justice and authority are themselves shaped by the overwhelming 
momentum of commercial improvement and thereby lead to a state of affairs in which 
commerce precedes political authority as a commanding power.   Divine providence 
is viewed within this conjectural model of history as a more or less redemptive and 
sanctifying power.  Such a notion no doubt reflects certain commitments to Christian 
orthodoxy—to make right and to make holy, for example—but is not an adequately 
discriminating account of providence.  What, exactly, is God redeeming?  What kind 
of improvements can or should be rendered?  Here the meaning of history becomes a 
story of an inevitable future, where refinements seek only further refinements, 
luxuries still greater luxuries, and innovations to still higher innovations.  This 
progressive improvement, readers are told, is ultimately what makes one happy. 
The above treatment has not investigated all the rooms that comprise the 
storehouse of eighteenth-century theological reflection, nor has it claimed to.  The 
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aim, as stated at the outset, has been to provide a contextual backdrop against which 
to hold the moral and political theology of Adam Ferguson.  In approaching the year 
1764 we have also come to Ferguson’s first professorial appointment and to the 
beginnings of his formal contribution to the intellectual landscape of the period.  The 
voices we have reviewed may remain Ferguson’s theoretical interlocutors, to be sure, 
but the more pressing question is whether Ferguson fits the early-century mould.  
What are his questions?  Do providence, sin, property, and history maintain the same 
character for Ferguson as they did for his predecessors?   
  




The Meaning of History 
 
What is history? In posing this question we shift our focus from the early part of 
the century to its middle and from a widely continental scope to an expressly 
Scottish. Here in the eighteenth-century Scottish burghs historical interests re-
captivate philosophical imaginations. But because we are attempting to project 
ourselves imaginatively into the eighteenth-century Scottish purview, the question 
that precedes our original question—“what is history?”—should be carefully 
rephrased: What was history for the mid-century Scotsman? How did history present 
itself to the classically educated, religiously attuned, and politically involved 
theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment? What were their vexing historical questions? 
Adopting a historical methodology was not easy. Theorists were concerned both with 
what happened in the past, as well as how best to narrate what had happened in the 
past, differentiating closely between occurrences and interpretation of occurrences. 
By attempting to take the Scottish questions as our own it will be useful first to 
identify why, exactly, history emerged from the shadows of natural philosophy when 
it did. Adam Ferguson was not the first to attempt retrieval of this semi-forgotten 
subject, and because he was not the first, retracing how the study of history was 
revived by the likes of Lord Kames, David Hume, William Robertson, and Adam 
Smith becomes all the more important. Capturing how these theorists conceived of 
history and its method will provide a stark contrast for underscoring Ferguson’s 
uniqueness and therefore provide an apt theoretical starting point for this essay. If 
Scottish thought of the period is concerned ultimately with the meaning of history 
and not merely its austere and static factuality, then what might history mean for 
Adam Ferguson in particular?   
This essay will seek to identify two generic themes in Ferguson’s philosophy of 
history—Metaphysics and Institutions—and use them as guideposts by which to 
explore more specific conceptual territories. Unconvinced as he was that the 
Newtonian portrait of a strictly law-governed universe offered the only truthful 
representation of the world, Ferguson did not abandon metaphysical thinking 
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altogether for the simple reason that the study of history itself seemed to demand it of 
him. Metaphysical contours of history are defined by several acute polarities, or 
dialectics, that help uncover the hidden meanings of history. In suggesting history 
has metaphysical shape we are reminded of characteristics not immediately 
perceptible or comprehended, always pointing to something beyond itself. If history 
is at all metaphysical, then by definition it cannot be explained in purely physical 
terms; philosophical contemplation becomes the principal tool of historical 
investigation. With a basic sketch of history’s metaphysical shape we may then turn 
to the concrete theme of Institutions. History cannot remain wholly abstract if it is to 
retain meaningful content. As a chronicle of what has happened in the world it is 
vital that metaphysical reflections map onto concrete political realities. Institutions 
are the flesh enlivened by a metaphysical soul legitimating history’s mode of 
presentation to humankind. The task for our purposes is not to identify and list 
modern institutions—a tedious and redundant method—but rather what they meant 
to our predecessors, what they mean to us, and what they might mean for generations 
to come. When can we be assured that some idea or event is truly meaningful? If the 
significance of institutions that either endure or disappear in history is established by 
their talent for disclosing meaning, then what is it about an institution that, as it were, 
changes things?   
An institution’s affecting change or being changed itself inaugurates an 
interruption of otherwise steady routines in worldly life. The question for most 
eighteenth-century historians was what advantages followed, or were implied by, 
these institutional shifts. On this point Ferguson takes bold departure from his fellow 
Scots: history is not the story of humanity’s progress from savage to citizen; it is not 
inherently progressive and cannot establish contemporary superiority over the past. 
As becomes clear with his treatment of the ancient Romans and North American 
savage, history does not symbolize a series of interrelated narratives of an advancing 
or improving humanity. Ferguson’s judicious treatment of history offers a richly 
textured hermeneutic that successfully accommodates certain types of progress and 
improvement yet resists declaration of superiority. Not even commerce, the Scottish 
school’s dominant institutional force for progress, can explain the transitory 
character of politics and society. Commerce is one institution among many.  
Ferguson’s critique of conjectural histories enlisting commerce as a primary catalyst 
for institutional progress focuses on the moral limits of economic exchange. Are 
there moral costs to the unyielding pressure for commercial gain? Is the good to be 
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sought in interpersonal exchanges reducible to increased refinements and luxuries on 
the widest possible scale? Ferguson’s exposition of history through the interpretive 
themes of Metaphysics and Institutions accentuates the mistake of viewing 
commerce as the primary vehicle of progress in political society. The redemptive, as 
opposed to conjectural, history of God’s providence unmasks the myth of progress 
by revealing history’s true Power. The meaning of history both proceeds from and 
returns to God himself. To better understand how Ferguson made his way to this 
conclusion we should now revisit the inner logic of the proposed themes and contrast 
them with views of his contemporaries.   
 
Scottish School of Conjectural History 
The staggering proportion of historical literature published by Ferguson’s 
Scottish colleagues in the mid to late eighteenth-century is nearly unparalleled in 
scale; each writer—Hume, Robertson, Kames, and Smith, for example—producing 
reputable historical treatises of excruciating length and detail.126 Each work differs 
from the other perhaps only in subject. But it is the scale, the sheer overwhelming 
quantity of historical texts that first attracts the reader’s attention. The impressive 
number of monographs reveals intense fixation with the finer details of historic facts; 
scrutinizing every event and idea, arranging each factoid within a theoretically 
reconstructed state of affairs became the methodological norm. But because the story 
of history was comprised essentially of facts, those facts could also be recreated in 
the present to communicate certain truths about the nature of human existence, 
especially man’s capacity for making history itself. The more facts were collected, 
the fewer the errors or defects, the more pure and accurate the finished product. Scale 
came to symbolize extreme attentiveness and precision. 
Facts of history narrate a story of progress when properly organized and outfitted 
to take their role in the plot of the historical saga. Dugald Stewart, the late 
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contemporary of Scottish School historians and Adam Smith’s biographer, felt proud 
enough with the ambitious achievements of these historians to ascribe their model 
the special status of “conjectural history.”127 The ideological background to this 
version of progressive history—a history signalling the perpetual improvement and 
advancement of humankind—was first inherited from Gershom Carmichael, the 
Scottish publicist of Pufendorf’s De Officio.128 De Officio had made a case for the 
basic sociality of humankind and its subsequent progress through “four stages” of 
commercial advancement. This idea of irreducible sociality and its commercially 
driven progress proved enormously appealing to later Scottish historians. Scottish 
reception of the Four-stage theory was not unqualified, however. As Istvan Hont has 
explained, members of the Scottish school (especially Smith) were not aiming to 
redefine commercial society as such, but endeavouring “to integrate the fragmented 
aspects of Pufendorfian natural jurisprudence into a single theory of the history of 
civilization.”129 Theoretical foundations of a fundamentally commercial society were 
“already fully present” in Pufendorf’s jurisprudence.130 But it was the history of this 
union between commerce and civilization that augmented Scottish imaginations. In 
redefining the history of society as essentially commercial Pufendorf made a sharp 
break from Grotius’ theory of natural law, modifying it so drastically one could 
scarcely regard it as anything but an “invention.”131 Pufendorf’s deliberate 
divergence from Grotian sociability to establish a commercially centred politic was, 
in fact, the real genesis of Four-stage historiography.132 Commerce was seen as the 
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centripetal force of society and marketplaces the most public location for domestic 
trade.   
Distancing himself from Grotius still further, Pufendorf founded his theory of 
commercial sociability on private property. Interestingly, and again, entirely unlike 
Grotius, Pufendorf inserted his newly adopted authority of subjective rights directly 
into the historical storyline of property law.133 The task of justifying this argument 
for a subjective right to property would be carried out with the same careful analysis 
of history’s movement toward “refinement and politeness” as helped support his 
original theory of commercial sociability.134 Where Grotius had suggested social 
flourishing through “plainness” and “simplicity,” Pufendorf introduced covetousness, 
ambition, and conflict. The Four-stage theory was an essentially commercial vehicle 
turning on axes of property and refined progress. Nevertheless, this was a story that 
could only be made coherent by the legitimacy of subjective rights to bring peace, 
particularly those rights regarding private property and labor. The theory of basic 
sociality incorporated into rights-based natural jurisprudence hinged upon fluctuating 
and yet paradoxically stabilizing forces of economic necessity and want. Prolonged 
social solidarity became based on refinement’s ability to further expand the 
marketplace. Thus, the history of society is the story of its commercial progress from 
property possession to the development of “great cities” where “the dynamics of 
progress become irreversible.”135 
The Scottish reception of Pufendorf’s history of natural jurisprudence did not 
gain potency for several decades, however, until almost as a contagion the persuasive 
power of historical explanation came to its fullest life seemingly all at once in the 
thought of Hume, Robertson, Kames, and Smith. What interested these Scottish 
historians were history’s causal connections to natural law and political society. They 
were concerned with the basic historical narrative of society and its institutions, but 
also with why society has an historical narrative in the first place and what kind of 
story history tells about it. Exploration of this deeper theme, the question of “why?”, 
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was pioneered most persuasively by Hume, who having accepted Pufendorf’s theory 
of property in principal, sought then to redeploy it as an historical hermeneutic more 
to his liking.   
For Hume, metaphysics is powerless to provide the analytical tools for serious 
historical research because of its tenuously unreliable and indefinite subject matter. 
No, the task of the historian is to identify and explain laws that would ultimately 
establish a science of man transcending metaphysics.136 History is partly, if not 
predominately, defined by the relative transitions in this science of man from its 
earliest savagery to its latest commercial refinement. If the individual is a progressive 
being, then society experiences progress de facto. But getting this conjectural history 
off the ground requires at least one crucial assumption. As Christopher Berry has 
identified, “if human behaviour across space and time can be compared, if gaps can 
be plugged by conjecturing what may have happened, if it is feasible to write a 
history of mankind then there has to be a basic fixity or constancy in human 
nature.”137 Natural law governs reality by imposing specific limits on what presently 
occurs and on what will possibly occur in the future. The same can even be said, on 
Hume’s view, for the natural law’s arbitration of intellectual faculties. Every human 
mind is and must be uniform, for “the faculties of mind are supposed to be naturally 
alike in every individual.”138 Law demands the same predictable uniformity from the 
human mind as it does of reality itself:   
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of 
men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its 
principles and operations.  The same motives always produce the same actions: the 
same events follow from the same causes.139 
Most of what one might conclude about the people of modern France or England, 
suggests Hume confidently, could just as easily be concluded about the ancient 
Greek or Roman: “Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that 
history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular.”140   
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Nevertheless, despite overwhelming immutability the static fixity of human 
nature does not on Hume’s account preclude the possibility of long-term 
improvements. In addition to the Pufendorfian vision of commercial society 
historically conceived, an attitude of “optimism” had also pervaded the eighteenth-
century consciousness.  Leibniz’ Theodicy, with its insistence that God could only 
have created the “best of all possible worlds,” intending to justify theologically the 
occurrence of evil inadvertently induced (or at least encouraged) a spirit of rational 
optimism in early eighteenth-century political theorists.141 Shaftsbury and Pope are 
ideal examples in this regard; the latter going so far as to admit that in “spite of 
Pride, in erring Reason’s spite, one truth is clear, whatever is, is Right.”142 To put the 
matter another way, readily adopted by eighteenth-century philosophers was the idea 
of intellect’s immediate and untarnished interpretation of reality. Its tendency was to 
give itself over to additional optimisms. A perfectly created world governed by laws 
of a providential Deity meant that the mind’s comprehension of reality was unlikely 
wrong and the authority of natural law unconditionally attributable to mind itself. It 
was this optimistic faith in the truthfulness of reality’s presentation through the 
natural law and the certainty of mind to comprehend those presentations that invited 
an inherently progressive history of society. Strangely, however, the idea that God’s 
best possible creation could somehow be improved over time apparently never struck 
the eighteenth-century mind as inconsistent. Part of what made this the best world 
was its openness to further improvement.   
Hume’s History of England was an attempt to reconstruct the facts of history to 
demonstrate just how far the English had truly advanced from its primitive, savage 
origins. Beginning with the ancient Roman settlements in Briton and concluding with 
the reign of William and Mary, Hume constructs what appears to be an historical 
outline framed by the cyclical loss and consecration of monarchs. Each volume, as it 
were, lifts the people of England onto higher planes and ushers them into grander 
vestibules. As he finally approaches the seventeenth-century and the conclusion of 
his historical journey, Hume highlights retrospectively the many sources of the 
kingdom’s prosperity and pinpoints exactly where this prosperity was needlessly 
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curtailed. When liberty is promoted in human affairs—whether in commerce, policy, 
or literature—and interference from the monarch avoided, citizens are most happy 
and moral.143 This explains why Hume concludes his treatment of the late 
seventeenth-century monarchs with a summary of the period’s “manners, arts, and 
science.” When freedoms are allowed to run their course their natural effect is social 
improvement in every category. A conclusion slow in completion, he wishes to show 
how society is improved when afforded political freedoms. The liberalization of trade 
and printed word simply bring the historical story to its eighteenth-century climax. 
The six volumes of the History were intended to remind Britons of their long-term 
progressive trajectory evinced in specific commercial and literary freedoms. A 
sequence of English monarchs structures the timeline of Hume’s History of England, 
but this should not overshadow the real purpose of the regal line-up to demonstrate 
how monarchs infringe upon freedom and subsequently forced to resign themselves 
to a “mixed” form of government.   
Elsewhere, in “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume 
identifies four principles of artistic and scientific advance.144 First, arts and sciences 
arise only where society enjoys free government. To expect culture to blossom 
during the reign of an absolute monarch is “to expect a contradiction.”145 Second, 
and rather straightforwardly, nothing proves more favourable to rapid and prolonged 
political advantage than trading with like nations. One might recall it is from this 
principle that “jealousy of trade” is later brandished to justify self-perpetuating 
refinements generated by consistent international trade. The third and fourth 
principles claim that arts and sciences are best cultivated under different types of 
government, and that when any state reaches perfection it must from that moment 
naturally (and necessarily) decline.146 Thus articulated the implicit principles of 
Hume’s History become firmly explicit. Progress is secured and energized by a free 
government with mixed constitution that encourages commercial refinement. When 
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one takes into account the totality of Hume’s writings on the subject of trading 
liberties one is inclined to interpret his insistence on the radical superiority of free 
government as motivated by luxuries achieved in a free, unregulated commercial 
sphere; to be sure, he often seems to insist on free government for the sake of 
expanded freedoms in trade. But how then are we to respond to the last of Hume’s 
principles: that when a state reaches perfection it must then begin to decline? One 
possibility might be to dismiss the principle as categorically impossible; a protective 
caveat to cover his flank from those mindful of ancient Rome. But Hume likely 
would have anticipated this objection, and in any event he appears actually to have in 
mind the rise and fall not of humanity in general, but of individual states. No state 
has ever reached constitutional perfection and there is no reason to believe one ever 
shall, but such challenges do not restrain human progress in arts and sciences over 
many centuries. “The arts and sciences, like some plants, require fresh soil,” and so 
even where one society may wither and decay another springs to life from its 
fertilization.147 Hume’s account of England’s journey from ancient Roman territory 
to seventeenth-century dynasty is an account of how, exactly, progress happens. The 
meaning of history is what humanity can become if it establishes institutions 
conducive to the political and commercial freedoms that promote luxury and 
refinement. He gives to us a story with several movements—from monarchical to 
mixed government, regulated trade to free trade, and even superstitious religion to 
natural religion—but regardless of which thematic variation one chooses the Humean 
plot remains the same—progress is an intrinsic good to civil society.148 Passage of 
time gives everyone a greater reason to hope. 
Lord Kames and William Robertson took a similar view. Robertson’s History of 
America and History of Scotland, following closely in the footsteps of Hume, 
reconstruct the histories of America and Scotland with the same agonizing detail and 
conjectural aspirations. Rehearsing specific historical events should not confuse the 
fact, however, that all historical work, no matter how detailed, intends to make an 
argument; every historical event constitutes a premise reaching for a conclusion. For 
Robertson, each event and its unfolding consequences result from Divine providence 
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and thus cannot possibly be accidental. The Almighty executes his purposes through 
perfect laws and gradually affects the kinds of change that gradually improve human 
affairs. “Sacred history, by drawing aside that veil which covers the counsels of the 
Almighty, lays open his designs to the view of his creatures; and we can there trace 
the steps which he taketh towards accomplishing them with more certainty and 
greater pleasure.”149 Historiography is the dominant mode of revelation. Equally 
telling is the selection of Colossians 1:26 for his sermon to the General Assembly—
Even the mystery, which hath been hid from ages and generations, but now is made 
manifest to his saints. In his letter to the Colossians Paul declares that the gospel of 
Jesus Christ was, until his bodily appearance, a hidden mystery. Robertson’s reading 
of the text instead focuses on how society has progressed since the time of Christ and 
classifies several examples of contemporary superiority, including the abolition of 
slavery and establishment of just marital laws. He does not deny that Christ Jesus is 
the mystery St. Paul refers to in his letter to the Colossians; rather, his central point is 
that the revelation of Jesus Christ came at the most opportune time in history. The 
unfolding drama of God’s providence since that Revelation has taken the form of 
natural laws in the created order: “men came by degrees to understand this 
progressive plan of providence and to conceive how systems temporary and 
incomplete might serve to introduce that concluding and perfect revelation which 
would declare the whole council of God to man.”150 History puts humanity in touch 
with conditions of ages past and thereby discloses gradual improvements to 
individuals and societies. “Mystery” has been revealed and now is the period of 
knowing. Importantly, our progress also includes “polished” morals to reinforce 
political institutions. By the hand of providence the present is made superior to the 
past and mankind fully comprehends this revealed fact since, as Robertson suggests, 
God has made His “whole council” known to him.   
Lord Kames’ Sketches of the History of Man, on the other hand, is a much more 
explicit reconstruction of history’s progressive spirit. Kames felt that historiography 
had not gone quite far enough in its progressive reconstruction, as “there is still 
wanting a history of the species in its progress from the savage state to its highest 
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civilization and improvement.”151 Everything humans familiarize themselves with 
evinces marked progression. Manners, commerce, government, law, reason, 
morality, and even theology are all naturally improved over time by man’s increasing 
genius. God has endowed humanity with capacities for attaining higher and higher 
perfections with every passing age. When brought together, the several minor 
“sketches” of man’s historical development unite to form a much grander portrait 
wherein humanity is presented with the most elegant and colourful light. If the 
portrait of humanity was once a primitive charcoal sketch, it is surely now an ornate 
masterpiece! Kames’ Sketches is in this respect indicative of basic historical project 
of the Scottish school. No semblance of Ash Wednesday lingers—“from dust you 
came and to dust thou shalt return”—but only ambition, “from dust you came and 
higher glory shalt thou ever go!”  
Of all the representatives of the Scottish school, however, it was Adam Smith 
that made greatest use of Pufendorf’s four-stage history. The four stages outlined in 
Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence—Hunter, Shepherd, Agriculture, and 
Commerce—designate epochs, or constitutional transitions in the history of 
communities. His historical question concerns how contemporary society acquires a 
particular type of political order. Why, in other words, do we have this civil 
constitution rather than that? Smith’s theory first emerges from an inquiry into the 
origins of government, where he outlines several different types of government 
found in the annals of history. Society began as a collection of hunters with no 
conception of private property and no institutions on which to found a government. 
When it was recognized that objects, particularly livestock, could be possessed 
personally, this recognition initiated the first constitutional transition from Hunter to 
Shepherd. From the Shepherd stage emerged the first semblances of monarchy, as 
one individual by virtue of capacity or resource became naturally acknowledged to 
lead and govern. Separating the Shepherd from the Agricultural stage is the notion of 
possessing territorial lands, whereby a mere chieftain soon becomes a consecrated 
monarch. On this configuration land is no longer common but seized and divided 
into tracts. Society takes the form of extreme hierarchy, control of the dispossessed is 
maintained by those who possess and soil becomes the agricultural society’s most 
precious commodity. The age of Commerce that emerges from the decay of 
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Agriculture tends on Smith’s account to begin with expanded domestic and 
international trade, but he had a difficult time explaining how, precisely, the 
transition from Agriculture to Commerce occurred as naturally as the previous two 
transitions. Unlike the first three stages, Commerce was not initiated by changing 
conceptions of property and Smith likely conceived of Commerce following from 
Agriculture in much the way Hont has suggested, “in a purely quantitative sense” 
only.152 Smith believed the Agricultural stage to be formally transcended. 
Interestingly, as was the case with Hume, this transition to Commerce would also 
naturally diminish the power of monarchical government and greatly strengthen 
republican sentiments. Even more interesting, though, is how the four-stage theory 
construes the establishment of constitutions. Smith’s is a unique interpretation of 
history in that it gives commerce the power to break and refashion political 
structures. In the first two transitions this change is marked by revised conceptions of 
private property; in the latter two, labour is liberated from the necessity of the soil. 
Chieftain, monarch, and republic all emerge from revolutions in how basic 
commercial practices are understood within society. The power of commerce 
precedes the power of political institutions—commerce is conferred a dangerously 
totalizing force within Smith’s theory when the strength behind what society has 
become expresses its most basic object of pursuit.   
Central to Smith’s account, as it was for Robertson and Kames, is the conviction 
that each transition into a new constitutional epoch symbolizes divinely executed 
positive improvement. In part six of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith claims: 
This universal benevolence, how noble and generous soever, can be the source of no 
solid happiness to any man who is not thoroughly convinced that all the inhabitants 
of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are under the immediate care and 
protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise Being, who directs all the 
movements of nature; and who is determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to 
maintain in it, at all times, the greatest possible quantity of happiness.153 
God not only directs gradual improvements over time, but also determines by his 
own inalterable perfections to provide creatures with the greatest possible quantity of 
happiness. Our Maker’s universal benevolence is thus simultaneously progressive 
and felicitous. His mission in the world is to amend abject circumstances and 
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strengthen feeble sentiments for the sole purpose of creaturely progress and 
enjoyment. The historian’s task is to uncover exactly how this providence matures 
humankind and contributes to the happiness of commercial society. For Smith and 
his peers the many advances in science, art, literature, manners, and especially 
commerce answered the question of how each contributes to the architecture of 
gladness God establishes for his creatures. Freedom to enjoy the happiness derived 
from these overarching provisions is all that is required; to allow the provisions to 
reach an appointed end.   
Taking into account all four Scottish school historians, it would be useful to 
restate the general principles underlying the conjectural model before turning our 
attention directly to Ferguson’s more unusual hermeneutic. Conjectural history is 
first and foremost a fact-driven model. The task is to reconstruct facts of history with 
such precision and unremitting detail that the narrative builds incrementally to an 
apex where readers can behold the glorious vistas of what has become of humankind. 
The depiction was inherently and unqualifiedly progressive. Natural law, the primary 
instrument of providence, could be discerned with immediate certainty and trusted to 
ensure uniformity in everyday affairs. Indeed, for Hume this uniformity would 
extend even to individual members of society determined by law to live predictably 
ordinary lives. Perhaps more dominant than any other principle of the conjectural 
model, however, was the power of commerce to unite, inspire, and direct civil 
society and its institutions. In this sphere the hand of providence was most easily 
detected. The Scottish school’s wooden, quasi-static version of providence tended to 
identify God’s purposes either with what humankind would like for God to 
accomplish or with what had transpired in past ages and was still sufficiently 
appreciated. It was, in other words, a selective providence twisted to serve 
humanity’s moral improvement and maximal happiness. Nearly unanimous in their 
acknowledgement of basic human progress, the notion became enshrined as a 
guiding light to historical interpretation. Material history, those past happenings that 
comprise specific facts of history, informs immaterial history, the ideas and 
meanings surrounding past happenings. Prioritizing material to immaterial history in 
this way inevitably suppresses the meaning of history latent in material facts: what 
happened in the past and what one presently thinks about the event are wholly 
correspondent, uniting the material “then” with the material “now.” The pre-
eminence of material history, however paradoxical, inaugurated the idea of intrinsic 
progress in history. In the hands of the Scottish school the need for historical respect 
   63
was largely forgotten and then replaced by a story of relentless progress led chiefly 
by refinements in the commercial sphere. 
 
Adam Ferguson on History 
Among eighteenth-century Scottish historical treatises, Adam Ferguson’s are 
doubtless among the unique and theoretically sophisticated.154 Here we have a 
theorist steeped in the classics, trained theologically for the Kirk, who seems to 
prefer the ancient histories of moral and political thought to much of their 
contemporary commentary; a figure who tellingly conceives of philosophical inquiry 
as an historical investigation .155 The first evidence of his historical perspective arises 
from a short pamphlet supporting stage-plays, and can be traced in greater maturity 
through his Principles of Moral and Political Science, History of the Progress and 
Termination of the Roman Republic, and Essay on the History of Civil Society. 
Ferguson’s mind is always historically directed but maintains an alternative notion of 
history to that of his Scottish peers. David Allen summarizes it well when he says, 
“the key appears to lie in Ferguson’s preoccupation…with how the techniques 
required for studying past and present societies might be made to yield philosophical 
principles with far-reaching economic, political and ethical implications.”156 
But what conceptual distinctions set Ferguson apart? In responding to this 
question it would be useful to take up the generic themes proposed at the outset—
Metaphysics and Institutions—and consider how they were deployed to address 
historical questions. In doing so it will become clear that Ferguson was not only 
disparaging of conjectural models of history, but aimed even to purify the methods of 
historical inquiry themselves. Using a variety of different illustrations and 
metaphors, from biological life-cycles to the fall of the Roman Empire, Ferguson 
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allows the ideas and events of history to retain their complex integrity, interpreting 
them cautiously in their proper context and without forcing them into progressive 
moulds. For him the circumstances from which ideas and events proceed are vital to 
how historical phenomena are correctly understood. The logical movement of history 
is neither conjectural nor cyclical, but a preliminary exploration of what can only be 
described as a primitive dialectic tool that, I argue, becomes a forerunner to an 
historical method later modified by Hegel and other German social theorists. In the 
course of our review of Ferguson’s thought it will become increasingly evident that 
he takes his greatest departure from the conjectural school on the question of 
commerce. Conducting a history of commerce reveals that commercial force is only 
one of many powers forging constitutional changes in political society. The most 
decisive reason commerce cannot remain central to any version of progressive 
history, however, is because Divine providence, the true governing power of 
commerce, is neither unquestioning nor unselective. Providence makes specific 
provisions and is therefore misunderstood when construed as inherently progressive. 
Concepts of improvement and advancement are in themselves historically deficient 
and theologically vacuous. If God is ever concerned with improvement it is always 
first redemptive, for the idea of a God that improves without redeeming substitutes 
the God who rights wrongs for a god content to promote happiness or refine 
manners. To understand how Ferguson conceives of the historical relation between 
providence and commerce it is to the themes of Metaphysics and Institutions we 
should now turn. 
Every philosophy of history implicitly or explicitly begins with the question of 
method. The first question of what history is quickly transforms into a question of 
how history is. Ferguson’s historical methodology is exploratory and sound, 
conversing with different periods of history on their own terms. “The information 
they bring,” he tells us, “is not like the light reflected in a mirror, which delineates 
the object which it originally came; but, like rays that come broken and 
dispersed…only give the colours and features of the body from which they were last 
reflected.”157 He is critical of those methodologies that appear to lean their 
conclusions too readily upon conjecture, and “to imagine that a mere negation of all 
our virtues is a sufficient description of man in his original state.”158 With statements 
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like these Ferguson is aware both of how notions of a “state of nature” are arrived at, 
as well as how Whig history is summoned to support this species of political inquiry. 
His contemporaries tended to view the past with present standards, imposing modern 
ideals of “manners” and “polish” upon supposed “barbarous” and “savage” nations 
of antiquity. The present, however, is ill-qualified “to prognosticate effects” or to 
decide what should or should not have been the case in a past state of affairs. The 
present cannot discern with great specificity what the societies of the distant past 
were like and thus “we can neither safely take, nor pretend to give, information on 
the subject.”159 We must insist upon a cautious reception. Comparing the present 
with the past qualitatively is not a valid form of moral and political inquiry and does 
a great disservice to history itself. Ferguson understood that moral and political 
philosophy were interdependent fields of thought and that to locate answers to moral 
and political questions one would be required to shift easily between the two spheres. 
Moreover, recognizing moral and political interdependency he also understood that 
these subjects were best understood when viewed historically. His methodology 
assumes that history is the place one goes for the wisdom to address compelling 
moral and political questions.   
History remains an emphatically metaphysical subject in that it cannot reside 
exclusively in the present world but must also rely upon a variety of alternate powers 
for its continued existence. Memory, habit, communication, place, all cooperate to 
support the life of history. History becomes unintelligible when wholly naturalized 
because history cannot be explained in purely natural terms. Intrinsic to history is a 
peculiar transcendence. The material historian might find it an easy task to tell us 
where and when the Act of Union was signed into law, for example, but will find it 
woefully difficult to tell us why it was recommended or passed in the first place. 
History is as surprisingly elusive as it is decisive; which is another way of saying that 
it has both an abstract and concrete ontology. Ferguson perceived this tension and 
sought to reconcile the two polarities within a balanced historical inquiry, making 
each polarity central to the other for meaningful communication from past to present. 
All history transpires in nature because mankind inhabits a natural world. What 
interests Ferguson, however, is how mankind deals with the world; not natural 
history per se, but mankind’s nature historically conceived. In both Principles and 
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History, Ferguson rejects the popular notion of a supposed “state of nature” from 
which all humanity is a common descendant. He begins instead with the “order” of 
nature, which “consists of movements… [that] in a state of counteraction and 
apparent disturbance, mutually regulate and balance one another.”160 Never static or 
entirely uniform, nature contains within itself a principle of continued movement 
controlled by its own inner forces—an original movement is counteracted and new 
movement begins afresh. Nature’s ordered unity allows for societies to form and 
flourish by affording enough consistency for them to generate elaborate histories of 
their own. Any such history will offer two types of narratives: a “history of species” 
and a “history of mind.”161 The former narrative will inform the historian of the 
effects of mind, whereas the latter will inform him of the operations of mind itself. 
So, to gain the truest vision of humanity one must avail oneself both to the study of 
mind, as well as to its “varieties presented in the history of mankind.”162 To know 
what we are like we must examine what we have been like. 
Ferguson wants to understand the meaning of mind’s historical manifestations. 
Each such manifestation is unique and complex but never simply a consequence of 
human ingenuity. True ingenuity is due to the “wisdom of God,” he explains, “not 
the deliberate effect of invention or choice.”163 One’s task is largely prescribed to 
them by their circumstance. Different places with different climates and different 
people means that each person must vary his pursuits to match the exigency of the 
case. “The inventions of one age prepare a new situation for the age that succeeds; 
and as the scene is ever changing, the actors proceed to change their pursuits… 
[according] to the circumstances in which they are placed.”164 Man is meant to bend 
to reality, not reality to man, and thus reality’s dominance defines for each person 
and society the terms of fruitful participation. Because humankind is shaped by 
reality it is thereby empowered to help shape reality itself. If there is anything 
ingenious about a human accomplishment it comes purely as a gift of God’s 
benevolent wisdom. Nature and the human subject mutually accommodate one 
another according to the moving order established by Providence and its creative 
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genius. Behind every good and truthful manifestation of mind is the wisdom of God 
giving or allowing it expression. Indeed, on this point Ferguson would have warmly 
affirmed the condemnation of natural religion issued by Friedrich Schleiermacher at 
the turn of the century: “Suavity and sociability, art and science have so fully taken 
possession of…minds, that no room remains for the holy Being that lies beyond the 
world.”165 
Nature is life-cycle consisting in ordered movements. The many parts of life 
come together in an unexpected unity established paradoxically by virtue of life’s 
conflicting polarities: war and peace, freedom and determinacy, perfection and 
defect. What appears prima facie to be a profane conflict may regularly turn out to be 
the beginnings of peace; what was thought to be perfection was actually a defect; and 
so forth. Coherence is brought to these polarities by God’s providential order. His 
order is evidence of a design that must be revealed to humankind, wherein “man is 
finally let into the secret of his own destination and is enabled to become a conscious 
and willing instrument in the hand of his Maker for the completion of his work.”166 If 
then one is made aware of their destination the task becomes one of discerning God’s 
eternal will. Sometimes God’s purposes are easily acted upon and sometimes they 
are not. This means the agent must consult the authority of history where the 
commands and wisdom of God consist in a living tradition. Sacred history discloses 
nature’s deepest truth: that life comes from death, and that death, in turn, summons 
all created life: “While the things that were are passing away, things that were not are 
brought into being.”167 The moving life-cycle includes within itself the pinnacle of 
creation—humankind—whom God invites to look back upon the past from which it 
has come and glean the wisdom communicated.   
This idea of “movement” and Ferguson’s not infrequent reference to “progress” 
or “progressive being” has persuaded many commentators to include him in the 
conjectural fold. Casting him in this way, isolating certain passages, fails to grasp the 
complexity of Ferguson’s historical imagination. It is true that he characterizes man 
as an active, even progressive being, but this is primarily because man cannot 
possibly be stationary or static. Matter can appear stationary, of course, but human 
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being is always “progressing,” as it were, in a certain direction. Ferguson suggests, 
by and large, though everyone tends toward progression of some form or other, the 
content of their progression will differ according to the object pursued: “Progressive 
natures are subject to vicissitudes of advancement and decline, but are not stationary, 
perhaps, in any period of their existence.”168 Human beings recognize within 
themselves a capacity for improvement motivated by a spirit of ambition to better 
themselves and their circumstance. At the same time Ferguson also argues that 
profiting from these ambitious powers obliges one “to recollect what they are, and to 
take resolution respecting their purpose.” His point, in short, is that progression 
should not be considered an open-ended horizon, but simply a natural process of 
human being directed toward a truthful end.  
If it matters in what or how progress is made, or what kinds of progress are good 
or evil, then the detection of progress remains crucial for historiography. A striking 
difference arises between some particular innovation presenting itself and 
understanding the full significance or meaning of that innovation. The foremost 
difficulty is distinguishing a genuine innovation from false. Trajectories of persons 
or nations, for example, need time to develop and diffuse, and thus are often viewed 
in retrospect with many years separating the judge and the judged of. This distance 
results in a kind of intellectual humility, a patient suspension of judgement that 
permits the content of history to disclose itself on its own terms. There is no way of 
telling, really, in which general direction a person or society travels without some 
idea of their ultimate destination: “the sequel in the order of things is hid from our 
sight” and each is perfectly blind to future possibilities.169 Speculating upon the 
future, particularly on the ultimate course of a given society, is like peering through 
the clouds and fog (James 4:13-17). On such evaluations science can teach us almost 
nothing, since there is little in “which the progress of mind is less questionable than 
it is in the attainment of science.”170 Although the ultimate goal of science is to 
explain reality and investigate its operations, it frequently disappoints by “pushing 
forward too fast” in hasty pursuit of discovery. If unchecked this haste might also 
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define judgements on the moral trajectory of an individual or society. It is better, 
thinks Ferguson, to take the long view—to step back and define the wider contours 
of civil society’s topography. 
Returning to the notion of life-cycle and nature’s movement through contrasting 
polarities, it is interesting that, of all things, Ferguson uses the development of 
memories and habits to transition from a mostly personal interrogation of progress, to 
a dynamically social one. Memories and habits are personal, yes, but they are also 
corporate, and each requires time to gain its communicative momentum. Ferguson 
narrows his attention to the impact of habits on political constitutions, and in 
particular their propensity for stimulating intellectual prejudices, since “the authority 
of government itself, under every political establishment, rests on the habits of 
thinking which prevail among the people.”171 He captures here an element of truth in 
popular sovereignty: sometimes habits are for the best politically and sometimes they 
are for the worst, but in either case habits remain essential to the enduring stability of 
civic order.  Habit expresses itself politically through customs. As a history of action, 
habits serve as channels down which the current of human morality travels. Habits of 
thought and action determine together the directional character of civil society. 
Society utilizes habits to balance the life-cycle’s repetitive clash of polarities and 
drive them onward in one contiguous direction. Improvement is one natural end for 
society, decline the other. But it should be remembered that the question before us is 
metaphysical and asks specifically why progress or decline comes about when it 
does. What criteria are observed when making judgments of this kind? History is a 
narrative of past transactions, to be sure, but does it then follow that the plot of this 
narrative is contrived? Not obviously. A principle of progress in human nature might 
elicit one’s longing for improvement, but gratifying this desire is never guaranteed, 
and even if granted rarely takes an anticipated form. Thus, progress is an object of 
human longing that remains beyond human control. Here the metaphysical character 
of Ferguson’s historical thought becomes strikingly less opaque: “The material world 
was made,” suggests Ferguson, “not for itself, but for the mutual communication of 
minds and forming a system of signs and expressions in which the infinite author 
makes himself known to his intelligent creatures.”172 As a means of Divine 
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communication, man’s task is to participate with God in the world’s redemption. 
Indeed, “the first object of concert or convention on the part of man is not to give 
society existence” or attempt novelty in a world already created, “but to perfect [the] 
society in which he finds himself already by nature placed.”173 Humanity is 
responsible for assisting God in his redemptive purposes without being motivated by 
reward, since “every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are 
termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future.”174 Therefore, 
one may conclude that the best one can do is: 
To view himself as but part in the community of living natures; by which he is in 
some measure let into the design of God, to combine all the parts together for the 
common benefit of all; and can state himself as a willing instrument for this purpose, 
in what depends on his own will; and as a conscious instrument, at the disposal of 
providence, in matters which are out of his power.175 
Having shown that the general direction of society cannot be known, much less 
shouted from the rooftops, Ferguson suggests that movements of society, like 
everyday movements of individuals, take one faint step at a time. The history of 
species is the story of society’s advancement and decline, improvement and 
corruption; a history of mortals that takes the interest of historians only so far. The 
history of mind, on the other hand, allows for much more interesting metaphysical 
speculations. On this subject Ferguson distinguishes strictly between the material and 
the immaterial: 
There are limits set to the progress of [man’s] animal frame.  It is stationary; it 
declines; and is dissolved: But to this progress of intelligence, in ascending the scale 
of knowledge and of wisdom, there are not any physical limits, short of the universe 
itself, which the happy mind aspires to know, and to the order of which he would 
conform his will.176 
In the section “Of the Future State” which concludes the first volume of the 
Principles, Ferguson argues further that although the material of humanity has an 
unthinkable future, “it is no violent stretch of imagination to conceive the human 
soul, in its present state, as the embryo of a celestial spirit.”177 Mankind is intended 
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to participate in God’s redemptive purposes on earth so that it may participate 
eternally in His life after work on earth is done. The highest calling is to participate 
with Him so as to forever live in Him. Mind is that immaterial part of man that, after 
bodily death, becomes the everlasting company of God. Eternality unlocks mind’s 
potential and renders it actual.  
These broadly metaphysical concerns highlight Ferguson’s objection to 
historiographies that presume to judge conclusively on the moral orientation and 
political trajectory of society. Methodologically this meant treating the subjects of 
historical inquiry with caution and dignity, allowing them to communicate their own 
questions from their own unique context. The present is not superior to the past by 
virtue of its convenient existence at a later time in history. Some conclusions can be 
drawn by observing the historical development of a given society, some cannot.  
What surely cannot be judged with sufficient accuracy is whether a people progress 
toward greater and greater refinements; whether, in other words, one society can 
ever be considered superior to another. Ferguson’s argument has been that a 
society’s true character is transcendent in that its moral direction can never be self-
determined or self-assigned. Scientific discovery, despite its promises and noble 
aspirations, cannot reduce, test, dilute, or otherwise explain the problem away. No 
amount of observation or experimentation will abolish the transcendent beauty of the 
world. What often appears progressive—like the caterpillar’s maturity to butterfly, 
or the merchant’s continued acquisition of wealth—may prove in the end merely to 
have initiated the beginnings of ruin. If societies experience progress or decline it 
must be determined what kind of progress or decline is being experienced or sought. 
And in drawing this distinction, the distinction of kind, we approach the second 
theme of Ferguson’s philosophy of history, Institutions. 
Historically speaking, how do institutions form a narrative that clarifies the 
ambiguities of politics? Do institutions possess a greater descriptive power nature 
can only point toward indirectly? For Ferguson the answer to this latter question 
clearly is “yes” and the task of outlining this theme will be to respond to the question 
of why institutions receive and contribute unique historical meanings. Methods 
seeking only to describe persons, places, ideas, events, or institutions of history are 
bound to disappoint, as such descriptive efforts are usually as tedious as they are 
uninteresting. History is shaped by the ever-changing harmony of these forces, each 
striking its own note and inspiring the historian in a different way. Hume was correct 
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to suggest that history maintains certain seamless regularities and constancies but 
was wrong to insist that such fixity determines how history should be interpreted. 
The song that history sings may retain its basic form, indeed it must, but the many 
different sopranos, tenors, and basses uniting to vocalize the harmony of history’s 
song are often wildly unpredictable. Without doubt the most moving moments of 
any a choral arrangement are those that fracture expectations! Meaning emerges 
from history as moments of surprise, spontaneity, or intense breakthrough. That 
Bach expresses a tendency to appreciate certain notes or harmonies and uses them 
with frequency is easily overshadowed by the dazzling originality of his artistic 
expressions. History, too, expresses certain uniformities, as Hume suggests, but its 
regularities and constancies become meaningful only when interrupted or 
transformed. Institutions serve as anchors of history in much the same way C-minor 
occupies Bach’s Cantatas; the fixity of institutions provides a gravity regulating the 
unpredictable force of ideas and events. Institutions become, as it were, the 
historians starting point. 
But what is an institution? Initially the term’s use was theological and referred to 
a contiguous authority established by God to direct and order human affairs. 
Marriage, law, church, university, all represent institutions divinely imputed and 
governed. They are chiefly inherited, not assigned; their authority and continued 
legitimacy vouchsafed by God and assisted by public faith, habits, and prejudices. 
Human beings are born into particular places at particular times, and institutions 
provide the authoritative boundaries for human action in political life. Institutions 
are involuntary in the sense that they are not presented to the public as a collection of 
equal options from which to choose. And yet, for Ferguson, although a society’s 
inherited institutions continually exert enormous force on social consciousness, each 
relies tenuously upon sustained public honouring of that force. In fact, authority of 
government itself “rests on the habits of thinking which prevail among the 
people.”178 The actual thinking of a people about their institutions contributes 
directly to the ever-fluctuating influence and durability of the institutions 
themselves. Questions of how institutions are experienced, therefore, logically 
precede their further formation of human experience.   
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Upon institutions “civilization” is founded.179 For Scottish school historians this 
title of “civilization” was awarded, in addition to their own, only to the ancient 
Greek and Roman states. On their view these “masculine” yet vanquished republics 
represent the origin of a progress that European societies have since been avidly 
trying to replicate. Both Hume and Robertson began their histories of England and 
Scotland at their ancient roots. Ferguson, on the other hand, takes the question of 
institutional progression from a different angle and draws notably different 
conclusions. His moral and political thought remains institutionally, as opposed to 
socially or conventionally, centred because society and conventions revolve around 
institutions much like the planets do the sun, receiving energy from their furnishings 
and providing equilibrium to everyday life. In his History of the Progress and 
Termination of the Roman Republic, Ferguson illustrates how institutions are 
historically conceived. As the title indicates, the book narrates constitutional changes 
of ancient Rome from their republican beginnings to their despotic end. His method 
mimics in many ways the descriptive style of Robertson and Hume, but does so 
under radically different assumptions of what that history ultimately means. In his 
erudite article on political “threats” in Ferguson’s Roman Republic, Iain McDaniel 
explains that “Ferguson’s insistence upon the relevance of classical history for a 
proper understanding of modern Europe’s political trajectory sets him at some 
distance from other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers,” who “generally emphasized 
the superiority of modern commercial societies over their ancient more ‘barbarous’ 
predecessors.”180 Roman history meant something to contemporary Europe because 
the story of Rome mapped nicely onto modern political affairs. The issues that either 
plagued or benefitted Rome seem also to plague or benefit societies many centuries 
removed, suggesting many moral and political questions always remain perennial. 
Montesquieu had made a similar claim only a few decades prior and it is from him 
Ferguson inherits the interpretation of Roman decline as a consequence of 
“corrupted public spirit” attending constitutional transitions toward democratic 
sovereignty.181 Disagreement between the two theorists is visible too, of course, but 
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what is essential for our purposes is what Ferguson’s understanding of ancient 
Roman institutions tells us about his philosophy of history. The point seems to be 
that “progresses” assigned to civilizations of modern Europe could also be assigned 
to ancient Rome. Rome is not merely a society from which modern society has 
arisen and upon which it frowns; rather, it is a society with abundant political 
analogues that would, if consulted, impart wisdom to cope with corresponding 
questions. In Rome’s case the active pursuit of greater territories and pleasures 
slowly destabilized institutions preserving social cohesion and anesthetized public 
spirit. But Ferguson nowhere argues that these corruptions ultimately converted 
Rome from a republican to monarchical constitution. The problem was more 
complex than that. Instead his argument is that modern European nations, like 
ancient Rome, are susceptible to capricious swings between popular and monarchical 
tyranny. The real political problem is anarchy. Ancient Rome had lost the power of 
its institutions because their authority was undermined, becoming 
by degrees, and at every succession, more and more mercenary or venal in the 
choice of their masters, more brutal in the exercise of their force against fellow-
subjects, and, with a continual degradation from bad to worse, substituted order, 
courage, and discipline of Roman legions, [for] mere ferocity, with a disposition to 
mutiny as well as rapine.182 
The empire appeared healthy at its outer extremities while secretly rotting in its 
centre. It underwent two ideological transitions, one moral and one political: from 
republic to monarchy, and from Epicurean to Stoic convictions. We are concerned 
here only with the latter transition, from Epicurean to Stoic. When there were rights 
to preserve and public duties to perform the Roman people were persuaded to align 
themselves with Epicurus and establish pleasure as the highest standard of good and 
evil. But when public occupations were taken from them and their personal safety 
jeopardized they quickly returned to the idea that “men were made happy by the 
qualities which they themselves possessed, and by the good they performed, not by 
mere gifts of fortune.”183 Romans turned their hearts from Epicurus to Zeno for 
consolation. In this way, therefore, philosophical ideas—their usual commitments 
included—are seen to emanate from political circumstances, not vice-versa.  
Political and moral convictions were deeply intertwined: the empire grew, commerce 
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flourished, and the land was cultivated, “but these were but poor compensations for 
the want of that rigor, elevation, and freedom of mind, which perished with the 
Roman republic itself, or with the political character of the other nations which had 
been absorbed in the depths of this ruinous abyss.”184 Institutions had endured 
gradual, almost imperceptible deterioration at the hand of the very people these 
institutions supported, and thus ancient Rome collapsed under the weight of its own 
corruption.   
The story of ancient Rome illustrates how and why institutions are initiated, 
changed, protected, or abolished.  Every new variation is a budding flower ripe with 
meaning. Ferguson’s investigation of the “Savage” and “Barbarian,” the historic 
creatures so disparaged by Scottish school historians, reinforces this point.  In early 
sections of the Essay, Ferguson isolates the question of what man is capable of 
actively carrying out. What can man’s exertive actions actually accomplish?  
Scientific experimentation, it is clear, will teach us nothing new on the subject.185 
The better option is to “take the history of active being from his conduct in the 
situation to which he is formed, not from his appearance in any forced or uncommon 
condition.”186 The Savage or Barbarian, for example, should be treated contextually 
as a product of their placement. Notions of a progress from animal to citizen are 
nothing but presumptuous fantasies and inventions. If it is admitted that man 
possesses a principle of improvement, then that improvement has only to do with 
what he is capable of achieving, and nothing more. All the latest efforts at newness 
and advantage are but a continuation of past endeavours and whether or not one 
naturally advances toward or retreats from noticeable improvement remains mostly 
concealed. Determining what is truly “natural” about progress always proves 
treacherous because of the term’s unavoidable ambiguity, and because “the actions 
of men are equally the result of their natures.”187  The Savage in Ferguson’s Essay is 
represented by the Indian tribes of North America. On his account, the Savage pays 
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little attention to property, lives mostly for subsistence, views his place 
pragmatically, and lives a life of equality with peers. There exists little sign of 
subordination and each member is content to live according to the natural 
furnishings of nature. For Savages, “power is no more than the natural ascendancy of 
mind; the discharge of office no more than a natural exercise of the personal 
character, and while the community acts with an appearance of order, there is no 
sense of disparity in the breast of any of its members.”188 The bonds that bring 
Savages together are those of genuine affection and friendship. Property is 
unthought-of because it is not yet viewed as a requirement for life. “No man is 
naturally indebted to another” and therefore the community is free of unequal 
treatment. It is only when friendship becomes defined in terms of duties or favours 
that the bonds of friendship are corroded, as the importation of obligations into the 
frame of relations eliminates its friendliness. The presumption of equality is 
abolished by a sense of indebtedness giving one member of the community leverage 
over another. Trust is lost; suspicion prevails. But the Savage avoids this problem by 
seeing justice as a matter of fitness, “not the distinctions of equipage and fortune.”189 
To illustrate this conceptual difference: “in Europe to fall in battle is accounted an 
honour; among the [Savages] it is reckoned disgraceful.”190 They are a capable 
people without ambition. Ferguson is persuaded that once the Savage has taken note 
of the negative effects commercial arts admit, he loses the freedom that only his 
native culture naturally endows—“however tempted to mix with polished nations, 
and to better his fortune, the first moment of liberty brings him back to the woods 
again; he droops and he pines in the streets of the populous city.”191 Commercial 
gain is for the Savage a small temptation, but one quick to atrophy with the 
deadening of competitive energy. 
What differentiates the Savage from the Barbarian is the latter’s recognition that 
property can be privately possessed. For the Barbarian, the “common” is already a 
divided common.192 A specific application of labour to a specific place “aims at an 
exclusive possession” and “when the individual no longer finds among his associates 
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the same inclination to commit every subject to public use, he is seized for his 
personal fortune; and is alarmed by the cares which every person entertains for 
himself.”193 Thus it is only when others are seen to be withholding from the public 
and hoarding out of fear of not-having that one seeks to acquire what best supports 
subsistence. Herds are the initial source of the Barbarian’s wealth. Each occupies 
himself with his own doings, his own accumulation and his own advantage. And yet, 
explains Ferguson, one “may now apprehend that the individual having now found a 
separate interest, the bands of society must become less firm, and domestic disorders 
more frequent.”194 Unequal distribution of property introduces a permanent 
subordination resulting in total abolition of equality. Property first initiates and then 
encourages competition, strife, and violent conflict. Unity is forged anew only by 
dedication to a leader recognized for their amassed fortunes. Thus, in the society of 
Barbarians, fortune replaces capacity, generosity, and friendship: “every nation is a 
band of robbers, who prey without restraint, or remorse, on their neighbours.”195 
Ferguson agrees with Scottish peers that recognition of a “fortunate” leader is the 
beginning of monarchical government, but disagrees with where this logic leads 
historical thinking. When the Chieftain or King becomes “the object of veneration” 
he also becomes the highest object of national unity, their “common bond of 
connection.”196 Upon coronation the monarch seeks to expand his dominion by 
conquest, which serves to further unite the nation against a common enemy and 
doubly reinforce allegiance to the king. The Barbarian is reduced to a useful subject, 
for “when interest prevails in every breast, the sovereign and his party cannot escape 
the infection…to turn people into property, and to command their possessions for his 
profit or his pleasure.”197 This is what happens, thinks Ferguson, when interest rather 
than laws guides a sovereign and his people; the logic of acquisition halts not even at 
the profane possession of people. Mankind is everywhere divided and interest drives 
the wedge still deeper. 
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Stepping back from our direct investigation of the Savage and Barbarian what, 
exactly, is their practical role in Ferguson’s philosophy of history? As with the 
narrative of the Roman Empire, it seems that the Savage and Barbarian illustrate the 
incoherence of reading progress into the institutional plot of history. The supposed 
“rude” nations of the past (a term Ferguson identifies with “disorder”) are not to be 
considered as inferior to our own: 
We are generally at a loss to conceive how mankind can subsist under customs and 
manners extremely different from our own; and we are apt to exaggerate the misery 
of barbarous times by an imagination of what we ourselves should suffer in a 
situation to which we are not accustomed.  But every age hath its consolations, as 
well as its sufferings.198 
Projecting oneself and one’s circumstance onto history is a tempting fallacy for even 
the most cautious historian, but history must not be considered as an account of how 
institutions of the present came to ascendancy over institutions of the past. As is 
illustrated by the rise and fall of the Roman Empire and the basic political 
configuration of Savage and Barbarian societies, institutions, like the people they 
govern, are susceptible to transforming movements. Rome seemed to be progressing 
just fine until it unexpectedly collapsed; the Savage seemed (by Hume and 
Robertson, anyway) to show signs of rudeness and depravity when in fact he was 
happily content with primitive subsistence. On both accounts Ferguson shows that 
institutions are not self-directed toward political perfection. Any discernible 
difference between the ancient and modern—between “rude” and “polished”—is 
purely a difference of kind and not of worth. Ferguson’s treatment of the Roman and 
Savage demonstrates that institutional changes prompted by commercial forces 
within these rude societies, though such forces may appear to modern eyes 
intrinsically conducive to political improvement, were for these societies corrosive to 
the affective powers that held them together. There is little reason to view the 
ancients as less polished or civilized: “they have merited and obtained our praise” by 
“their penetration, the ability of their conduct, and the force of their spirit.”199     
A natural law of progress cannot long exist because, as Prof. Collingwood has 
nicely put it, the idea of a law of progress, “by which the course of history is so 
governed that successive forms of human activity exhibit each an improvement on 
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the last, is…a mere confusion of thought, bred of an unnatural union between man’s 
belief in his own superiority to nature and his belief that his is nothing more than a 
part of nature.”200 Similarly persuaded, Ferguson suggests societies are largely a 
product of their place and circumstance, and any advancement or improvement 
considered only in kind. Commerce is conspicuously referred to as a category of 
“art,” prescribed to humanity by its place, controlling to some degree what can or 
cannot be contributed. In a period of conflict the energy of arts will be comparatively 
low as national felicity is doused by the burden of war. The artistic is latent in every 
human soul and only requires favourable circumstances to draw it into the open. 
Modern Europe is artistically indebted to the ancients only to a small degree, since 
they provided merely the “materials” and “form” of artistry and not the felicitous 
motivation. Arts arise spontaneously from the human mind wherever men are 
cheerfully placed. And yet, in a statement strangely resonant with Heidegger’s “The 
Origin of the Work of Art,” “it is difficult to find the origin of any art.”201 The steps 
toward perfect art are numerous and “we are at a loss on whom to bestow the 
greatest praise; on the first or on the last who may have born a part in the 
progress.”202 Commercial arts, a specific category of artistic activity, arise from 
affections and, like literary arts, are “promoted by circumstances that suffer the mind 
to enjoy itself.”203 Not wholly inherited from the past and containing in itself a 
certain newness, art makes fresh impressions upon the fabric of reality and upon the 
texture of commercial enterprise in particular. The question is whether this newness 
or fresh impression constitutes a genuine improvement: does the process of the old 
giving way to new imply superiority? From whose point of view could such a 
judgment be determined? Here again Collingwood offers insight. The problem with 
latent progress is that experience shows us that the new generation has a difficult 
time entering sympathetically into the life of the old; the new generation “sees life as 
a mere incomprehensible spectacle, and seems driven to escape from sympathy…by 
a kind of instinctive effort to free itself from parental influences and bring about the 
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change on which it is blindly resolved.”204 It is precisely because of this inability to 
sympathize that 
the historical changes in a society’s way of life are very rarely conceived as 
progressive even by the generation that makes them.  It makes them in obedience to 
a blind impulse to destroy what it does not comprehend, as bad, and substitute 
something else as good.  But progress is not the replacement of bad by the good, but 
of the good by the better.205 
Art develops but cannot be said to progress. And as commercial arts cooperate with 
institutions it becomes clear, on Ferguson’s account, that art leaves an historical 
impression on institutions which might not turn out to be an improvement. Political 
institutions are initiated and concluded, contracted and expanded, altered and 
preserved; they are both a product of, and force upon, civil society. Against the 
Scottish school therefore Ferguson insists commerce does not always administer 
improvements but may degenerate and corrupt even the most cultivated bonds of 
cohesion.    
The two generic themes we have considered in Ferguson’s historical thought—
Metaphysics and Institutions—appear on closer examination to take on a sharply 
dialectical character. History widens prudence by stretching and informing it of 
customs and conventions corresponding to present reality. Ferguson’s historical 
writing, as David Kettler explains, “embodies a method, but does not pronounce on 
method,” allowing him to “hold alternative possibilities in suspension, while moving 
to a conclusion and achieving an effect at a level different from that upon which the 
possibilities clash.”206 Hume, of course, is known to have disliked the Essay enough 
to discourage Ferguson from going ahead with publication, and although Hume’s 
letters on the subject are unclear as to why, the tone with which his disagreement is 
expressed draws further contrast between the preferred methods of each historian. 
And as Italian historian Vincenzo Merolle urges, “Hume is a man of the 
Enlightenment, Ferguson a precursor of Historicism and Romanticism.”207 The ideas 
and method of the Essay belong more to the nineteenth than to the eighteenth-
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century. Ferguson could identify the faulty logic of historical progress while 
simultaneously acknowledging the historical fact that life changes—his method 
allows for this tension. A primitive brand of historicism was introduced that even his 
contemporaries could identify as original. The “secret substratum of the Essay was 
not the philosophy of the Enlightenment but a philosophy that sought…to 
comprehend theory as a historical practice—historicism.”208  
This, in essence, explains Ferguson’s taking an historical view of morality and 
politics and why his philosophy of history appears proto-Hegelian. Ferguson’s 
position toward history manifests itself throughout the corpus of his work—moral 
and political philosophy are historical explorations. In the Principles, but even more 
explicitly in the Essay, he employs an unrefined dialectical method that hangs 
together precisely as Kettler has suggested, in suspension. Affirmation is often 
followed by denial; freedom is pitted against determinacy; life gives itself to death 
and death gives itself to life. History progresses and declines and its dialectic 
movement gathers still greater exploratory momentum through successive human 
experiences. The rough-edged historicism and primitive dialectic in Ferguson’s 
thought is also confirmed by the German reception of his historical works in the late 
eighteenth-century.209 It is difficult to say with any exactness what Hegel himself 
thought of Ferguson’s historical method, but clearly “Ferguson’s complex view of 
history, allowing patterns of progress and regress and tying them to deliberate human 
actions, fascinated and baffled” his German counterparts.210 The best we can do is 
infer from a comparison of Ferguson and Hegel’s historical methods notable 
similarities suggesting a common historical outlook. Disincluded from the list of 
similarities, obviously, is the idea of historical progress; a view Hegel endorses with 
confidence and one Ferguson largely rejects.  
Describing Ferguson’s historical method as dialectical returns us to the analogy 
of the life-cycle referred to above. Conjectural history is expressly premised on the 
idea that history naturally progresses. Its unspoken premise, however, is the idea that 
nature itself progresses. This latter premise was made possible by conceptual 
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transitions several decades earlier when matter, the stuff of the universe, became 
“the quantitatively organized totality of moving things.”211 For the ancient Greeks, 
on the other hand, there was no “dead” matter: “nature was a vast living organism, 
consisting of a material body spread out in space and permeated by movements in 
time; the whole body was endowed with life, so that all its movements were vital 
movements; and all these movements were purposive, directed by intellect.”212 
Unlike the ancients, late renaissance theorists perceived reality as a multiplicity of 
united objects absent of imposed form. Mind and the material world were fused. 
Ferguson is clearly most sympathetic with the ancient view of nature.213 In a short 
section of the Principles (“The Origin of Evil”) he claims “the whole is alive and in 
action; the scene perpetually changing, but in its changes exhibits an order more 
striking than could be made to arise from the mere position or description of any 
form entirely at rest.” In reality, explains Ferguson, “the principles of agitation and 
of life combine their effects in constituting an order of things, which is at once 
fleeting and permanent.”214 Thus, not only is the “whole alive and in action,” but the 
movement of this life takes a dialectical shape. “While the things that were are 
passing away, things that were not are brought into being.”215 
Ferguson modifies this classical understanding of nature by infusing it with 
Providence. The natural world is God’s creation, and like the artist who gives every 
effort to preserve his masterpiece, so too does God concern himself with the care of 
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his good world. It is indeed a natural world enlivened by the immanent Spirit 
“consisting” in Christ (Col. 1:17). The life-cycle of nature reflects the telos of divine 
wisdom in its paradoxical character: material and immaterial, describable and 
indescribable, fleeting and permanent. Life-cycle as a natural revelation of God 
imitates the revelation of the gospel of Jesus Christ, whose life, death, and 
resurrection restores the created order and reconciles all life from estrangement. But 
the transformation of creation that follows from the resurrection of Christ does not 
emanate a progressive hue; “redemption” conveys a meaning that deliberately avoids 
the ambitions of progress. His world was created good (Gen.1) and does not need to 
be improved upon, only ordered.216 Progress is for Ferguson a theological mistake 
and a historical fallacy. Semblances of improvement making appearance in history—
perceived in the only way improvements or declines can be perceived, 
retrospectively—are the direct result of Christianity’s inexhaustible competence for 
transforming human existence. Transformations are often interpreted as 
improvements, and indeed this is not to a fault, since many important historical 
moments disclose obvious progresses; the trouble, however, is that what may seem 
an example of progress from one point of view may well appear an odious 
corruption from another.217 Progresses, if they occur at all, enjoy only a minor niche 
of human experience and invariably suffer a very short life. Confusion sets in when a 
“change” observed in history is categorized positively or negatively according to 
unknown evaluative criteria of a judging historian. Prescriptions of what should or 
should not have been the case will therefore dismember any history it holds in view.  
More important than the historical change itself, at any rate, is the inner meaning 
partially hidden from scrutiny. Meaning, not fact, is the crux of historical 
knowledge. Whether persons or societies progress to superior states of being is less 
important historically than seeking to recover the significance of historical 
phenomenon by asking what was actually accomplished. Meaning emerges from 
eruptive newness in history. “To be truly ‘history’,” as Oliver O’Donovan has put it, 
“history must be shaped by the unique, by that which cannot be guessed from the 
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scrutiny of the natural.”218 When the artist completes his masterpiece on canvas he 
revisits it only with the most slight and meticulous strokes.   
Perhaps the most questionable consequence of the conjectural model in the 
modern age is its packaging of progress into economic theory. The totalizing 
intensity with which the economy demands our constant attention tends also to blind 
us to the fact that nearly all capitalist models have built within them variables of 
progress. The market must grow, consumption must increase, and ever more capital 
generated. Unrelenting in its aims the progressive market is incapable of yielding to 
its own demands; its thirst is unquenchable. Christian virtues of contentment, 
satisfaction, peace, and generosity are forced into exile. This is not to say, of course, 
that capitalism would self-destruct if guided by such virtues; it may well be 
strengthened. The point, rather, is that under present conditions the progressive 
energy of capitalism discourages (or disallows) these Christian virtues. Liberal free 
market capitalism promises limitless horizons for limitless human ambitions and we 
have arrived at this position, however indirectly, precisely because progress came to 
describe what happens necessarily to the world over time.   
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to contrast the historical thought of Adam 
Ferguson with his Scottish contemporaries so as to expose tensions inherent to 
conjectural models of history. We began outlining the shape of the conjectural 
position by describing its motivations, method, and end. This was followed by an 
extended conversation with Ferguson on the disclosure of meaning in history. The 
conversation was guided by two generic themes: Metaphysics and Institutions. From 
the former emerged questions of nature, determinacy and freedom, novelty, 
complexity, epistemic humility, and Providence. Metaphysics came at the meaning 
of history from the abstract angle. The latter theme, Institutions, came at the meaning 
of history from the concrete angle, which explored the nature of institutional shift 
historically (ancient Rome) and comparatively (Savage). From this treatment 
emerged a primitive version of a dialectical method. But it was a dialectical method 
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with historicist commitments, as it is clear Ferguson wished to investigate moral and 
political questions as historical phenomena.   
History is a search for meaning, and meaning endeavours to express itself 
uniquely in history. For Ferguson history is not a story of progress—history is a 
sage. Through its lens one traces the moral and political contours of human 
existence. History resists rigid determinacy and is absorbed into Providence that 
preserves history by infusing it with meaning. Commercial progress may improve 
certain political institutions or it may ruin them, one can never be certain. 
Civilizations rise and fall, institutions endure and crumble, societies unite and 
dissolve. What is to come of any given society cannot be determined absolutely and 
for this reason Ferguson recommends a posture of humility. People of one age 
cannot with any degree of accuracy claim superiority to another when 
comprehensive evaluative criteria remain unavailable. Bound up in the wisdom of 
God history is, in truth, the story of his goodness; a symphony of which he is the 
author, conductor, and audience: History bespeaks him as he reveals its meaning. 
  






Historians familiar with eighteenth-century moral and political thought might 
balk at the proposal of treating action as an exceptional philosophic category. The 
eighteenth-century, they will say, is the age of natural reason, Greek virtue, and 
Roman politics; the age of moral sense, sentiment, sympathy, fellow-feeling, and 
natural reason. If the period erects any ideological pillars, action is not like to be one 
of them. For most eighteenth-century philosophers, action is at best a tertiary 
concern. One acts in the way one is conditioned or determined to act. Studying the 
act itself can illuminate little of moral or political significance. This tendency toward 
evaluation of pre-action conditions is perhaps the most dominant motif of eighteenth-
century moral philosophy and it is precisely in light of this motif and philosopher’s 
determination to marginalize the role of action in moral and political theory that 
Ferguson’s thought becomes all the more unique. Unlike his Scottish contemporaries 
Ferguson positions action squarely in the center of his philosophical investigations. 
He is concerned with practical questions his contemporaries either wholly neglect or 
purposefully marginalize. Action is not merely a by-product of other more important 
ethical matters, but a moral and political gateway through which all practical 
investigations must pass.   
Unique he may be, systematic he most certainly is not. Ferguson’s is a 
conceptually cautious and historically balanced action theory of subtle originality, 
charily weaving together disparate threads of classical insight and Christian 
metaphysical reflection. We saw in the previous chapter that “active being” occupied 
a prominent, if not central position in Ferguson’s philosophy of history: action is 
understood historically and history is largely understood as a narrative of actions. To 
better define the texture of action in Ferguson’s thought, this essay will begin by 
reviewing several of Ferguson’s peers—Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith—and 
outlining briefly their rationale for centralizing virtue in civil society, taking 
particular note of how action became largely neglected in moral inquiries of the 
period. Each of these theorists view action as an inessential part of moral philosophy 
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and in the final estimate it will be crucial to see why this was in fact the case. With 
these contextual observations in place we will make our first attempt at sketching 
Ferguson’s own action theory with greater specificity, focusing narrowly on five 
distinct but interrelated conceptual themes: history, human nature, reason, virtue, and 
futurity. Framing the sketch within these thematic parameters will aid in further 
illustrating Ferguson’s distinctiveness as a thinker and accentuate the Christian 
character of his action theory. At the conclusion of this rehearsal it will be essential 
to put some conceptual distance between Ferguson and the Roman Stoicism to which 
he has been linked by modern commentators; neither going so far as to suggest 
avoidance of Stoic tendencies altogether, nor leaving him relegated to Stoic fates. 
Final points of this chapter will then be devoted to highlighting the import 
Ferguson’s existential understanding of action has for commerce and for the types of 
exertions called for commercially in political life. If action could be said to have an 
essence, does that essence reflect certain Christian commitments? If so, how do those 
commitments produce a moral shape in the commercial sphere? 
 
Interlocutors: Scottish Contemporaries and Ancient Stoicism 
Eighteenth-century philosophy, on the whole, has comparatively little to say 
about the nature or anatomy of action and incomparably more to say about the nature 
of virtue. Not dissimilar to previous ages for which virtue takes conceptual priority, 
moral inquiry in the eighteenth-century tends to by-pass transformative action 
altogether by focusing on what lies hidden behind actions in the form of passions or 
dispositions. Scottish moralists of this period were of no exception and were perhaps 
even more inclined to privilege virtue to exertive action in moral casuistry. Before 
proceeding to a reconstruction and interpretation of Ferguson’s theory of action, 
therefore, it would be useful first to capture a vision of how several Scottish peers—
in this case Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith—understood the 
virtue-action interface. 
The philosophic efforts of Francis Hutcheson could be viewed as a preliminary 
attempt to break apart and differentiate the dispositional strata that uphold 
impassioned virtue. Questions relating to the appropriate execution or intended goals 
of action are no longer relevant or interesting. His attention is narrowed to the 
discrete origins of action where passions offer singular guidance to particular moral 
judgments. Persuaded by ancient appraisals of human passion, Hutcheson exposes 
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human nature at its core first by grounding action in affections and then by 
grounding affections in human nature. The main strategy of his Inquiry into the 
Origins of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue shows that the source for comprehending 
virtue is human nature’s moral sense—“that faculty by which we perceive virtue and 
vice, and approve or disapprove of them in others.”219 This sense of virtue or vice is 
itself reducible to “one general foundation; the manner [of] computing the morality 
of Actions.”220 By making Moral Sense the basic origin of action and diverting the 
focus of moral inquiry to the questions of why and how the Moral Sense operates, 
Hutcheson enshrines a cognitive function that serves as both the executor and object 
of moral evaluation. The pursuit of moral learning becomes a retreat into the mind’s 
Moral Sense and the task of moral deliberation becomes a matter of describing 
dispositional attitudes. Contingent mental content temporarily controlling the Moral 
Sense is of greatest ethical significance. The “intention of moral philosophy,” he 
claims, is “to direct me to that course of action which tends most effectually to 
promote [my] greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by 
observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without 
any aids of supernatural revelation.”221 Moral inquiry therefore addresses the 
fluctuating properties of an otherwise constant Moral Sense. Nevertheless, the true 
and happy end of humankind “cannot be distinctly known without previous 
knowledge of the constitution of the species,” which we are told later is simply “to 
inquire into the several powers and dispositions of the species.”222 Strangely, this 
investigation into (historically) “previous” dispositions is never conducted. 
Hutcheson instead attempts to translate historically sensitive moral concepts into 
terms suitable for the ever-widening field of contemporary “pneumatics.”223 The 
important task, he thinks, is to describe the mental faculty of moral sense and why 
that faculty approves or disapproves of certain actions. Such approbation, in the end, 
is all that matters in morality: “there is therefore…a natural and immediate 
determination to approve certain affections, and actions consequent upon them; or 
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natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality 
perceivable by our senses or by reasoning.”224 Thus, with the language of “approval” 
one recognizes necessary functions of a learned and immediate “determination” 
(judgment) operating unfettered from reasoning, law, truth, or history.225 This cluster 
of instincts (senses) and judgments known as human nature are considered absolutely 
trustworthy and universally benevolent, cooperating “beautifully” to maximize 
personal and corporate happiness.226 It is simply a credit to the Author of nature that 
benevolence happens to be that affection which most directly leads to human 
happiness.    
David Hume, on the other hand, though certainly partial to a “pneumatic” 
method, attempts to get behind even the moral sense itself by explaining what it is 
and to what it is not ultimately beholden. Moral philosophy interrogates the 
collection of perceptions causally linked to feelings of pleasure and pain. Like 
Hutcheson, Hume also detaches the virtuousness of an action from its 
reasonableness. On his account, the problem is “whether it be possible, from reason 
alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur some 
other principles to enable us to make that distinction.”227 Morals are transformed 
from objective authorities to special intellectual powers, since reason lacks the causal 
capacity to initiate an action from its own resources and must instead rely upon the 
forces of passion and perception to accomplish its ends. Hume’s more extreme claim 
that “moral distinctions are not the offspring of reason,” which understands reason to 
be “wholly inactive,” further reinforces the virtue-action contrast.228 These stark 
divisions between reason and morality, and between virtue and action, signal the 
final and “natural” conclusion that “morality is more properly felt than judged of.”229 
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Feeling and the perception of feeling actually constitutes praise or blame.230 By 
making human nature the decisive authority of moral inquiry Hume has reduced the 
totality of ethical content to natural human passions by collapsing the role of 
deliberative reason. On his view, not only must reason remain mute within moral 
discourses, but so too must virtue, as it is absorbed into the feelings of personal 
association. Virtue is nothing but the feeling of pleasure and vice nothing but the 
feeling of pain.231 The meaning of virtue signifies empirical principles of mind 
habituated and organized into a personal ‘character’. “Actions themselves,” Hume 
insists, “not proceeding from any constant principle have no influence on love or 
hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never considered in morality.”232 
Hence, all genuine ethical inquiry is concerned with the quality of character from 
which action proceeded; no other origin is possible. 
Passions eventually give rise to sympathy and to a specific kind of pleasure that 
only the sympathetic person can enjoy. Sympathy is for Hume the highest and most 
basic moral faculty. Functioning much like the moral sense, sympathy is socially 
informed and causally constructed, approving or disapproving as passions dictate. 
Human beings within civil society learn to accommodate one another by expressing 
and enjoying mutual sympathy. This is why Hume is able to redefine justice as an 
interior (artificial) virtue and law as a perpetuation of social custom; both justice and 
law become expressions of how impassioned individuals secure social cohesion 
through formal institutions. By universalizing human nature in this way he can 
separate his treatment of virtue and vice (methodologically) into two distinct parts; 
the nature of virtue and vice on the one hand, and the function of virtue and vice on 
the other.233 Human nature is fashioned into a function that both receives and 
contributes “extensive sympathy” and “limited generosity,” because “moral good and 
evil are distinguished by our sentiments, and not our reason.”234 Thus, if a passion 
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contributes to an enduring beauty, then that passion is found immediately agreeable 
and absolutely trustworthy.   
One of Hume’s many aims is to eradicate action from moral inquiry altogether by 
identifying what he believes holds the true power of being—human nature. Two 
implications of Hume’s theory of human nature merit further consideration: the 
internalization of value and the social ascription of identity. The internalization of 
value is most clearly expounded in his Essays. In a sequence of four essays, Hume 
enlists the ancient philosophic schools—Epicurean, Stoic, Platonist, and Sceptic—to 
face down rationalist phantoms in seventeenth and eighteenth-century moral 
epistemology. Of those antiquarian schools represented Hume unreservedly casts his 
lot with the Sceptics. The Epicurean, or “the man of elegance and pleasure,” makes 
pleasure the object of pursuit and pain the object of his avoidance; the Stoic, or “the 
man of action and virtue,” attempts to abolish desire altogether, or at the least 
become indifferent to it; the Platonist, or “the man of contemplation and 
philosophical devotion,” hopes for mind to find happiness in its most perfect object; 
the Sceptic, on the other hand, harbours doubt about the whole externality of an 
ultimate or universal object. As Hume puts it, “in a word, human life is more 
governed by fortune than by reason; is to be regarded more as a dull pastime than as 
a serious occupation; and is more influenced by particular humour, than by general 
principles.”235 No first principles exist that are not already qualities of mind, for “it is 
not from the value or worth of the object which any person pursues that we can 
determine his enjoyment, but merely from the passion with which he pursues it, and 
the success which he meets with in his pursuit.”236 One must get on with one’s life as 
best one can. Look inside, for out there “objects have absolutely no worth or value in 
themselves.”237 
Adam Smith’s moral theory, as the title of his monograph on moral philosophy 
suggests, overlooks the performance of action altogether. Virtue consists in the 
complementarity, or coherence, of virtues within the Impartial Spectator. The 
meaning of an action is immediately comprehended by the Impartial Spectator as 
virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy, and only she can determine 
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whether an action has upheld the “rules” of perfect prudence, strict justice, and 
proper benevolence.238 From what do these “rules” of perfect prudence arise? To 
what are they essentially associated? On his account, the rules are ontologically 
bound up with the intellectual faculty that evaluates moral character, the principle of 
approbation. Never clearly defined, the principle of approbation refers to that faculty 
approving or disapproving of experienced phenomena according to understood rules 
of virtue. Like Hume, Smith’s notion of approbation includes an element of 
judgment; unlike Hume, it does not rest upon grounds of utility or beauty, but upon 
prudence, the very unity of “superior reason” and self-command.239   
“When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel 
are…derived from four sources: [i] we sympathize with the motives of the agent; [ii] 
we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of action; [iii] we 
observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two 
sympathies generally act; and [iv] we consider such actions as making a part of a 
system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or 
of the society….”240   
How this inductive process of entirely natural sentimental negotiation finds its true 
heartbeat in repeated evaluative judgments remains ill defined. Judgment is not 
identical to action. For Smith, action is an opportunity to demonstrate one has rightly 
empathized with and adapted to the demands of society. Of supreme importance, as it 
was for Hutcheson and Hume, are the origins of action grounded in a principle of 
sentimental approbation. Action itself is politically and legally, but not morally, 
interesting or applicable. 
 
Ferguson on the Meaning of Action 
Having given a brief review of the relevant philosophic schools with which 
Ferguson interacts, we are now in a position to consider Ferguson’s theory of action 
in its Scottish and Stoic context. The principal aim here, as with any hermeneutic 
enterprise, is to reconstruct as accurately as possible Ferguson’s theory of active 
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being. Outlining ancient Stoic and eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy has meant 
only to provide an interpretive frame of reference for Ferguson’s theory. As a way of 
re-presenting Ferguson’s action theory as respondent to and not wholly dependent 
upon these conceptual inheritances, the interpretation I wish to offer identifies five 
conceptual signposts anchoring and orienting active being: (i) history, (ii) human 
nature, (iii) reason, (iv) virtue, and (v) futurity. Framing the theory in this way will 
carry the constructive advantage of revealing the transcendent nature of action and 
clarify how understanding an action’s meaning demands more than meagre retreats 
into human personality, but an obedient endeavour into Godliness. 
That the concept of action is integral to Ferguson’s philosophical project is beyond 
any reasonable contention.  The priority of action is asserted repeatedly: 
To act in the view of his fellow-creatures, to produce his mind in public, to give it 
all the exercise of sentiment and thought which pertain to man as a member of 
society, as a friend, or an enemy, seems to be the principal calling and occupation of 
his nature.  If he must labour that he must subsist, he can subsist for no better 
purpose than the good of mankind; nor can he have better talents than those which 
qualify him to act with men.241 
Or, similarly: 
Men are to be estimated not from what they know, but from what they are able to 
perform; from their skill in adapting materials to the several purposes of life; from 
their vigour and conduct in pursuing the objects of policy, and in finding the 
expedients of war and national defence.242 
Indeed, “the happiness of men in all cases alike consists in the blessings of a candid, 
an active, and strenuous mind.243 Active being plays a dominant role in Ferguson’s 
thought precisely because action is dominant to life itself. He is a practical man 
interested in practical subjects. Of what good is philosophical inquiry if it cannot tell 
us how best to live our lives?  He has little patience for disproportionate speculation 
or playful theorizing, seeing as “the parade of words and general reasonings which 
sometimes carry an appearance of so much learning and knowledge, are of little avail 
in the conduct of life.”244 Yet when the imperative that one must act is wholly 
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accepted and deliberations brought to a close where does that leave us? Is anything 
else of conceptual or practical import to the execution of acts? Yes, it is. Of 
particular interest to Ferguson is the history of the agent and the reality into which he 
acts. Every active moment is directly rooted in temporally prior moments supported 
always by a collective memory useful to the task at hand. Most personal skills are in 
fact cultivated and preserved in this manner; learning to walk, drive, read, and speak 
are first observed and soon followed by attempts of our own. Memory and habits are 
cooperative partners in tasks of propriety and yet neither is identical to nor 
independent of the other. Habits require a kind of memory that is not rightly called 
memory but rather a surpassing of memory—the casting of memory in a semi-
permanent mould. Memory is essential to action; habit inessential. The latter makes 
action easier; the former makes it possible. Habit is the ingrained memory of how to 
act without direct attention, while memory is the force giving action its energy and 
course. Memory and habit contextualize actions by putting each act in touch with a 
history that speaks to the present.     
History discloses to the historian facts that comprise the story of being. Past 
events express themselves as “facts” in that if an event has occurred, then the 
properties and effects of that event communicate what has transpired as a matter of 
actual historical occurrence. In this sense, anything in the past can be history to the 
extent that it discloses intelligible content to the present. History cannot perpetuate 
itself apart from the memory of an affected people. Yet memory always runs the risk 
of being forgotten, altered, or helplessly misrepresented; although the facts that 
support it can never be abolished volitionally.245 If ever an event was at any time 
apprehended by the human mind there is the chance that it will forever endure and 
stand as a mighty oak in the firmament of the past; but if forgotten, however, the oak 
returns to the dust from which it came and the living past along with it. Memories of 
the past challenge their indeterminacy by continually breaking through to the present. 
Truths of past events, though upheld beyond time in the Divine mind, are in the 
created order contingent upon indeterminacies of the human mind—rooted in the 
shifting sand of its often unreliable memory holders.   
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And yet it is within this tension of factual past and uncertain memory that the 
task of historiography recommends itself. History, for Ferguson, is a story of active 
being.  Past actions and events recommend possibilities and the many latent 
obligations couched within them. The stories of action arise from history as an 
authoritative tutor to the present moral and political spheres.246 “The order of things 
consists in movements,” suggests Ferguson, “which in a state of counteraction and 
apparent disturbance, mutually regulate and balance one another.”247 Historically 
conceived, this “order” is the direct result of a dialectical relationship between 
exertion and opposition, and thus the “movement” of history tells a story of humans 
encountering and overcoming opposition in a way that transforms a given state of 
affairs. The movement of history—the passage of time—is composed of a symphony 
of active beings playing different parts, in different places, at different times, and 
with varying measures of concerted harmony. Whether one holds the cello bow or 
the conductor’s baton, making an impression on the narrative history of active being 
is a matter of taking up one’s instrument and putting it into motion. History makes 
action intelligible, contextualizing it within the dialectical narrative of active being. 
The past carried memorably into present actions is what Ferguson identifies as 
the “history of active being.”248 To say something sensible about mankind’s present 
condition it is necessary to say something about what man has been like; actions 
simply cannot be identified as good or evil, virtuous or vicious, agreeable or 
disagreeable without a historical backdrop against which to contrast or contextualize 
them. Apart from an historical background the portrait of action remains 
unintelligible. Hutcheson, Hume and Smith all believed that the way to conduct a 
natural history of action is to get behind the intending mind.249 Ferguson’s 
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archaeology of action, on the other hand, differs from his contemporaries’ in that his 
method does not withdraw into the functions of the human mind for answers to the 
questions of the history of active being, resisting the search for mind’s causal ghosts. 
Without first conducting a genuinely historical exploration of active being—an 
exploration of what human actions have expressed over time, that is—commonality 
is lost and the meaning of action eroded. The history of active being discloses the 
exertions of a plurality of men among and for a plurality of men. Obvious as it may 
seem, Ferguson’s distinction here is subtle. If, as was the case with his 
contemporaries, the method for uncovering a history of active being is to classify 
psychological causes or principles of pre-action processes, then the only meaningful 
results of philosophical interest will be the collection of memories and quality of 
intellectual faculties afforded to that particular person. Thus, claiming that the 
history of active being is in truth a history of human nature is to begin with what is 
already a categorical mistake. Understanding how man has acted must be gleaned by 
an appeal to man’s active history in reality, not to states of mind prior to action. 
Action is a deeply social phenomenon. Discovery of human nature is not achieved 
through isolated self-reflection, desperately peeling back ontological layers in search 
of mind’s elusive intellectual phantoms. One best comes to terms with the 
significance of action by presenting oneself to others in society and then seeking to 
understand the wider meaning of the action in historical and political terms. 
Ferguson’s Essay demonstrates this point rather clearly. Understanding the present is 
achieved by appealing to past actions chronicled in public memory. Meaningful 
history is nothing less than the history of active being, just as meaningful action is 
nothing less than action historically disclosed. Likewise, history is defined by the 
shape and force of actions past, just as actions are defined by the history brought to 
bear upon them through memory: it is how the two understand one another. The 
content of history is written by action and the content of action is written by history. 
With this historically enriched theory of active being in mind, to what extent is 
human nature strictly natural? Ferguson is disparaging of a purely pneumatic theory 
of human nature and prefers instead an historical model that locates the regularities 
and continuities of action across time. For a particular action to be considered 
                                                                                                                                     
they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries which 
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“natural” to mankind it must be fundamentally habitual or customary. One might be 
tempted to call these habitual or cultural inclinations “instincts.” This would be a 
mistaken redefinition, however, and would identify “the natural” with purely 
subjective powers and overlooks the instructive forces of reality and civil society. 
Action is learned from society, and once learned it is for society that action is 
recommitted. Over time this giving and receiving is engrained and habituated, 
becoming man’s natural setting within society. “To be in society is the physical state 
of the species,” and “it is the state of those who quarrel, as well as those who agree; 
estrangement is not always a vice, nor association a virtue.”250   
Ferguson opens his Principles by dividing the self into an actual state and 
potential state. The actual state of humankind is a subject of history and of science; 
whereas humanity’s potential state is a subject of moral estimation. Examinations of 
human nature should methodically precede examinations of its potential because 
“our knowledge of what any nature ought to be must be derived from our knowledge 
of its faculties and powers, and the attainment to be aimed at must be of the kind 
which these faculties and power are fitted to produce.”251 Thus nothing separates 
human nature from the society in which it is placed. Ferguson challenges the 
problem of ahistorical pneumatics—when pneumatics precedes historiography—by 
questioning introspective appeals to “pure” human nature. Attempts by his 
contemporaries to get behind the virtues turn out to be historical descriptions of an 
agent’s sentiments “entertained in view of his species.”252 Both Hume and Smith 
admittedly place great emphasis on the basic sociality of individual agency, though it 
is not the basic sociality of man Ferguson is here calling into question. Human nature 
alone cannot define the order of community, but neither is community the sole 
determinate of human nature. Identifying “sympathy” or “sentiment” as a seat of 
human nature simply begs the question. Upon what is sentiment founded? What are 
its justifying conditions? The sentimentalization of human action mistakenly exalts 
human nature (pneumatically conceived) as an entity unto itself, a throne from which 
the soul renders judgment. Human nature, insists Ferguson, cannot be reduced to 
basic motivational passions. Passions may, and often do, contribute to the process of 
deliberate action, but if they are made to constitute the moral goodness or badness of 
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an action, then it is upon these passions that the blame or praise is laid. The problem 
with this position is that an agent’s intention is entirely unobservable even to the 
most “impartial” spectator. Motivation is not displayed externally for public 
judgment. Modern law enforcement observes this truth when prosecuting 
perpetrators whose motive may help explain proximately but never determines 
conclusively the offender’s ultimate guilt or innocence. Explicating motivations 
cannot satisfy the question of ‘why?’. The concealment of intentionality from the 
public means it is always possible that what may first appear a benevolent action is in 
fact reprehensibly selfish, or what may appear an evil action may prove to have the 
saintliest of motives. Only God and the acting agent can be sure.   
Against this type of argument, basing the goodness or badness of an act upon the 
passion from which it proceeded, Ferguson advances his principle of unintended 
consequences: “mankind, in following the present sense of their minds, in striving to 
remove inconveniencies or to gain apparent contiguous advantages, arrive at ends 
which even their imagination could not anticipate, and pass on like other animals in 
the track of their nature without perceiving its end.”253 This principle of unintended 
consequences is typically applied to social and political forms in which a nation or 
society intends one specific objective but inevitably actualizes several other states of 
affairs by accident. Indeterminacy of this sort alerts us to a stark and largely 
unbridgeable distance separating action from intention at both a political and 
personal level. At the political level, for example, when elevating conquest, riches, 
and glory to principle aims for ever-widening territorial expansion, ancient Rome 
certainly did not intend to compromise its capital city by inadvertently spreading its 
military forces too thin. Compromising its beloved heartland was in this case an 
unintended consequence of inexorable ambition and domestic inattention. Likewise, 
on a personal level, a decision to go trekking in the Highlands for the purpose of 
refreshment and adventure might at the same time cause one’s spouse to feel a sense 
of abandonment and insensitivity to marital responsibility.254 One not infrequently 
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finds that enthusiasm, to cite yet another example, can easily (and often) be taken by 
others as severe aggression or perverse arrogance, and not at all like genuine 
excitement. The distinction to be drawn here is not that actions and intentions are 
incommensurable, but that intentionality cannot control the effects of action. Action 
serves rather like a buffer between intention and effect that can fully adapt to 
arbitrate communications. An action’s moral worth cannot reside in the sum-total of 
that action’s motivational content.  
Ferguson’s theory of action also embodies certain metaphysical commitments. 
Freedom, on his account, is best described conceptually as “dialectical”: true 
freedom finds its fullest expression in rightful limitations, just as rightful limitations 
find fullest expression in freedom. Limitation gives meaning to freedom and freedom 
gives meaning to limitation. Confinement and freedom are to man “the principle 
constituents of good or of evil,” for without freedom and confinement the labeling of 
actions as good or evil would be meaningless.255 Consider three fixtures of this 
dialectical relationship between freedom and limitation, the last of which will return 
us to our main discussion: law, divine foreknowledge, and reason.  
Reality governs humanity with physical laws and political laws. Physical laws 
determine what is and is not physically possible; i.e., my throwing a baseball from 
here to the moon, willing myself to atomically disintegrate, and so forth. Political 
laws, by and large, protect and preserve the public good and limit the types of action 
contributing to societal degradation. Together these different types of law provide a 
context for meaningful action. Laws determine what is or is not, should or should not 
be, in one’s freedom to decide. We might call these limitations that we have no say 
over “determinations from above.” “Determinations from below,” on the other hand, 
are limits placed on an agent by his own physical and intellectual capacity. Only so 
many actions are available to a person at any one time.  My becoming perfectly 
virtuous by this afternoon’s coffee, for example, is as impossible as my solving 
calculus equations in theoretical astrophysics. These possibilities are not 
(realistically) available to me because neither is in my capacity to achieve, not 
because reality itself places limitations. Yet despite being limited from “above” and 
“below,” agency often means exercising specific freedoms over both reality (above) 
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and the self (below).256 To exercise freedom in this way, however, requires reason, 
which leads us to the third concept to which action is oriented in Ferguson’s theory. 
Reason is inseparable from our previous two action-oriented concepts of history 
and human nature. For Hume, the reader will recall, reason is “wholly inactive” in 
morality and should not enter into our contemplation of good or evil. Hutcheson and 
Smith, though not as explicit in their separation of passion from reason, create a 
similar division which claims that virtue consists in particular “sentiments.” Such 
“sentimentalization” of morality partly explains the mature moral psychology 
supporting these texts, particularly Hume’s Treatise and Enquiries and Smith’s TMS. 
When reason is thought slave to the passions it becomes clear why moralists would 
be dissuaded to include reason as a central function in ethical theory, especially when 
reason appears in nature to be ethically neutral. But is it really the case that morality 
is “better felt than judged of?” Ferguson responds to this question in the negative, 
and for three reasons; the separation of reason from morality confuses our 
understanding of (i) freedom, (ii) casuistry, and (iii) judgment.   
What is freedom without reason? To be faced with an authentic decision is to 
have no less than two options from which to decide, a criterion of truth and falsity 
upholding the agent’s relation to reality, and possession of the intellectual faculties 
needed to see a decision through from inception to completion. Freedom is not the 
mere absence of restraint, as many modern commentators have liked to insist, but the 
description given to what is or is not in one’s power to act upon in reality.257 Both the 
circumstances of reality and capacity of the agent give shape to action’s possibilities, 
as Ferguson observes: “in any two situations he [the agent] must vary his pursuits, 
and accommodate his manner of life to the exigency of his case.”258 Complex moral 
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situations confront us with dilemmas and quandaries no amount of impassioned 
virtue can assist in making the truthful moral decision about. Volition may very well 
contribute a dominant power to our exertions, but it should never be identified with 
pure passion. Reason always, to a lesser or greater degree, accompanies the 
emergence of a willful act.259 To be free is to have it within one’s power to decide 
and act upon a given state of affairs, and “by this law of his nature, he is entrusted to 
himself as the clay is entrusted to the hands of the potter.”260 Freedom is thus a law 
of human nature one is forever compelled to obey. Truth and falsity authoritatively 
structure practical reason and practical reason in turn structures freedom. To act 
freely is to have it within one’s power to act rightly or wrongly; that is, to have one’s 
action sanctioned by the same criterion of truth that authorized and legitimated the 
initial decision.  There are unique goods found in reasonable living and each must 
“observe and choose among the objects around him; to make a trial of different 
practices; and to abide by that which is most suited to his circumstances, or to the 
situation in which he is placed.”261 In short, rational deliberation is a condition to the 
possibility of authentic freedom, since to act without thought is already to have acted 
irresponsibly.  
Practical deliberation about the kinds of actions one can and should rationally 
undertake leads to considerations of how laws structuring human affairs are rightly 
understood. Reason’s casuistic office has to do with the perception, interpretation, 
and application of external laws of morality. Casuistry brings subject and reality 
together at a moral crossroads; seeing the way things are in the world and thinking 
about how best to engage them. But what, exactly, is to be interpreted? What is the 
rightful goal of casuistry? If, as Ferguson suggests, “all of nature is connected, and 
the world itself consists of parts which like the stones of an arch mutually support 
and are supported,” then shouldn’t the moral hermeneutic one employs hold order as 
its object? To know how to do what is right in any given situation requires 
knowledge of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to perform the action 
rightly. Observation, interpretation, and execution all depend on right reason and 
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sound judgment. As Ferguson eloquently puts it, the aim is “to penetrate the order 
established in nature; to emulate this order…to unfold the principles of estimation 
and realize the conceptions of excellence and beauty in works to be executed by 
human art….”262 Morality can no more rid itself of reason than the farmer can his 
plow. Reason is the instrument that unearths what is good and truthful about human 
action and it is incumbent on man to recognize that “human reason cannot finally 
acquiesce in what is found to be evil.”263 Nor, for that matter, should one refrain 
from doing what one knows to be good. 
Deliberation of moral concepts must eventually narrow at the gateway of 
judgment. Judgment is considered a “gateway” in that it is primarily through 
judgment that reasoning passes into action. Actions pass through the gateway of 
judgment and with passage become decidedly moral, immoral, or amoral. Judgment 
makes action rational and the rational performable, thus enabling one to comprehend 
the meaning of another’s act as well as enabling one to enact one’s own decisions. 
For Ferguson, “moral judgments give sanction to the propriety of…character or 
action in the society of fellow creatures;” that is, within the context of society, moral 
judgments assign moral worth to character and actions.264 The meaning of 
“propriety” in the eighteenth-century did not signify what has in contemporary 
discussions come to mean “acceptable”; rather, the eighteenth-century held strongly 
to the older, classical definition of propriety as “appropriateness”, or “fittedness.” In 
part I, chapter 2, section ix of the Institutes Ferguson defines practical judgment in 
terms resonant with “foresight”: 
Foresight is the faculty of conjecturing what is to follow from the past and present.  
It requires penetration and sagacity: the first, to comprehend all the circumstances of 
the case in question; the second, to perceive what is likely to follow from those 
circumstances.  Penetration and sagacity are the foundations of good conduct, art 
and skill.265 
What I would like to suggest is that foresight, as Ferguson defines it, is inseparably 
bound to deliberative judgment. The same terms used here, “penetration”, “sagacity”, 
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and “art” are all used later in the Principles to refer to deliberate judgment.266 Within 
the language it is couched, deliberate judgment is implicitly rational. Judgment 
brings completion to deliberative reasoning and begins the work of executive 
reasoning; from reasoning about what should be done, to what is now being done.267 
So much then for the first three of our concepts—history, human nature, and 
reason—and our brief interlude. The fourth concept toward which action is oriented 
in Ferguson’s theory is virtue. For his Scottish contemporaries, passions prompt the 
will to begin acting, implying that the morality of an act is determined by the 
character of an original, causal passion. As Smith put it, the cause is the “man of the 
breast,” the personification of feeling, that should face the inquisitions of morality. 
Actions, on his view, are the causal consequence of impassioned sentiments socially 
conditioned. Virtuous actions proceed from virtuous sentiments and the latter 
determines the moral worth of the former. For Ferguson, however, the passion or 
condition from which action arises has less to do with moral worth than the 
excellence or propriety of the action itself. Passions, whether felicitous, miserable, or 
magnanimous are a direct consequence of different types of action. The happiness of 
man is proportioned “to the exertion and application of his faculties…not to his 
exemption from difficulty or danger, but to the magnanimity, courage, and fortitude 
with which he acts.”268 Indeed, “it is mostly in some active exertions that happiness 
consists.”269 Happiness is the experience accompanying action itself, not a residual 
by-product. The priority of action to virtue is such that the “proper state of nature…is 
not a condition…prior to the exercise of faculties, but procured by their just 
application.”270   
Subjective turns to “natural” inclination are plagued with ambiguity and only 
explain why the application of “natural” descriptors to human being “can serve to 
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distinguish nothing,” since “all the actions of men are equally a result of his 
nature.”271 The danger in making passions of human nature the starting point for 
moral inquiry is that all actions are a result of human nature and thus can always be 
qualified as natural. If an action is natural then it is thought to be “right” simply 
because it is natural to perform.272 Identifying naturalness with rightness therefore 
runs the risk of reducing moral inquiry to the cataloguing of passions through 
personal habituation. Hume, for example, catching eye of this conceptual 
identification, enlists habit as a tool for assigning virtues to human nature; habits 
quite literally make a person good to the extent that they constrain or enhance 
passions lying behind them.273 Ferguson, on the other hand, though sympathetic to 
the power habits wield, insists that habit “is not that by which we are first inclined to 
act, but a disposition which results from our having already acted.”274 “Habit is 
known to be that by which the good or bad actions of men remain with them and 
become part of their characters.”275 Thus habits are the residue left on active being 
once the effects of action have made their impression. Successful cultivation of 
habits requires certain resistances that can take both an external and internal form; 
external in the form of adversity or trial in reality, and internal in the form of 
misdirected desire or intellectual apathy. Ferguson celebrates each encounter with 
resistance because each occurrence generates an occasion for overcoming challenges. 
Resistance to actions arise either from the ineptitudes of mind or from the adverse 
circumstances with which one is faced. Each conflicting occasion can and often does 
inhibit happiness, and might even explain why happiness cannot be an ultimate 
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object of human nature but only a consequence of action itself. The history of active 
being is the long story of mankind’s perseverance in the face of potential negations; a 
story whose tragic or comedic climax depends upon whether the new state of being 
occasioned success or failure. Here again Ferguson’s method is dialectical. In 
forward movements the subject encounters barriers to continuity, resistances, that 
result in either degradation or improvement. Actions meet resistance to the result of 
either negation or affirmation, and yet even if one’s efforts are negated and all 
attempts to overcome a particular trial are thwarted it remains within one’s power to 
rectify what can be rectified from the encounter.276 The coward, of course, will 
retreat from the ferocity of the trial itself or from the embarrassment that comes from 
having failed; whereas the courageous will make the active decision to face down 
adversity with the resilience necessary to act again another day.   
For Ferguson, virtues are active. Passivity is the road to ruination paved with 
bricks of luxury.277 One is challenged with a two-fold—or dialectical—capacity of 
action.  Action discloses the character of the actor while simultaneously forming the 
actor’s character. The act is a type of communication both to the actor and to the 
actor’s society, because “if virtue be the supreme good, its best and most signal 
effect is to communicate and diffuse itself.”278 Thus the meaning or moral 
significance of virtue for mankind is wholly bound-up in the meaning of action itself, 
since, as Ferguson has told us, it is in the character of the “supreme good” to 
“communicate” and “diffuse” itself. The meaning of an action contains far more than 
can be directly determined by an agent’s intentions, means, or ends. No doubt each 
of these leaves its own mark on the meaning of action, but even when taken 
collectively these three factors are not enough to determine what an action means. 
This is because the interpretation of an action can never fall entirely within the 
jurisdiction of the actor. The “unintended consequences” of an action implies that 
“many actions of men, by a natural connection with their motives, discover a 
meaning, as an effect discovers its cause.”279   
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The possibility of action contributing unintended consequences brings our 
inquiry to the fifth concept around which action is oriented in Ferguson’s theory—
futurity. Notorious for its rigid determinism, Stoic materiality suspends the temporal 
significance of active being. The future is inevitable and its inevitability must be 
accepted with personal indifference. Such determinacy similarly implicates Hume’s 
strictly causal account of human nature. Stoic and Humean visions of the future both 
attach static fixity to action’s vexing uncertainty. Actions mean what they were 
intended to mean and nothing else. However, Ferguson has already made it 
abundantly clear that freedom is a fact about which man is readily conscious, and 
“attempts to support it by argument are nugatory, and attempts to overthrow it by 
argument are absurd.”280 He will have nothing to do with any metaphysic rendering 
an action meaningless or that attempts to reduce the meaning of action to pure 
intentionality. Even so, each action requires at least a degree of fixity or immutability 
as an ordered context for the appropriation of meaning. Permanence is essential to 
understanding the impression an action makes on the fabric of reality. Action must 
present itself within a context of stable permanence accommodating to its blunt force 
and inherent creativity to be recognizable. The context of action is not “permanent” 
per se, but enduring; comprised of real fixtures that make action possible. Reality 
and action belong communicatively to one another as sentences belong to 
paragraphs. When a friend tells us they have been fishing all weekend, for example, 
our minds immediately covet more imaginative furniture. Where did the fishing trip 
take him? What kind of fishing did he do? How many fish did he catch? Our mind 
casts its nets to gather as much imagery as will help form an idea of what the action 
means. By virtue of having a place, action can be interpreted for either its uniformity 
or uniqueness, but only by virtue of its contextual backdrop can action establish itself 
as helpful or hurtful, good or evil, praiseworthy or blameworthy. As another 
example, it seems a fact of human existence that “the sentence of nature is equally 
pronounced upon all, that the longest liver must die,” and yet the dust to which one 
returns is, as the Stoics took pains to point out, always entirely within the hands of 
the agent.281 The necessity of death and the fact that death is always one’s own-most 
possession illustrate vividly the complex relation between freedom and contextual 
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action. Other less extreme examples might also be proposed: the writing of a poem, 
passing judgment on a case, or even driving an automobile. All such actions, though 
done freely, must observe and respect the laws guiding their performance. Poems 
follow certain meters, judgments adhere to civil procedures, and driving insists on 
relentless attentiveness to motorway codes. Finally, of course, there is the plain fact 
that an action must be performed at a particular time and at a particular place, and not 
some other time and place. The future guides and gives shape to freedom and yet 
does not determine what will be the case in every state of affairs. The fixtures of 
reality persist while their occasioning in time constantly changes.  Action shapes the 
future just as future shapes action. 
But what do future unknowns mean for the possibilities of action?  Is the mystery 
of what is to come a justifiable reason for indifference? Ferguson’s response is 
offered primarily in section xiv of chapter III, entitled “Of a Future State,” providing 
an extended treatment of “man’s progressive nature”, and takes the following form. 
First, it outlines what it means for a person to be stationary or progressive and then 
defines what principles of progression mean for human nature. Immediately 
following this brief outline of progress Ferguson takes a more comprehensive look at 
the nature and function of habituation. This then leads nicely into an engagement 
with “ambition,” or “the desire of something higher than is possessed at present,” and 
goes on to show how habits and ambition contribute to commerce, politics, and fine 
arts. The chapter then closes its final two sections with “progress in moral 
apprehension” and “a Future State.”  What this movement of thought reveals is 
Ferguson’s view of how the future and agent encounter one another. With various 
habits, aspirations, and pursuits the dynamic active being confronts the future with 
powers that the future does not itself possess, while the future confronts the active 
being with exhortation and mediation. With its regular opportunistic charm, the 
future encourages action by communicating what kinds of action may or may not 
contribute to the Good and thus may run the risk of meriting reward or punishment. 
Man’s nature, even if progressive, cannot be relieved of the moral obligation to offer 
distinct goods. If habits or ambitions do not pursue moral objects they are evil and 
altogether blameworthy. Actions either negate the good or affirm it—neutrality is 
impossible. Indifference, too, is impossible. Habits harness excessive passions but 
the final goal of habit is not to eliminate passion or cultivate indifference. Habits 
order passion. This is why Ferguson condemns only personally or socially corrupting 
ambitions; ambitions which strive for excellence will not likely be found wrongful. 
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Dr. Johnson’s vaguely general definition for “ambition” as the “desire of something 
higher than is possessed at present” represents for Ferguson a future of ardent 
participation in the life of God. When applied to moral understanding 
(“apprehension”), ambition draws active being toward the resources meant to aid in 
rightful conduct. “To know himself and his place in the system of nature is the 
specific lot and prerogative of man,” insists Ferguson, but can only be acquired by 
actively pursuing this prerogative.282 Indifference to the future would be for man a 
moral nemesis, a defeater to the good life manifest in future possibilities. 
Hutcheson’s assertion that future happiness awaits the completion of acts, in all 
its utilitarian splendor, dislodges happiness from the act itself and segregates it to 
consequences the act intended to bring about.283 Ferguson, of course, argues to the 
contrary. Happiness and order belong to the action itself, not to consequences that 
follow performance. The consequences of an action are not within the actor’s control 
and many are set in motion unintentionally. The possibility of future happiness rests 
not in consequences, but in hope inherent to action itself.284 Futurity reveals 
opportunities for action while simultaneously blinding us to what the actions may 
ultimately accomplish. Each active being places hope in what the future may allow 
and trusts that what is presently known and demanded can in fact be acted upon. “To 
man, the proper subjects of knowledge are the present and the past: yet, in some 
instances, the knowledge of these is a knowledge of the future also.”285 This is the 
will of God, concludes Ferguson, “that man should attend to his present task and not 
suffer himself to be diverted from it by prospects of futurity, towards which he can 
contribute nothing, besides the faithful and diligent performance of a part which is 
now assigned to him.”286 The axiom for man’s future is Hoc age, to “mind what you 
are about.”287 Providence invites one to mind what one is about and leave the future 
to One who rules eternal.  
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In recent decades it has become popular to characterize Ferguson as the Scottish 
stoic reaching back into antiquity to remind fellow patriots of a national glory once 
idyllically embodied by Rome.288 This reading is drawn mainly from isolated 
readings of specific texts and remains inattentive to the wider unity of his thought.  
Ferguson is at best a partial stoic. Certain stoic references appear throughout his 
writings, of course, but these instances must be integrated into Ferguson’s overall 
world-picture and situated on the hierarchy of his intellectual priorities. As it pertains 
to active being, what is of greatest interest to us is the degree to which Ferguson 
adopts, modifies, or altogether departs from a characteristically Stoic ethic. Stoicism 
has its own untidy history, as is well known, and in the hands of readers centuries 
removed it has been forced to take a variety of uncomfortable positions, but 
untidiness aside a constructive description of Stoic action theory would help better 
contextualize Ferguson’s reception of it. 
First, the nature of human desire is far and away the most dominant and regularly 
reviewed theme of the ancient stoic literature and it only makes sense as an article of 
action. Apart from action the contemplation of desire is purely superfluous. Given 
this Stoic starting point, one’s aspirations are to become personally indifferent to 
desires that impinge human capacity. When faced with a fixed future the best one can 
do is become unresponsive to life’s pressures. Desire management makes it humanly 
possible to then perform all actions with “fittedness.” The Roman stoic Cicero 
indicates there are no less than three types of action: virtuous actions, vicious actions, 
and intermediates, i.e. actions fitting or unfitting.289 Whether his view truly presents 
the most philosophically exacting version of stoic action is at this juncture 
immaterial; what interests us is this property of “fittedness.” Kathekon, often 
rendered “appropriate” or “befitting” action by modern translators, was conceived as 
officium by Cicero and thus in its transition from Greek to Latin contained a subtle 
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conceptual alteration from the generic impression an action makes on the texture of 
reality to the “service” or “reasonable duty” one has to one’s society. In this way, the 
meaning of the idea kathekon was diversified even at its inception. Cicero’s bringing 
political specificity to fitting action does not alter the way an action should be 
performed: action should exhibit “rightness” in its performance regardless of whether 
the action carries political implications. To say that actions must conform to a 
standard of rightness—or righteousness—is to draw upon language alerting us to 
limitations, boundaries, and standards. For an action to be capable of achieving 
rightness it must be equally capable of achieving wrongness, and this differentiation 
implies a pre-existing criterion for judgment. Action is defined as much by the reality 
in which it is performed as by the resources devoted to its execution. Reality, on the 
other hand, will disclose what can possibly be accomplished as well as how what can 
be done could be done. From a purely physical point of view, for an agent to perform 
an action in reality means that the subject can by definition do something but cannot 
do anything. For the Stoic this is equally true from the moral point of view, given 
that physical reality helps shape what should in fact be done. The goodness of an act 
cannot be considered in isolation either from the performing subject or from the 
circumstances occasioning action. Reality might provide the contextual boundaries 
within which meaningful action can take place, but it cannot by itself determine the 
relative character or excellence of the subject’s action. The propriety of an action is 
first a matter of what has presented itself to us. Understanding brought to this 
presentation imposes obligations and only reason can differentiate what can be done 
from what should be done. J. M. Rist has summed up this reason-reality interface by 
explaining that “in the Stoic world there is only one thing which can be called good 
without any qualification whatsoever…the providentially ordered life in accordance 
with reason.”290 The good to be achieved through action evades immediate 
understanding.  Goodness, particularly the good to be achieved by action, first 
requires recognition—katalepsis—then contemplation. Prior to action one must give 
deliberate reflection both to what should be done, as well as to how that dutiful 
action might best be carried out. This is a critical feature of the Stoic account of 
action: intentionality is not the sole determinate of an action’s moral goodness 
because each such action must also be performed with a measure of excellence. 
Genuinely moral deeds must answer the questions of why and how to go about such 
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and such a task.  Put in these terms, the reasons for describing action as either 
affirming truth or careening into falsity become definitive. To have performed an 
action truthfully is to have dealt rightly with reality; to have truly recognized how to 
do what is right. For the Stoic, truth and goodness hold transcendent jurisdiction over 
the realm of subjects in nature; they cannot be comprehensively defined and yet 
cannot be overlooked. Cicero depicts this narrative of moral learning as man’s 
attempt to bring action into “conformity” with the goods of reality, that is, with the 
goods of nature as presented in reality itself. In homologia (‘conformity’) “resides 
that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral 
Worth itself, which alone is counted good…and is nevertheless the sole thing that is 
for its own efficacy and value desirable.”291    
Before concluding our treatment of Ferguson’s partial stocism it would be useful 
to comment on two additional stoic concepts. First, it is everywhere assumed in Stoic 
literature that only virtue is good in itself. Action on this view is merely the outcome 
or result of a particular quality of virtue. But is it really the case that only virtue can 
be good in itself? Could not action, too, be considered a true good? The trouble with 
vesting goodness squarely in virtue is that virtue is itself formed by a particular 
excellence of action. Acquiring virtue is consequent upon the nature of an action 
already conducted; that is, by doing good deeds and thereby becoming good. 
“Repetition of the right action will forward the development of a right concept 
(ennoia) in the soul.”292 Hume refered to such formation as “habituation.” Either 
way, it is not in passivity that virtue is acquired, but in activity.  Virtue alone cannot 
be called good in itself. The second lingering concept, on the other hand, has a less 
direct bearing on a Stoic understanding of action. How is action to be understood 
when the external determinations impressed on action by the laws of reality lay 
wholly outside one’s control? In bringing this question to the fore we have come 
around full circle, since it was with the abolition of desire that this treatment of 
Stoicism began. The rationale for eliminating desire, as is well known, is to 
embolden individuals to face down the unknowns of future affairs with fortitude and 
temperance. Such future states of affairs will somewhat paradoxically include a 
subject’s own contributions to an approaching reality already entirely pre-
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determined. Kathekon, then, is the best one can do when certain consequences are 
erased from the content of action and the wise man is all that remains: “for the Stoic 
view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of 
seizing the right moment…so that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise 
Man to leave her.”293 
 
Artistry, Communication, and Trans-temporality in Commerce 
The compatibility of Ferguson’s action theory with Christian ethics is most 
noticeable in his use of conceptual tensions, dualisms, and dialectics framing exertive 
enterprises in the world. Notice the language he uses to describe properties of active 
being and the reality onto which actions make their mark: the language of “good” 
and “evil” triumphs over the use of “happy” and “miserable”; the language of “right” 
and “wrong” prevails upon “approbation” and “disapprobation”; and the mind-body 
dualism presumed throughout the Principles places him in direct contrast to Humean 
reductions.294 Man is both partially free and partially determined; he acts and is acted 
upon; he is autonomous and yet is necessarily social. Creator and created, ruler and 
ruled, active being and passive being are all tensions to which Ferguson gives 
repeated reference. The “unity of being” so revered by Stoicism is for Ferguson the 
direct result of man’s participation in the work of providence: 
The highest point to which moral science conducts the mind of man is that eminence 
of thought from which he can view himself as but a part in the community of living 
natures; by which he is in some measure let into the design by God, to combine all 
the parts together for the common benefit of all; and can state himself as a willing 
instrument for this purpose, in what depends on his own will; and as a conscious 
instrument at the disposal of providence, in matters which are out of his power.295 
This notion of agency as instrumental participation in the life of God is how the 
Christian tradition has characteristically conceived of its mission. St. Paul’s 
instruction on Christian action, for example, illustrates the point rather well: one is to 
fulfill their particular part in the wider body of Christ (1 Cor. 12); offer oneself as a 
living sacrifice (Rom. 12:1); and put on the new man while sloughing off the old 
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(Col. 3:9-10). Each metaphor represents for Paul an active, albeit submissive, 
participation in the life of God that is always secondarily for the church and common 
good. The unity of being coheres in God. The word used by St. Paul to refer to 
action—praxis—is used sparingly in his letters. He is more inclined to use energeia, 
often translated as “labour,” or “striving.” This particular term, from which moderns 
have derived the word “energy,” implies a type of effort, an exerting of one’s powers 
for the specific purpose of achieving objectives.296 For God’s part, this energeia is 
effortless; an efficacious operation performed by God within the individual.297 God 
acts in us so that we may act in Him; a participatory life St. Paul compares to 
“offering oneself as a living sacrifice” and “walking in the Spirit.”298 Active 
movement into God’s own activities means the disciple has “stripped off old 
behaviour” and his “old self,” and has “put on a new self which will progress 
towards true knowledge the more it is renewed in the image of its creator” (Col. 3:9-
10). What is at the centre of this “true knowledge?” “There is only Christ: he is 
everything and he is in everything” (Col. 3:11).   In conjunction with the language of 
“newness” Paul concurrently utilizes the political and juridical language of 
“obedience,” “submission,” “charity” and “justice.” Indeed the letter to the Romans 
is in many respects a jurisprudential and political elucidation of the Gospel message. 
For Paul, the task of each citizen is to observe and strictly adhere to the law 
(lowercase ‘l’), submit to the authorities, and love one’s neighbor as oneself. The 
jurist in Paul conceives of life as an ordered totality for whom “to live is Christ”; the 
essence of order, truth, and goodness. The “fitting” life for man is to become the 
“bond-slave” of Christ and submit steadfastly to his absolute authority. The object of 
life therefore is to align oneself obediently with the good as expressed and ordered 
by his rule. And although Paul is being taken only as an example from the Christian 
tradition, this configuration is strangely resonant with Ferguson’s vision for active 
being. ‘Putting on the new man’ complements Ferguson’s reflections on moral 
ambition and the striving for excellence; to submit to the law is to obediently 
perform actions “fitting” the shape of obligation; juridical and “energetic” languages 
are used routinely and interchangeable by Ferguson throughout his written corpus. A 
                                                
296 This “exertion” is put forth predominantly by God and secondarily by man, but is also occasionally 
effected by impersonal forces such as sin, death, and the word.   
297 A few examples for which there are many include: 1 Cor. 12:6; Phil. 2:13; Col. 2:12; Eph. 1:11, 
19-20. 
298 Rom. 12:1; Gal. 5:13-26 
   114
brief overview of three overarching themes will strengthen the connection I am 
attempting to draw between Ferguson’s theory of action and his Christian 
commitments, which for the sake of clarity will be broadly titled: Art, 
Communication, and Time. 
In both his Essay and Principles, Ferguson draws heavily upon the language of 
“art.” All action must exhibit a degree of excellence and should therefore be 
performed artistically. To perform an action with artistry is to perform a deliberate—
in the sense of “deliberation,” not the truncated, late-modern “intentionality”—action 
excellently and with a definite good as one’s principal object. In other words, the 
action must be properly deliberated, masterfully performed, and carried out in such a 
way that it contributes both to the common good and to the good of God’s kingdom.  
Artistry is what gracious providence both demonstrates and invites. “It is in the 
wisdom of God, not the deliberate effect of invention or choice which the created 
being is fitted to employ himself… [that] his task is prescribed and his manner of 
performing it secured.”299 The best one can do is give every effort to the task God 
assigns; to take up one’s work with an artistry exuding gratitude and striving for 
imitation. For “man is formed for an artist; and he must be allowed, even when he 
mistakes the purpose of his work, to practice his calling in order to find out for 
himself what is best for him to perform.”300 
In addition to owning artistic quality, actions should also communicate on each 
performance. Since one comes to understand how to act artistically from those who 
have come before, actions communicate primarily through the institution of custom, 
disclosing and forming personal characters simultaneously. Past actions 
communicate with the future through the megaphone of the present. Creation is 
configured in such a way that “the chain of communication extends from one to 
many, from species to species, and even from world to world, throughout the 
intellectual as well as material system of nature.”301 Actions artistically performed, 
therefore, are a type of noiseless speech directed toward the community into which 
the action was undertaken and unto the God who oversees every exertive enterprise 
no matter how trivial. “Arts communicate,” suggests Ferguson, “by information and 
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example, from the master to his pupil and from passing generation to that which 
succeeds it; so that the progress of the human species is not, like other animals, 
limited to the individual or to the age; but communicated from one to another, and 
continued from age to age.”302 The content of meaningful action accumulates with 
each and every inheritance. A new age receives from the old a body of instruction 
that takes aim at an everlasting target. The idea, as is stressed throughout Biblical 
literature, is to make contributions that do not perish but are chronicled in the listless 
volumes of public memory. Positive or negative, virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or 
blameworthy, what ultimately comes of an action cannot be controlled and thus the 
certitude surrounding its achievements released. The aim of artistic action is simply 
to give something of charitable endurance to the world.   
Lastly, artistry and communication partner cooperatively in the encompassing 
and nurturing arms of time. Every action performed with artistry communicates, and 
every communication brings together past, present, and future so that all three 
moments are made one in the unifying power of active being. Action makes the 
present feel existentially real by maintaining a contiguous vision of the future and 
past, creating “moments” in which time’s passage is “presented.” The fleeting 
character of the present is only temporarily overcome when action takes the past in 
one hand, the future in the other hand, and combines them into an ontological 
present. Action is to a large degree trans-temporal and yet it alone leaves a mark on 
the temporal realm. To act faithfully is to act simultaneously in and upon time, 
explaining why every action should be artistic and communicative. “Men are equally 
engaged by the past, present, and future,” suggests Ferguson, “and are prepared for 
every occupation that gives scope to their powers.”303   
But what brings ultimate unity to artistic actions communicated in and across 
time? For Ferguson, the answer is God. “The past, the present, and the future are but 
one object to the supreme intelligence of God, why not also to the created mind, so 
far as it is qualified to partake in this view of things, and can delight in contemplating 
the effects of eternal beneficence, whether past, present or future?”304 It is from God 
that one receives the wisdom necessary to conduct an act artistically; it is by the 
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power of God that actions are communicated in and upon time; and it is because God 
himself actively communicates with his children in time that humanity itself is 
empowered to act and communicate. Artistic communication in and across time is an 
identical imitation of how God himself acts. Ferguson can therefore emphatically 
affirm Paul’s declaration that God “is everything and is in everything”—our “all in 
all.” All good and truthful action is imitatio dei; a righteous performance “by, in and 
for” the God whose creative artistry communicates responsively with mankind in and 
over time. His creative communication actualizes goods through the use of his 
“instruments”—his people—to perpetuate order and meet human needs. In acting 
righteously one trusts that God is in and behind the act, bringing about the very best 
that that action can possibly bring about.305 The meaning of action is disclosed in the 
riches of history; it “discovers” a meaning, as Ferguson has told us, and ultimately 
comes to mean what Providence decides. Action is taken up into the caring arms of 
the Alpha and Omega of active being. 
The significance of Ferguson’s active triad—artistic, communicative, and trans-
temporal—is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than by its application to the 
commercial sphere. The commercial order, such as it existed in Ferguson’s time, was 
in many respects still an artisan culture. Occupations were usually dictated to 
individuals by circumstances lying entirely outside their control; birth order, family 
rank, political conflict, and agricultural stability name only a few. Nearly all 
professions, whether of statesman, farmer, mason, or trader, required an element of 
craftsmanship. Each profession was mutually dependent upon the other, and so how 
well one performed their trade was crucial to their continued subsistence and 
reputation. Prudence applied to one’s occupation best serves the community and 
satisfies one’s own familial needs. For the tradesman of eighteenth-century Scotland, 
craftsmanship was the defining virtue of actions directed to commercial ends.   
In an age where members of western societies are pressed to direct all activity 
toward commercial outlets, it is difficult to imagine a world in which one’s economic 
actions would be judged precisely by their quality. The decisive question for our 
purposes is whether something vitally important has been lost. Is it at all strange that 
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to be an ‘artist’ in the late-modern world is, as it were, to occupy a sanctified 
category of almost pitiable inactivity in the truest sense of the word? Why has the 
artistic quality of commercial labours been lost? Without answering a question that 
will be taken up more explicitly in the next chapter, it is sufficient here simply to hint 
at the abstract and highly individualized character of contemporary economic 
models. The actual tasks that one undertakes in today’s economy are dissolved into 
the unrelenting and ever-retreating goals of capital acquisition, which sweeps up into 
its forceful progress all labour and translates it into “liquidity.” One often gets the 
impression that they have become cogs in a larger system with little care of, or 
attention to, what one does with one’s labours. The economy’s enormous growth has 
reduced labour to a mechanical function, where one’s “employment” typically takes 
the form of turning knobs, pulling levers, or clicking buttons. It goes without saying, 
perhaps, that there are certain creative limits to organizing spreadsheets. 
The virtual abstraction that marks all considerations of modern economy also 
negatively effects how commercial actions are communicated. On Ferguson’s 
account good and truthful actions are performed unto God and neighbor. In 
eighteenth-century Edinburgh normal exchanges between different members of 
society were conducted on familiar terms; one knew their partner in exchange, their 
produce and reputation, and that was why they did business together. A neighbor was 
someone known in friendship or trust. Such a level of familiarity is almost 
impossible to achieve in contemporary economies, since the person or persons with 
whom one does business are unlikely to be persons at all, but a collection of invisible 
shareholders, or worse, an electronic program behind a corporate brand. But this 
burdensome situation, which admittedly some workers do not see as burdensome in 
the slightest but simply “the way things are,” arises out of a logically prior quandary 
involving the conferral of market goods and labour. Perhaps the most demeaning 
implication of modern labour’s continued mutation from craft to function in western 
economies is the fact that one’s labours seem quite literally to go nowhere and 
contribute nothing. Enormous amounts of human energy are devoted to labours that 
are only to be taken up into the market machine, processed, and squeezed for every 
drop of value. Who exactly does this taking, processing, and squeezing cannot be 
identified with great specificity, of course, because it remains largely unclear what 
real thing is being contributed. When an office administrator circulates memos, 
answers telephones, and photocopies reports, for example, where, exactly, does the 
labour go? What is the character of their contribution? How are those who never 
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interact with physical objects—minus computational devices, of course, since that is 
the only means for “producing” in any economy without physical matter—to 
understand their place or involvement in the wider “business model?” Such questions 
allude to the onerous dilemma of being unaware of how one fits within the economic 
order or of how one’s commercial enterprises communicates with others. If one of 
my neighbors is a systems analyst and the other neighbor a web technician, how or 
what do their actions communicate in the commercial sphere, if they deliver any 
content at all? 
For Ferguson, it is clear that when one submits oneself as an instrument to God’s 
purposes, every action so conducted becomes a candidate for trans-temporal 
endurance. Given the tendency of modern economy to minimize artistic action and 
communicative action from the commercial sphere, the question to be put to the 
modern economist is how or whether one can act in today’s economy for God and his 
kingdom? When a job is by all intents and purposes completely arbitrary, or could 
just as easily be left undone, how is one to consider their work a legitimate 
contribution, much less an eternal one? Every member of society wishes to leave 
behind something permanent and enduring, something that can be given as a gift to 
one’s neighbors and to generations still to come. Under contemporary economic 
circumstances, however, there is little way of knowing what, exactly, one’s 
commercial actions realistically accomplish and therefore everyone’s attempt to 
leave something behind is surrendered to forces beyond their control. So much of 
what is enacted laboriously with eternal intentions loses its way when incorporated 
into the market machine that the machine itself now confuses between the kinds of 
commercial action that truly last and those that merely generate capital. If it lives on, 




The aim of this chapter has been to contrast Ferguson with schools of thought to 
which he has typically been aligned and to expose some uniquely Christian 
commitments undergirding his theory of action. Commercially, his theory rescues 
labour from the throes of inactivity and meaninglessness. Good and rightful action 
participates in the Divine life by imitating Divine action. To imitate the actions of 
God is to perform actions of artistry that communicate in and through time. 
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Therefore to act in view of Divine action is to act “by, in and for” God, since “there 
is only Christ: he is everything and he is in everything” (Col. 3:11). Christ’s deathly 
utterance, “it is accomplished,” signifies the end of action for mankind in the sense 
that it is no longer by his action that man sacrificially redeems himself, and yet also 
reinforces the imperative to act by demonstrating that it is only by his action that man 
can participate in God’s redemptive purpose for the world. Christ’s death and 
resurrection exemplifies what every human life must pursue, the overcoming of 
adversity for the actualization of something new. For “if anyone is in Christ he is a 
new creation; the old has passed away, and all things have become new.” (2 Cor. 
5:17).  
  






With previous considerations of history and action in mind, this chapter will 
assess Adam Ferguson’s identification of moral tensions in modern commerce. If, 
ultimately, we want to understand why the specific brand of democratic capitalism 
we have inherited appears to create and antagonize political disorder, if we detect a 
problem in the present configuration of the marketplace, how then has the problem of 
disorder arisen? In what way do the political and economic spheres relate to one 
another? How do the controls and commitments of market ideology become 
systemically embedded in political structures?  Such questions are responded to 
insightfully by Ferguson, and his perceiving moral and political problems so early in 
the genesis of capitalism highlights the fact that even in its beginning, its ends were 
often contradictory.    
Responding to this question of how certain economic institutions and practices 
compromise the political architecture of western modernity requires a slight 
methodological turn. This essay will broaden the Fergusonian portrait by sketching 
his account of a morally and politically subservient commercial order. We will begin, 
perhaps unexpectedly, with his advocacy for the establishment of local militias, 
which affords useful insight into his militaristic hermeneutic and illuminates 
rationale for his Principle of Defense. With the militia issue in mind we will then 
rehearse the movement of Ferguson’s argument as presented in the Essay on the 
History of Civil Society. Here we are determined to make the historical and moral 
character of his political thought as clear as possible. The history of civil society 
discloses distinct patterns and developments, continuities and discontinuities, helping 
us diagnose how and why history experiences transitions as it does. Ferguson 
narrates for us a misfortune that has occurred before in the history of society and will 
likely occur again. Grasping the historical texture of the story will allow us to 
proceed at last to the moment of methodological shift where application of his 
argument to contemporary western societies will be most suitable. It will be 
particularly important at this stage to resist venturing into wild abstractions. To avoid 
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the temptation of wandering into the no-man’s-land of theoretical economic 
“modeling,” concrete examples will be incorporated to illustrate the astuteness of 
Ferguson’s account and highlight the extent to which commercial forces have 
usurped control of political institutions. On final pass it will be clear how this 
deposition has occurred and what the moral significance of this change might be for 
dis-integrated capitalist societies. 
 
The Militia Issue 
Even after his honorable discharge Ferguson’s military service never really 
concluded. Taking a degree in Classics at St. Andrews, he matriculated afterward to 
the School of Divinity at Edinburgh for ordination in 1742. But due to pressing 
political circumstances abroad ministerial training customarily requiring six years for 
ordinands to complete Ferguson was invited to satisfy in only three. The Blatk Watch 
highland regiment required a Gaelic-speaking chaplain to serve his majesty’s 
continental campaign and selection for this particular post in this particular 
detachment called for the most delicate precaution. The country being still very much 
at war with France, the campaign could not afford destructive espionage from Stuart 
sympathizers holding an office as strategic and potentially explosive as regiment 
chaplain. Ferguson was quickly examined, ordained, and made fit for service.  In 
1745 he joined the Black Watch at Flanders. His Flemish exploits were not long 
enjoyed, however, for no sooner had he arrived than the Watch was pulled from the 
front lines of Europe to defend Yorkshire against the renewed Jacobite threat from 
the north. But the regiment would have been among the last units to deploy against 
the young Pretender’s forces and, in the end, it saw only limited action; clannish 
papists were far too untrustworthy to be thrust into battle with their own kin. After 
the defeat of Prince Charles threats to the throne dwindled and the Watch was soon 
deployed to Ireland where it would remain for the next several years. The unit was 
still stationed in Ireland when Ferguson resigned from active service in 1754. 
He spoke fondly, even romantically of his military service because that is how he 
conceived of it—as service. To be a military man required submission to an 
exceptional class of discipline, order, masculine virtue, and honor; military service 
epitomized a civic service above which no higher display could be achieved. In this 
regard Ferguson’s loyalties lay decisively with Great Britain, which were what 
decided his assignment to the Watch in the first place and was later confirmed in turn 
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by his Sermon in Ersh Language.306  Roughly ten years later and well into his 
retirement from active duty he published the mildly contentious pamphlet, 
Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia.307 His principle argument that 
militia service makes a positive contribution to civil society and affords the enlisted 
an opportunity to exercise virtues of courage and self-discipline held much to the 
classical line. “Self defense is the business of all,” he insists, and to establish local 
militias two things are required: that rotating members of the militia familiarize 
themselves with weaponry, and an order of authority instituted for the “habit of 
military obedience.”308 Standard objections to militias are then recited and quickly 
dismissed with underdeveloped, if not wholly inadequate rebuttals. Or so it would 
seem. Perhaps the better reason for his use of weaker or near impotent responses to 
his critics is that the Reflections primarily addresses establishment of militias and the 
benefits they bestow upon civic virtues and to local defense, and in doing so reveals 
along the way to its conclusion a deep suspicion harbored toward maintenance of 
permanent standing armies. He supports militias, but not nearly as much as he 
opposes the expense and potential tyranny of standing armies. This is precisely why 
his response to objections in the pamphlet comes across muted; the establishment of 
purely defensive militias is a lesser evil than the tyrannical threat of a standing army. 
The argument could not have been put more cautiously. 
On this issue Ferguson stands within a tradition of Scottish political suspicion. 
Nearly sixty years prior the able parliamentarian and political theorist Andrew 
Fletcher of Saltoun had also proposed the establishment of militias, and with more 
constructive detail. Fletcher explained how, in his own time, “most princes of Europe 
are in possession of the sword by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, 
absolutely depending upon them,” and how “all such governments are changed from 
monarchies to tyrannies.”309 Maintaining standing armies was the ultimate error of 
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the Roman Empire, which on Fletcher’s account represents the fall of antiquity’s last 
great standing army. From the gradual division of the Roman Empire arose a 
network of territories governed by kings, subdivided for barons, and then subdivided 
again for vassals; everyone had access to productive property or had at least secured 
general means of subsistence. By the turn of the eighteenth-century however, the 
economy’s adverse effects were wearing this conception of militarism ruinously thin. 
“The only remaining security we have,” complained Fletcher, “is that no standing 
armies were ever yet allowed in time of peace, the parliament of England having so 
often and so expressly declared them to be contrary to law.”310 The 1689 Bill of 
Rights had set preventative measures that no standing army could be maintained 
without the express consent of parliament. By Fletcher’s lights this “consent” was 
being grossly stretched and it seemed only a matter of time before these measures 
were seen as all but unbinding ceremony. In truth, power is the fulcrum of politics. 
To give the monarch a standing army “puts his power beyond control, and 
consequently makes him absolute.”311 The sword constitutes the true force behind 
political will and the bitter tip of its authority. When tyranny quickens, little protects 
the citizenry from a monarch’s sprawling controls, for, as J. G. Pocock has 
commented, “once armies were paid for by taxes, taxes were collected by armies and 
the liberties of nearly all Europe were at an end.”312 Still worse, one can assume any 
ruler thus empowered will turn readily to conquest. But “conquest is not in our 
interest,” insisted Fletcher, because it consumes both life and treasure—the very 
things that conquests are meant to improve—with deplorable alacrity.313 Tyranny 
expresses itself domestically as a suppression of personal and public freedoms, and 
internationally as a deleterious program for conquest. Establishing a standing army 
would therefore mean the beginning of national enslavement and explains why “a 
good militia is of such importance to a nation.”314 
For Ferguson the problem is slightly more nuanced. Maintenance of standing 
armies may formally establish certain irrecoverable political compromises, but more 
troublesome by far is the negative impact a loss of civic participation might have on 
                                                
310 Ibid., 19. 
311 Ibid. 
312 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 430. 
313 Ibid., 30. 
314 Ibid., 21. 
   124
the moral character of individual agents, and by extension to civil society itself. 
Societies unexercised in military responsibility are gradually susceptible to alien 
domination as they prove themselves devoid of masculine virtues necessary to defend 
the cities of their God. The martially unprepared are never genuinely free. Several 
years later when Ferguson expanded his lectures, published as Principles of Moral 
and Political Science, in a section on the meaning of political liberty he takes aim at 
the doctrinaire classification of liberty as an “absence of restraint,” defining it instead 
as “the operation of just government and the exemption from injury of any sort, 
rather than merely an exemption from restraint; for it actually implies every just 
restraint.”315 Freedom is not gained by jettisoning restraints, but by implementing 
and actively enforcing just restraints. Conceptually, freedom implies protective 
measures. So important is the protective impetus of freedom that “security, in fact, is 
the essence of freedom, and if security is to be obtained under political establishment 
alone, there also is freedom obtained.”316 Freedom and security belong to one 
another.  
In rejecting the idea of liberty realized by the absence of restraint, he also rejects 
the notion of freedom consisting in equality of station or rank. The trouble with 
fusing liberty and equality, he thinks, is “individuals are destined to inequality from 
their birth,” which then leads naturally to “all the varieties of possession and 
fortune.”317 In truth, “the only respect in which all men continue forever to be equal 
is that of the equal right which every man has to defend himself,” although this 
clearly admits an inequality in the things to be defended.318 Defense of person and 
property is the only equity. The conditions of society may become unequal, even 
grossly so, but “it is impossible to prevent the inequality of condition in the fortunes 
of men without violating the first and common principles of right in the most flagrant 
manner.”319 For government to force equality upon a people is to violate the basic 
right to defend one’s person and property. Therefore, on Ferguson’s account, 
equality cannot serve as a principle of justice. Only the Principle of Security rightly 
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prioritizes liberty and equality and explains why militias remain urgently necessary. 
The aim of the state should be to establish the conditions within which freedom can 
flourish, not force impossible ideals upon a resistant people. We will see later why 
Ferguson believes democracy cannot serve as a principle of freedom either. For now, 
it is enough simply to identify the vitality of militias in Ferguson’s political theory. 
Militias ensure that society is defended and that the bluntest instrument of modern 
coercive power is decentralized. These passages from the Principles evince 
Ferguson’s boundless support for the establishment of local militias from the 
beginning of his intellectual career to the end: “Liberty consists in the 
communication of safety to all,” a communication achieved through the service of 
militias on the part of society. 
As a matter of martial import, Ferguson’s Principle of Defense and insistence on 
the establishment of militias as opposed to state maintenance of standing armies has 
direct relevance to the moral question of war-making itself. Ferguson makes use of 
the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’ principles of just war to support his conviction that 
nations should take a natural posture of defense, not of aggression, in matters of 
international conflict.320 Conquest, the domination of another territory for reasons of 
interest, is not a sufficient condition for the declaration of war, and neither should 
war be waged on the supposition of fear or potential animosities. War is almost 
wholly reactive, “the success of arms cannot change wrong into right, and…any 
supposed right of conquest arising from the success of a war is a mere solecism in 
language and the reverse of any just tenet of natural law.”321 The political reality is 
that “nations are…almost in every instance mutual objects of jealousy and distrust, 
and must think themselves safe so far only as they are severely in condition to 
maintain their respective rights.”322 Yet modern nations, despite mutual jealousy and 
distrust, should use force only as a “last resort” aimed at “the redress of wrongs.”323 
Ferguson’s Principle of Defense affirms the just war tradition’s rebuke of aggressive 
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conquest.  His points here and those above on the imperial tendencies of standing 
armies achieve even greater relevance in his direct critique of modern commercial 
society.324 By the end of my exposition of Ferguson’s Essay, the political 
complications introduced to commercial exchange by martial expansion will have 
become clear. 
 
Essay on the History of Civil Society 
Bearing the subtleties of the militia issue in mind we are now in position to 
identify the broader logic of Ferguson’s argument in the Essay on the History of Civil 
Society. Society is the main character in his story and its journey down the corridor 
of commercial advancement constitutes the plotline. As we saw in chapter two, the 
history of civil society informs us of our contemporary circumstances by teaching us 
how to identify problems that have arisen before and respond sensibly to novel 
challenges. History is a sage. And in response to the commercial incongruities, 
complexities, and contradictions of modern society, history is Ferguson’s preferred 
guide for exploring the boundaries and forms of commercial life. 
Why have human beings always been found joined together in communities large 
and small? Given what we have discovered in Ferguson’s Principle of Defense and 
theoretical tendencies of eighteenth-century political thought in general, we are likely 
unsurprised by his immediate appeal to self-preservation as a basic principle of social 
formation. Humans have always been found in companies and the cause of this 
assemblage is “the principle of their alliance or union.”325 Human beings are social 
from beginning, for it is not good for man to be alone (Gen.2:18). On this principle 
of union Ferguson distinguishes crucially between self-love and self-interest.326 
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Interest, we are told, “arises from the principles of self-preservation in the human 
frame, but is a corruption, or at least a partial result of those principles, and is upon 
many accounts very improperly termed self-love.”327 Identification of self-interest 
with self-love is a mistake because “love is an affection which carries the attention of 
the mind beyond itself, and has a quality which we call tenderness, that never can 
accompany the considerations of interest.”328 Confusing love with interest leads to 
deep ambiguities over the affective powers giving rise to political action as such. The 
idea of interest “commonly implies little more than our regard for property” and in 
turn complicates social cohesion. But because love is self-transcending by definition, 
Ferguson reckons it essential to the principle of self-preservation itself: that I am 
taken care of is a consequence of having loved others first, not accidentally loving 
others by caring chiefly for myself. “Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of 
fortitude, redouble the ardors of friendship and kindle a flame in the human breast 
which the considerations of personal interest or safety cannot express.”329 United to 
this notion of love as self-transcendence, therefore, is the cooperative overcoming of 
adversity where people join together in the face of trial. “Affection operates with the 
greatest force where it meets with the greatest difficulties,” he states; a force 
illustrated vividly by the ancient Greeks and Romans, who understood how 
affections created and nourished bonds of union through allegiance to nation, land, 
and honor. The ancient citizen sets a striking contrast to the citizen of the modern 
state: 
Let those examples be compared with the spirit which reigns in a commercial state, 
where men may be supposed to have experienced, in its full extent, the interest 
which individuals have in the preservation of their country.  It is here indeed, if ever, 
that man is sometimes found a detached and a solitary being: he has found an object 
which sets him in competition with his fellow-creatures, and he deals with them as 
he does with his cattle and his soil, for the sake of the profits they bring. The mighty 
engine which we suppose to have formed society, only tends to set its members at 
variance, or to continue their intercourse after the bands of affection are broken.330 
The duty of all society members is to protect and foster community. “No person is so 
far insignificant as not to be able, in some particular, to contribute to the welfare of 
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others.”331 Notably absent from Ferguson’s account of society is any semblance of 
voluntarism. Membership in society is not premised upon voluntary consent, but by 
virtue of one’s natural birth, each being born into a community and thus given to that 
community on terms not of its own devising. “Man is by nature the member of a 
community, and when considered in this capacity the individual appears to be no 
longer made for himself.”332 Birth is a blessing to the community, and with age the 
responsibilities to one’s community may fluctuate or shift but the fundamental duty 
to serve the needs of others never slackens. 
Those who stand for the community, patriots for whom ministry to the father-
land is an enriching privilege, remain always tethered by the bonds of affection 
uniting brothers and neighbors. They belong together, and they belong where they 
are. This kind of existence, one dis-interested and directed toward the good of the 
community, is characterized by Ferguson as a Savage existence. He has in mind the 
native tribes of North America with their unpropertied and yet naturally stratified 
social order. The savage’s egalitarian occupations are simple: to contribute to the 
subsistence of the tribe and to help defend it as necessary—everyone occupies a 
definite role and place. The prospect of physical challenge is all that excites them. 
These savages enjoy an admirable existence without the idea or even desire to 
possess property. Throughout the Essay, Ferguson refers to savages, and later to 
barbarians, as a “rude” people. He means “rude” in the sense of “coarse” or 
“unrefined,” but where many of his contemporaries portray savages and barbarians in 
a mockingly primitive light, he uses them to illustrate how well a society can be 
ordered when property and wealth acquisition are not its dominant concerns. The 
irony with which he employs the savage as a literary tool will be seen more clearly 
later; for now, it is sufficient to note that the primitive political condition of the 
savage and barbarian is linked to their lack of property and indifference to wealth.  
For those members of modern society who do not view themselves as for the 
community, on the other hand, personal pursuits become detached and self-directed. 
Members of society addicted to self-interest quickly begin to treat others as useful to 
their aims; no longer are they the object of pursuit, but instead become the means to 
other less honorable ends. 
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According to Ferguson, civil society’s historical narrative undergoes a 
revolutionary change with the introduction of private property. Savages and 
Barbarians either could not conceive of possessing land, or simply did not value it to 
the point of rampant accumulation. Their disinterestedness implies that “rude” 
peoples, because they did not hold property, “admit of no distinctions of rank or 
condition, and they have in fact no degree of subordination different from the 
distribution of function.”333 Property possession inaugurates an alternative 
configuration to the political hierarchy. The power of property changes the essential 
criteria of authority, because “where no profit attends dominion, one party is as much 
averse to the trouble of perpetual command as the other is to the mortification of 
perpetual submission.”334 In other words, political power is no longer natural, but 
artificial and coerced. Savages, like those of North America, are constituted by 
affections of equitable friendship and kindness, whereas the modern European it 
seems would “rather corrupt than improve the system of morality” by making 
repeated “demands for attention.”335 The savages conceive of authority in terms of 
capacity; moderns in terms of possession. Characteristic of savages is a deep-seated 
contentment, disinterest in wealth, and commitment to testing fortitude. Political 
conditions for the savage seem always conducive to friendship. Indebtedness, the 
reality upon which modern commerce is founded, compromises genuine friendship 
by leveraging one neighbor against another and sinking the relationship into pure 
compensatory contract.   
In addition to reshaping criteria of authority and fracturing bonds of friendship, 
the establishment of property can also oppose personal freedom and interest. The 
sight of another’s acquisition initially motivates one to acquire property for oneself 
in fear that it might lead to serious deprivations. This sense of fear, coupled with 
jealousies arising later, urges members to amass their own resources and hoard them 
away. The change is one of perspective: from “what can I do to assist my neighbor?” 
to “how am I going to take care of myself?” The idea of private property made this 
transition possible. Something has come between my neighbor and me that requires 
close and constant attention, and which inverts the basic orientation of friendship. 
Next, “the individual having now a separate interest, the bands of society must 
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become less firm and domestic disorders more frequent.”336 This is what we might 
call “step one” in the loosening of social cohesion. Property presents one with the 
fresh awareness that one has interests needful of protection and promotion, and once 
this process of acquisition has commenced it accelerates at astonishing speed. At 
some point in history this acceleration led even to the consecration of a monarch, 
who had allocated enough property to rule surrounding territories at will. According 
to Ferguson, the movement from mere possession of property to the consecration of 
monarchs illustrates how fortune establishes rank and social status: “when the 
distinctions of fortune and those of birth are conjoined,” society is almost 
permanently stratified; subordinates find their purpose in the glory of the monarch 
and are even “guided by his smiles and his frowns.”337 Possession of wealth and the 
political status accompanying it become customary and eventually gain legal 
support—tradition reinforces perception. At this juncture the concepts of property 
and interest converge to the confusion of both: 
It is in this woeful condition that mankind, being slavish, interested, insidious, 
deceitful, and bloody, bear marks, if not of the least curable, surely of the most 
lamentable sort of corruption. Among them, war is the mere practice of rapine to 
enrich the individual; commerce is turned into a system of snares and impositions, 
and government turns oppressive or weak.338 
Property and interest seem therefore to reinforce one another—property becomes an 
interest, and interest concentrates on property.   
With Ferguson’s principle of subordination and protection of institutions in mind 
it would useful at this juncture to pause and consider his theory of right and critique 
of ideal liberty. In a section entitled, “Of the Political Arts,” Ferguson elaborates how 
proper engagement in the political sphere might reasonably take place. Causes of 
disorder or injustice are not found in the legal or authorial parameters of the political 
institutions themselves, or the constitutional bases of society, but in “the collision of 
private interests and passions; or from the interfering of private with public 
concerns.”339  Frictions generated by competing interests test the ability of 
government to remedy disparate claims; at one moment it guards against abuses and 
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the next it checks the proportion of its own abuses. The state is not privileged with 
omniscience or omnipotence. It must make do with what resources it has at the time. 
Thus, some form of political art is required to achieve enduring order. The question, 
of course, is what the right means might be, and in response Ferguson appeals to 
Grotian jurisprudence.340 The term right is defined as “the relation of a person to a 
thing in which no alteration ought to be made, without his own consent.”341 Right is 
objective and expresses the qualitative relation between things. Violation of right is a 
wrong. And thus the task of every citizen “is not to give society existence,” Ferguson 
reiterates, “but to perfect the society in which he finds himself already by nature 
placed; not to establish subordination, but to correct the abuse of a subordination 
already established.”342 Political arts are aimed, therefore, at the renewal of society 
through the righting of self-interested and divisive wrongs. One might even call the 
work redemptive: “society, in which alone the distinctions of right and wrong are 
exemplified, may be considered as the garden of God, in which the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil is planted; and in which men are destined to distinguish 
and to choose among its fruits.”343 But lest one be misled, individual liberty is right 
only in a particular, not absolute sense. Zealots of liberty have historically run into 
all varieties of disorder “and adventures under pretence of promoting it have found 
their way to the most violent and pernicious usurpations.”344 Exemplary evils of the 
French Revolution come to mind, and seeing as how the Principles were not 
published until 1792, perhaps it is one such “pernicious usurpation” Ferguson bears 
in mind. His philosophical approach to liberty is arrived at by way of negation, 
naming what liberty does not consist in. First, “liberty is not, as the origin of the 
name may seem to imply, an exemption from all restraint, but rather the most 
effectual application of every just restraint to all the members of a free state, whether 
they be magistrates or subjects.”345 Freedom must resonate with justice. Second, 
liberty cannot consist in equal station or fortune. Equality has not existed since the 
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fall of man and regardless of whether one insists on an equality of possession or of 
capacity, both are misguided: 
Nay, but we shall be told that all men were originally equal. This in regard to 
property can mean only that when no one had anything, all men were equally rich: 
But even this is no more than fancied equality in a single point. In respect to sex and 
age, strength of body and mind, individuals are destined to inequality from their 
birth; and almost in the first steps of society bear the distinctions which industry and 
courage give in the different attainments of men, and lead in the sequel to all the 
varieties of profession and fortune.346 
Equality, as an ideal, can never be properly deployed or actualized and so therefore 
should never be made a political aim. Maintaining equality as a political aim would 
violate the only right every human being does hold equally—the right to defend 
oneself. If the state were to force an ideal of equality it would have to do so at the 
expense of the only equality society enjoys. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, 
liberty cannot consist in the prevalence of democratic power. “The violence of 
popular assemblies and their tumults need to be restrained no less than the passions 
and usurpations of any other power whatever; and there is indeed no species of 
tyranny under which individuals are less safe than under that of a majority or 
prevailing faction of a corrupted people.”347 A concert of wills is as susceptible to 
anarchy and tyranny as a solitary monarch, and thus democracy can neither furnish 
nor guarantee individual freedom. On the distant view, only attributive justice gives 
scope to genuine freedom. 
In his Essay, Ferguson assesses the idea of freedom by comparing ancient 
(savage) notions with modern. In so doing he names two familiar powers that can 
either restrain or enhance freedom—property and law. Unbridled freedom tends 
almost universally to corruptions when left to itself. Law mitigates that tendency by 
establishing the terms of justice. “Where men enjoy peace,” he explains, “they owe it 
either to their mutual regards and affections, or the restraints of law.”348 The greatest 
threat to civil peace is “desire of lucre,” and that requires law have “a principle 
reference to property.”349 Strangely, however, the very laws meant to protect against 
violations of property may also instigate further violations, because “many of the 
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establishments which serve to defend the weak from oppression, contribute, by 
securing the possession of property, to favor its unequal division, and to increase the 
ascendant of those from whom the abuses of power may be feared.”350 All sorts of 
provisions have been envisaged to remedy the problem of unequal property 
possession but to little avail; revenue caps and abolition of primogeniture being 
among the more popular policies to date. Such regulations are hardly effective. He 
understands them to be more or less helpful to the sphere of commerce, but are 
proposed mainly in countries “whose national object is wealth.”351 Distribution of 
productive property is crucial, he thinks, but never quite enough. Insatiable passions 
are the real problem. Regulation is “never perfectly attained in any state where the 
unequal division of property is admitted, and where fortune is allowed to bestow 
distinction and rank.”352 Regulatory measures are at best coercive. Here the 
difference between the ancient and modern on regulating commerce is perhaps most 
stark. The ancient differs from the modern in that he gives little thought to 
“possessing” property, because (and Ferguson is behind this commitment 
wholeheartedly) the ancient “was made to consider himself as the property of his 
country, not as the owner of a private estate.”353 Genuine patriotism understands 
fully the permanence of land and concedes to its tangible authority, submitting 
humbly in recognition that the land possesses him, not he the land. In political arts 
every citizen should be a part of something larger than himself. But because the 
modern does not view property possession in the ancient way, we should expect 
blatant economic injustices to continue and for productive property to accumulate in 
fewer hands. Where the rule of law does not intervene, freedom is trampled 
underfoot. 
Modern society is manifestly fixated with wealth and with the status attached to 
it. The reality of modernity is everyone’s enchantment with commercial gain. For 
Ferguson, the totalizing power of commerce, cajoling society into deep and 
irrevocable devotion to the ideals of profit and status, would have greatest impact on 
the institution of labor.  In part four of the Essay, “Of Consequences that Result from 
the Advancement of Civil and Commercial Arts,” Ferguson is at pains to show how 
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commercial progress leads to the separation of professions and to the subsequent 
“subordination” these divisions establish. “The progress of commerce is but a 
continued subdivision of the mechanical arts,” he tells us, “every species of material 
is wrought up to the greatest perfection, and every commodity is produced in the 
greatest abundance.”354 Divisions of labor, in an unsavory irony, bring man and 
wealth together. But the effect of this division, apart from the plentiful result just 
described, is that laborers are made “like the parts of an engine, to concur to a 
purpose without any concert of their own.”355 Ferguson calls this line of work a 
“mechanical art,” since it requires “no capacity” and minimizes the human 
contribution. In fact, many mechanical arts “require no capacity” and “succeed best 
under a total suppression of sentiment and reason; and ignorance is the mother of 
industry as well as of superstition.”356 With this argument Ferguson levels what is 
perhaps the first recorded critique of the division of labor. Dividing and re-dividing 
the categories of labor refashions the laborer increasingly into a cog; functionally 
tasked, but devoid of meaning. He points out that manufacturing prospers most 
“where the mind is least consulted, and where the workshop may, without any great 
effort of imagination, be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men.”357 The 
mechanistic reduction of working man to an industrial function might even be 
described as inhumane, treating the worker not as a person, but as an object of 
productivity. If this were all Ferguson had to say on the subject our interest would 
remain piqued, but the division of labor is only the next perplexing phase in the story 
of commercial advancement.   
Division of labor creates the necessary conditions from which the second phase 
of commercial advancement may proceed: the escalation of subordination. Two types 
of subordination, or disparities in authority, have already been identified in the 
Essay—natural disparities of talent and unequal divisions of property. Both imply 
vertical ordering and therefore strain the prospects of true equality. The third type of 
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subordination arises from “the habits which are acquired by the practice of different 
arts.”358 Different occupations make differing contributions to civil society, some 
more visibly political than others. The work of the judge is a different contribution to 
that of the innkeeper; one definitively public, the other mainly private. Each offers a 
different civic service. Yet what strikes us most about this third subordination is 
Ferguson’s use of the word “habit.” Habits acquired from undertaking different 
occupations lead to further subordinations. Each worker’s occupation shapes him 
into something of the occupation’s own making. Occupational proficiency thus 
serves as a lever of stratification. Professions undertaken purely out of intellectual 
interest and which aim at perfection are considered highest order occupations, since 
the worker is not in any sense bound to a certain task. In short, an ideal day’s work 
will encourage freedom and creativity, remain non-necessitous by definition, and 
gravitate ever closer to its ideal. Not everyone is cut out for every variety of work; 
some prefer the labors of mind while others prefer the labors of hand, but both are 
needed for the preservation of society. 
Equality, the antithesis of subordination, is treated by Ferguson with deep 
suspicion. The ideal of equality dislodges authority from its traditionally qualitative 
attribution and categorically levels it. The problem, in other words, is not simply that 
you and I have equal dignity in the eyes of God but that by nature you and I are equal 
citizens with equal competencies and contributions. Equality turns the verticality of 
authority horizontal. Excellence, which by definition seeks to surpass the status quo, 
brings to a political society in search of equality nothing but confusion. Forcing the 
ideal of equality politically creates tensions, for “if the pretensions to equal justice 
and freedom should terminate in rendering every class equally servile and 
mercenary, we make a nation of helots, and have no free citizens.”359 Freedom and 
equality are adverse to one another; the pursuit of freedom transgresses the rules of 
equality, and the pursuit of equality transgresses the rules of freedom.360 So, for 
example, if the state attempts to establish equality as constitutional principle, then it 
must do so at the expense of certain freedoms. The same goes for freedom, for if the 
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state seeks to maximize the freedoms of its citizens it must do so at the expense of 
citizens’ claims to equality. In their ideal form, freedom and equality are primarily 
assessed by their prominence in the commercial sphere. However it is precisely here, 
in the commercial sphere, that “the exaltation of the few must depress the many,” 
and freedom descends rapidly into slavery.361 This arrangement is understood to be 
an injustice, one not easily remediable. That “the many” suffer at the expense of “the 
few” has been a long-recognized socio-economic injustice. Some theorists in 
Ferguson’s day seem to have been persuaded that the “meanness” of lower classes 
arose primarily “from the defect of knowledge and of liberal education.”362 Late-
moderns can therefore take comfort in the knowledge that an argument for 
educational correction of social deficiencies was a premonition very much alive as 
early as the mid eighteenth-century! The idea that certain ways of thinking and acting 
can be educated-out of a general population or that a lack of education is the primary 
reason for our social woes has been an alluring doctrine for quite some time, it turns 
out, and in the course of the eighteenth-century debate it was commonly believed 
education would elevate the lower class from its distasteful “meanness.” In any 
event, the main point for our purposes is that the commercial state and the pursuit of 
equality are antithetical to the liberal state. So antithetical are they, in fact, that that 
the primary objections to democracy itself—the most equalizing political form—are 
“taken from the inequalities which arise among men in the result of commercial 
arts.”363 But not for reasons one might assume. For Ferguson, commercial enterprise 
negatively shapes political representatives. “How,” he asks, “can he who has 
confined his views to his own subsistence or preservation be entrusted with the 
conduct of nations?”364 The commercial state might of necessity yield a hierarchical 
social order but the primary reason democracy cannot succeed in leveling society is 
because the magistrates cannot be trusted to represent justly their constituents. 
Elected magistrates being principle benefactors of a non-democratic commercial 
state leaves little room to hope for a parliament constituted entirely for public 
purposes. 
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Commercial advancement therefore results in the division of labor and the 
necessary subordinations resulting from that division. This division and subsequent 
subordination signals an historical turning point. Latent in the consequences of 
commercial advancement are the first signs of national decline. But before the 
reasons for this decline can be articulated Ferguson needs first to show how national 
sentiments are formed and directed. Every nation thinks highly of itself and it seems 
patently evident that “no nation is so unfortunate as to think itself inferior to the rest 
of mankind: few are even willing to put up with the claim to equality.”365 If one 
nation sees itself as superior to another it does so according to prejudiced standards. 
The criteria used to compare qualitative differences between nations must be 
interrogated, for if the deciding criteria of national greatness are expanded to include 
achievements harmful to personal or institutional character, then final judgments on 
the comparative relationship will be fickle at best. “Even where we pretend to found 
our opinions on reason, and to justify our preference of one nation to another, we 
frequently bestow our esteem on circumstances which do not relate to national 
character, and which have little tendency to promote the welfare of mankind.”366 
Conquest, territory, and wealth are insufficient criteria for determining the character 
of a nation. Some theorists will contend that wealth and national power are a natural 
fruits of public virtue, and that loss of these coveted national possessions is a direct 
result of vice. Prosperity, on this view, becomes a natural reward for being virtuous; 
poverty a natural punishment for vice. For Ferguson, however, it is clear that “the 
virtues of men have shone most during their struggles, not after the attainment of 
their ends.”367 Virtues display themselves when tried by conflict or resistance, like 
muscular exercise, and thus disclose the true quality of an action. The “ends” of 
wealth and national power are “frequently the causes of corruption and vice,” not the 
prize for virtuous actions.368 Pushing ever harder for ascendancy among nations—the 
natural result of what Hume called international “jealousies’”—has brought each to 
the point of willfully substituting mechanical arts, which increase wealth, for those 
professions which might benefit the laborer.369 Identifying national greatness with 
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commercial wealth or prowess betrays the classical—and for that matter biblical—
view of what it means to be great.   
Humility, contentment, and peace are noble qualities that ultimately fail to 
deliver “commercial advantage” or “national ascendancy.” Rich and ascendant 
societies are “polished,”  “civilized,” and modern; the unpolished savage and 
barbarian. Savages and barbarians are peoples who by definition never enjoy the 
refinements of wealth or national greatness. Nevertheless, both savage and barbarian 
societies view themselves as great and perhaps even comparably greater than 
surrounding peoples. Every nation sees itself as great. In asserting a position of 
prestige the self-declared “polished” society should be ashamed of its 
superciliousness. So called “polished” societies would do well to read their history, 
claims Ferguson, for history shows that “the progress of societies to what we call the 
heights of national greatness is not more natural than their return to weakness and 
obscurity is necessary and unavoidable.”370 The brutal truth about society is that it is 
comprised of mere mortals capable of great achievement as well as great failure; at 
different times both victim and benefactor of natural circumstance. Greatness is not 
an artificially engineered, contrived, or fabricated social status, but a quality only to 
be conferred, never demanded. It is perhaps at the exact moment when a society 
considers itself great that it has actually forsaken the constitutive properties of 
greatness. This is not to say, of course, that one should eliminate all aspirations 
whatsoever. As we have already seen, the essence of one’s life displays itself through 
exertion. But exertions can also be misdirected or misspent, as is clearly manifest in 
the pursuit of riches, where “men engage in pursuits with degrees of ardor not 
proportioned to the importance of their object.”371 The moral question of what end 
our commercial endeavors seek is preceded by the question of whether the spirit of 
progress itself, “which for a time continues to carry on the project of civil and 
commercial arts, find(s) a natural pause in the termination of its own pursuits?”372 
The word “pause” stands out in that question almost as an absurdity. Pause? Is there 
ever a chance for progress to pause? Perhaps certain types of progress may allow or 
even encourage a noticeable pause, but commercial progress appears not to be one of 
these important types. Desire for riches grips the heart and penetrates the soul of 
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every polished nation. The pursuit of wealth is, on Ferguson’s account, the beginning 
of its own unmaking: 
The commercial and lucrative arts may continue to prosper, but they gain an 
ascendant at the expense of other pursuits.  The desire of profit stifles the love of 
perfection.  Interest cools the imagination and hardens the heart; and, recommending 
employments in proportion as they are lucrative and certain in their gains, it drives 
ingenuity, and ambition itself to the counter and the workshop.  But apart from these 
considerations, the separation of professions, while it seems to promise 
improvement of skill, and is actually the cause why the productions of every art 
become more perfect as commerce advances; yet in its termination and ultimate 
effects, serves in some measure to break the bands of society, to substitute form in 
place of ingenuity, and to withdraw individuals from the common scene of 
occupation on which the sentiments of the heart and the mind are most happily 
employed.373 
Constant pursuit of interest, refining over and over again the apparatus of production, 
degrades and devalues the labors of society, breaking it apart and forcing it into ever 
more clandestine occupations. Love of “perfection” and “imagination” are 
substituted in deference to form and efficiency. This resignation to narrowly defined 
specializations leads to the common assumption that society is made to consist in 
parts, “of which none is animated with the spirit of society itself.”374 Such persons as 
are inattentive to the needs of state, Ferguson follows Pericles in calling “perfectly 
insignificant.”375 When each is after one’s own private interest, public interest falls 
inevitably by the wayside. The state would do well to remain suspicious of this 
transition from public to private interest, because it may quickly find its citizens 
unworthy of the freedoms it protects. It must pay attention, in other words, to the 
uses being made of freedom. Liberty has its dangers, he reminds us, and people “may 
be found to grow tired in secret of a free constitution, of which they never cease to 
boast in their conversation and which they always neglect in their conduct.”376 Public 
needs are not the concern of Private Man, and this is why “national spirit,” that 
energetic push towards progressive ascendancy among nations, appears frequently 
transient—the “spirit” of privacy neglects and therefore corrupts the public sphere. 
Commercially oriented “national spirit” produces a relaxation in, and ignorance of, 
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the public sphere. This is for Ferguson the third moment of society’s transition 
toward slavery. “Ordinary establishments,” he explains, “terminate in a relaxation of 
vigor and are ineffectual to the preservation of states, because they lead mankind to 
rely on their arts, instead of their virtues, and to mistake for an improvement of 
human nature a mere accession of accommodation or of riches.”377 Taking his cue 
from the Scriptures, therefore, Ferguson seems content simply to affirm the truth 
from St. Paul’s first letter to Timothy: But those who desire to be rich fall into 
temptation, in a snare, into many senseless and hurtful desires that plunge men into 
ruin and destruction.  For the love of money is the root of all evil; it is through this 
craving that some have wandered away from the faith, and pierced their hearts with 
many pangs (1Tim.6:10). 
Packaged covertly into this argument is Ferguson’s militaristic conviction that 
every adult male citizen should serve in public defense. Pursuing avidly and perhaps 
unconscionably the social status resulting from wealth leads persons and 
communities into compromising apathy. “Men frequently, while they study to 
improve their fortunes, neglect themselves; and while they reason for their country, 
forget the considerations that most deserve attention.” Thus, “a nation consisting of 
degenerate and cowardly men is weak,” asserts Ferguson, and “a nation consisting of 
a vigorous, public-spirited, and resolute men is strong.”378 Ferguson’s weak-strong 
dichotomy harkens to antiquity, where the individual who seeks to increase riches 
and gain greater social prominence is seen as an “effeminate” and corrupted louse, 
cowardly, unable to possess himself or to wield a weapon. The “strong” citizen who 
serves the public and humbles himself dutifully on behalf of nation is seen as 
“heroic,” a possessor of “masculine” virtues, a true patriot. Commercial interest 
divides the public from private and thus creates conditions for either a weak or strong 
citizenry. The constant danger is prioritizing commercial service to political service.  
Rigidly dividing professions into narrower fields of precise functionality also 
deprives citizens of the moral and intellectual resources needed for public service, for 
“to separate the arts which form the citizen and the statesman, the arts of policy and 
war, is an attempt to dismember the human character and to destroy those very arts 
we mean to improve.”379 Ferguson describes this incredible division as a civil 
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“deprivation.” Society is thus grouped into two types of citizens: one set has an 
interest in the preservation of civil establishments but lack the means to defend them, 
and the other has this power to defend but lacks either the inclination or the interest 
to do so.380 Such was the ancient Roman dilemma. It was not until legions became 
mercenary, fighting only for monetary compensation, that the conquests of Rome 
descended into banality. Of course, this insight, too, is directly relevant to Ferguson’s 
denouncement of standing armies and repeated appeal to establish local militias. 
Standing armies of a commercial state are at constant risk of being used as an 
instrument of commercial interest. Just as the mercenaries in Caesar’s legions fought 
for plunder, so too would modern nations fall prey to the lucre of conquest. Warfare 
couches the moral imperative deceitfully in terms of protecting or promoting 
interests—lines are constantly blurred, goods distorted, lives lost, and profits made. 
What was once a service to the public, at least by intention, is given over to each 
soldier or magistrate’s private interest; the publicity of the service masks the true 
commercial ambitions of the nation. Maintenance of such an army is but a massive 
“national waste.” 
The last part of Ferguson’s Essay brings readers to the fourth step and to the 
argument’s climax. The character of nations remains the primary object of his 
inquiry, only now he shifts his attention to the final corruption incident to the 
loosening of social bonds and to that corruption’s admission of political slavery. 
Collective focus on the commercial state has settled into the fabric of society like an 
acid, breaking it apart and dissolving the affections that give it life: 
When mere riches, or court favor, are supposed to constitute rank; the mind is 
misled from the consideration of qualities on which it ought to rely.  Magnanimity, 
courage, and the love of mankind are sacrificed to avarice and vanity, or suppressed 
under a sense of dependence.  The individual considers his community so far only as 
it can be rendered subservient to his personal advancement or profit: he states 
himself in competition with his fellow creatures; and, urged by the passions of 
emulation, of fear and jealousy, of envy and malice, he follows the maxims of an 
animal destined to preserve his separate existence, and to indulge his caprice or his 
appetite at the expense of his species.381 
Competition between private interest and public good is the contradictory starting-
point of the modern commercial state. Citizens tend toward the former, 
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unfortunately, and become either zealous to trespass on others in their rapacious 
pursuit of profit or willingly relinquish their political privileges for a baser, more 
servile existence. A people, as it were, split naturally into roles of either master or 
slave. The split is “natural” in that it results from a government which views itself 
principally as a protector and manager of commercial interests. From this 
management only two parties arise: “the oppressor who demands, and the oppressed 
who dare not refuse.”382 The idea of Master and Slave does not seem to disturb 
Ferguson in the slightest; rather, what disturbs him is government turning a blind eye 
to obvious injustices:  
Defects of government, and of law, may be in some case considered as a symptom 
of innocence and of virtue.  But where power is already established, where the 
strong are unwilling to suffer restraint or the weak unable to find a protection, the 
defects of law are marks of the most perfect corruption. 383 
If the state proves incapable of remedying public injustices, then the moral 
corruptions of the commercial state have already entrenched themselves in the 
statutes of law and structures of government, corroding them from within.   
The source of extravagant corruption and the hidden oracle of national declension 
is luxury. Ferguson defines it plainly as “that complicated apparatus which mankind 
devises for the ease and convenience of life.”384 A luxurious item in one place may 
not be luxurious in another, and a luxurious advantage in one generation may not be 
luxurious to the one succeeding it. Conceptions of luxury constantly change. Morally 
disconcerting to Ferguson, however, is the extreme priority given to luxuries. 
Whenever a luxurious object “may come to be preferred to friends, to a country, or to 
mankind” the corruptions of luxury can be seen to have left their mark. The moral 
force of luxury “is not to limit men to any particular species of lodging, diet, or 
clothes; but to prevent their considering these conveniences as the principle objects 
of human life.”385 Luxury is by definition a privileged possession identified purely by 
its exclusivity. If a sufficient number possess this “luxurious” object, then it ceases to 
be luxurious. The luxurious object, to put the matter another way, is one that only 
some people can obtain and when acquired by a sufficient number degrades into an 
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object of mere convenience. In thinking about this niggling inequality one should 
bear in mind that the unequal distribution of wealth is a necessary product of an 
advancing commercial state. A certain level of inequality must be accepted in order 
to experience any degree of commercial improvement. Luxury is a class concept 
actualized by what the upper class flaunts and lower class envies. Politically this 
means that “luxury is…adverse to the form of democratic government; and in any 
state of society can be safely admitted in that degree only in which the members of 
the community are supposed of unequal rank and constitute public order by means of 
a regular subordination.”386 Notice the language Ferguson employs for this 
distinction—luxury and democracy are not only incompatible with one another, but 
altogether adverse. To the extent that democracy implies establishment of equality, 
or at least the pursuit of equality, luxury will menace the political order with abrupt 
and irresolvable inequalities. One can take one or the other, but cannot have both. 
Moral corruption is the prima causa of institutional corruption. All people long 
for what they do not presently possess and think unreflectively of felicity consisting 
in much the way Hobbes describes: “a continual progress of the desire, from one 
object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but way to the latter.”387 
Regardless of status, whether abiding in cave or palace, everyone longs for sensual 
gratification in an object not presently held. Luxury—that object of near-universal 
longing—is a false mirage on the personal and social horizon. When it becomes an 
object of pursuit, exertive actions have nowhere to go but back upon the actor, 
amassing upon himself.  Ferguson suggests that when left to follow their own private 
advantages, each will become “effeminate,” “mercenary,” and “sensual.” Yet each 
will become so not because pleasures and profits have become alluring, “but because 
he has fewer calls to attend to other objects; and because he has more encouragement 
to study his personal advantages and pursue his separate interest.”388 Andrew 
Fletcher, too, had foreseen this danger. Luxury affords some the choice of whether to 
submit to military service or pay the poor to do so for him; “an expensive way of 
living” that allows the rich to sell the means of freedom and amuse themselves 
endlessly with private commercial tokens. A luxury of not-serving martially would 
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387 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70. 
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seem then to widen the divide between public and private.389 Self-interested and 
isolated individuals lose the ability to think and act in service to the public. When 
this tendency becomes a sufficiently widespread national phenomenon, fortune and 
luxury absorb public attention: 
Nations are most exposed to corruption form this quarter, when the mechanical arts, 
being greatly advanced, furnish numberless articles to be applied in ornament to the 
person, in furniture, entertainment, or equipage; when such articles as the rich alone 
can procure are admired; and when consideration, precedence, and rank are 
accordingly made to depend on fortune.390  
The quality of “goodness”—the ground of political life—is dissolved into mere 
appearances. Merit and ability become politically superfluous. Within such a society 
“we rate our fellow-citizens by the figure they are able to make,” and the highest of 
our praise is reserved for what seems richest in ostentation. Modern commercial 
society has thus “transferred the idea of perfection from the character to the 
equipage; and that excellence itself is, in our esteem, a mere pageant, adorned at a 
great expense by the labors of many workmen.”391 Ferguson identifies here the 
workings of an informal bondage. A rich master uses commoners for commercial and 
political gain, and the commoners willingly permit their enslavement to “so great” a 
master. Stocks have hereby snapped shut around the wrists of a nation, but not yet 
been securely locked.   
For the corruption of society to achieve completeness, as Fletcher had 
foreshadowed, the luxurious bent of commercial society must be aided concomitantly 
by the mass forsaking of public service. The day is coming when private interests 
effectively distract citizens from public affairs and bring them to focus entirely upon 
their set of independent personal domains. Those public affairs demanding attention 
will be discerned as inconveniences or interruptions to the normal pace of personal 
enterprise. Under such conditions “the care of mere fortune is supposed to constitute 
wisdom; retirement from public affairs and real indifference to mankind receive the 
applauses of moderation and virtue.”392 Political life reduces to a series of petty 
                                                
389 See Fletcher’s  “A Discourse on Government with Relation to Militias” and chapter thirteen of 
Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, 423-461. 
390 Ibid., 238. 
391 Ibid., 239. 
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disputes over issues of minor commercial interest. The higher orders of society claim 
here a particularly cumbersome experience when, in truth: 
They speak of human pursuits as if the whole difficulty were to find something to 
do: They fix on some frivolous occupation as if there was nothing that deserved to 
be done: They consider what tends to the good of their fellow creatures as a 
disadvantage to themselves: They fly from every scene in which any efforts of vigor 
are required, or in which they might be allured to perform any service to their 
country.393 
Who then is truly pitiable? It is surely not the poor that deserve our pity, insists 
Ferguson angrily, it is much more justly given to the rich!  In their lavish inactivity 
they waste away on new indulgences and fresh sensualities all the while unimpressed 
by concerns of others. The political situation is therefore dismal. 
Portrayed thusly the modern commercial state can only end in political slavery.  
This slavery is two tiered: slavery within the society itself, where the upper class 
rules the lower by virtue of fortune and status, and slavery between nations. The 
latter form is foreshadowed randomly throughout earlier parts of the Essay and is 
only made explicit at the argument’s climax. National slavery occurs when fortune 
ceases to be an instrument for good and becomes instead the idol of a slackened and 
sickened public conscience. Fortune, “the foundation on which freedom was built, 
may serve to support a tyranny; and what in one age raised the pretensions and 
fostered the confidence of the subject may in another incline him to servility, and 
furnish the price to be paid for his prostitutions.”394 Wealth preliminarily enhances 
freedom but when admired “leads to despotical government.”395 Riches become so 
singularly exalted that law itself is impaled on the sword of interest, concealing 
rather than restraining the “iniquities of power.” Law is the soil that gives life to 
genuine liberty, but if the soil is disparaged and the roots of freedom destroyed, then 
each must be willing to vindicate his own freedom for himself. Under a private 
commercial state, therefore, “even political establishments…cannot be relied on for 
the preservation of freedom.”396     
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Ferguson realizes that in the long run, higher orders of society will begin to 
revere one another in much the same way the lower order of society reveres the 
higher. Each will be prepared to do whatever it takes to ascend the social ladder, 
especially if all it requires is pretend (or real) admiration of those who stand in 
position to benefit. The whole socio-political structure is interest driven. So long as 
one’s money-making capacities remain unimpeded it does not matter whether wealth 
is becoming increasingly isolated in a few or whether a solitary individual has 
control of the political sword. Here we see the undercurrent of Ferguson’s argument 
come full circle—he is mindful of militias and the establishment of a standing army 
at the disposal of Westminster. When the division between public and private is 
formally established, separating civilian and public professions, the way is prepared 
for a “dangerous alliance of faction with military power.”397 Soon conquest becomes 
a political end in itself; and as it was for ancient Rome, so it will be in modern 
Britain: 
In proportion as territory is extended, its parts lose their relative importance to the 
whole.  Its inhabitants cease to perceive their connection with the state, and are 
seldom united in the execution of any national, or even factious, designs.  Distance 
from the seats of administration, and indifference to the persons who contend for 
preferment, teach the majority to consider themselves as the subjects of a 
sovereignty, not as the members of a political body.398 
Conquest reinforces the perception of dissociation. Of all the consequences tendered 
by the modern commercial state it is “perpetual enlargement of territory” which leads 
most easily to despotism. Even the government in a political situation of complete 
commercialization and national servitude takes a view to its own fiscal interests, 
where it becomes (like its subjects) devoted to the protection and promotion of its 
own commercial interests. The irony, as illustrated vividly by the history of civil 
society, is that to conquer and to be conquered often appears the same, sharing the 
same ultimate conclusion. Slavery is the political, social, and personal outcome of 
the commercial state. Each citizen is either enslaved to his own desires, to the 
empowered elites of his community, or to the despotic ruler of state: “Obedience is 
the only duty that remains, and this is exacted by force.”399 Enslavement is integral to 
the tragic narrative of commercial society, reaching its historical climax with a 
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conquest that is always also its anticlimax. For although conquest might appear the 
apex of political power, it is in fact the genesis of impotence and enslavement; 
speaking not of power, but of uncertainty; expressing nothing of contentment or 




Institutions, Democracy, and Slavery 
Ferguson’s history of civil society understands the moral and political 
compromises inherent to commercial enterprise. Posing ancient Greek and Roman 
societies as examples, he seeks to show how a distinctly modern understanding of 
commercial interest creates both moral and political contradictions. Societies in 
pursuit of wealth become submissive to the point of defenseless, and when unable or 
unwilling to preserve their own domestic order such societies are easily dominated 
by a foreign power. The “despotical tyrant” Ferguson has in mind resembles the 
commander of a national standing army, like King Louis XV for example, or allied 
conquerors from Austria or Spain. The commercial society is affectively 
incapacitated. This is what he means when he says that fortune may come to support 
a tyrant—the very object of pursuit becomes the catalyst for political domination.   
He does not appear to have noticed it himself, but inherent to the logic of 
Ferguson’s argument is the crucial premise that the pursuit of wealth in commercial 
enterprise undermines political institutions. He has in mind a uniquely military 
despot who marches without resistance into a territory and captures all political 
authority. Having expended all its energies in the pursuit of commercial gain, the rich 
nation has forfeited its ability to make war and thus succumbs to the power of a 
nation that can. As late-moderns standing centuries removed we must resist the urge 
to discount Ferguson’s argument as primitively naïve. Surmising impulsively that his 
situation was so very different from our own or that questions faced in eighteenth-
century Britain could not possibly correspond to political questions of the early 
twenty-first century are equally naïve. Are they so different? Do we not detect 
something poignant and applicable in Ferguson’s historical assessment of 
commercial society? What Ferguson could not have seen when modern capitalism 
was but a sapling in the great forest of political history was how and to what degree 
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that sapling would mature and eventually seed itself across the globe. He could see 
that the progress of democratic capitalism gradually undermines political institutions, 
as was already patently evident in the dispassionate view of military service among 
social elites, but we have in our time seen his claim come true in an altogether 
different way.  
In our age, we have seen the market itself become the tyrant. If one might be 
permitted this personification—and there is little reason for disallowing it, seeing as 
the commonest references to “the market” are in regard to its “habits,” “moods,” and 
“reactions”—then it seems relatively clear that the market can, in fact, tyrannize. 
Capital market tyranny asserts itself cruelly without political or legal repercussion. 
On a political level, the commercial sphere appears at times to be both constructive 
and destructive; it replenishes tax revenues for the building of infrastructure, for 
instance, while at the same time bringing productive property into the hands of a 
shrinking number of benefactors. Moral and political inconsistencies within health 
care, or campaign finance, or climate change, or investment banking, for example, 
emerge as each distinct market tends to extremes when configured by capitalist logic: 
the commodification of health, buying of votes, opposition to reform, and 
reimbursement of stock gamblers. Political institutions are therefore either 
intrinsically broken or simply prone to commercial domination. Ferguson, for his 
part, had already perceived this tendency in the history of society—political society 
naturally accommodates the market will, although the market’s demand for political 
attention is not itself a brand of tyranny. The market becomes genuinely tyrannical 
only when it destroys or forsakes the very political institutions meant to govern it, 
stampeding them underfoot as a violent herd shatters its picket corral.     
To late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century theorists who would 
view the dawning of liberal capitalism as the initial victory of democracy over 
monarchy as a political form, Ferguson has already rejoined with at least two reasons 
why this usurpation would not be successful. First, when wealth is made the principle 
object of commercial exchange this leads to a twofold slavery—between possessors 
and dispossessed, and also between nations. Slavery is total. If one were not enslaved 
to riches itself, then one would be enslaved to another who would; if one society 
were to become intoxicated by the pleasures of riches, then it would be quickly 
enslaved by another society virtuous enough to resist the same temptation. Slavery is 
total because greed appears helplessly pervasive; made possible by way of a simple 
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idea that has gradually bewitched the modern world: Luxury. Luxury, as we have 
seen, relies for its existence on class divisions because it is defined by an enjoyment 
premised on exclusivity. When a luxury becomes the possession of enough non-
elites, then the object or service no longer remains a luxury but becomes instead a 
mere convenience. Luxury therefore abolishes equality. In a free market directed 
toward the multiplication of wealth equality becomes impossible precisely because 
wealth by its very existence drives a wedge between those who possess the means of 
productive property and those who do not.400 How then, Ferguson asks us, can a 
legitimate democratic government be established upon such conditions? When the 
object of commercial exchange leads to deeper inequalities why should anyone 
expect democratic processes to endure?  
In supposed popular governments such as exist in representative democracies of 
the early twenty-first century, political power is not—contrary to popular opinion—
held by that collection of individuals comprising the majority, but by those who 
possess the greatest monetary resources, who, in order to command political control 
must first be market beneficiaries prior to becoming political magistrates. This 
problem offers two revelations. The first is the patently obvious reality of 
representatives being faced with a conflict-of-interest between economic gains and 
political service. Who are they to support, for example, when a piece of legislation 
creates tension between the interests of a party-supporting multinational corporation 
and those of the wider electorate? Whose needs are being represented? This dilemma 
is a timeless political reality. Constituents cannot control whom or to what their 
magistrates will lend support. Second, and perhaps the more important revelation, is 
a profound blindness to forces giving rise to political power as such. Elections are 
won these days by the savvy and solvent, meaning candidates must be wealthy in 
order to gain political appointment. Political authority of the democratic variety, it 
turns out, comes with a price. Nevertheless, when it is finally recognized that 
possession of wealth gives rise to political power the undermining of political 
institutions by the Market has finally become complete, for when wealth becomes the 
primary means to political power the object of societal corruption has itself become 
institutionalized. 
                                                
400 For a useful historical overview of luxury as a concept, see Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of 
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If slavery is an institution—not “slavery” in the modern sense of physical and 
psychological cruelty, but in the ancient sense of servus, or service—and   
commercial order is defined by the relationships humans share with one another in 
the exchange of wares, then it means a great deal that Ferguson joins a host of early-
modern theorists in referring to physical exchanges as “commerce,” drawing as it 
does from the Latin tradition of “coming together” to exchange merchandise. The 
marketplace was not yet an abstraction, but a collection of real people coming 
together to trade tangible objects. On these terms Locke was correct in suggesting a 
deep link between the vitality of commerce and the labours that go into it; labour and 
land are indeed partners in the genesis of commerce. But if labour is always a 
necessary part of commerce this means everyone must render service to someone: 
masters serve slaves, as it were, and slaves serve their masters. “Everyone is a slave 
to someone” would seem to be an essential human aphorism that on the commercial 
level smacks of universal truth.401 The fundamental composition of society is 
premised on the tacit offering and acceptance of service. Yet, at the same time, we 
realize that despite the master’s service to the slave there is a distinguishable “slave 
class” in society, a larger proportion of slaves who labour on behalf of a smaller 
proportion of masters. Marx, of course, found this to be the Injustice of all injustices. 
But what we have seen in the latter twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is a 
further impoverishment of this relationship. If it is true that slavery is an institution, 
as I have maintained, what distinguishes the late-modern slave from the ancient is the 
modern’s tragic loss of service. The chasm between the ancient and modern slave is 
therefore one of both time and dignity, since it seems there is no denying the late-
modern slave now has little knowledge of who, exactly, his master is, and if that 
were not enough, the work assigned to him is even less meaningful. Modern slave-
labour is normally dedicated to corporate multinationals owned by masters without 
faces or names; it is from the slave’s perspective service only to an idea or 
possibility. The labours undertaken, moreover, are often fragmented the moment they 
are completed, circulated numerically to different departments and then tallied as a 
percentage in stock value. On rare occasion these slaves are offered stock options 
affording them limited “ownership” in the business their efforts serve, collectable by 
                                                
401 For all its historical fascination, on this point Hilaire Belloc came up short.  The capitalist and the 
collectivist were moral menaces to modern society, to be sure, but their theoretical tendency to a 
“servile state” misjudges the historical fact that slavery is a permanent human fixture, not simply a 
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instalments upon retirement. Still, the fact remains that the slave is required daily to 
continue button-clicking and data-plugging without the slightest prospect of 
imagination, service, or sense of purpose. Contemporary conditions of slave labour 
would seem comparably worse than the ancient’s. Deprived of soul, slavery defined 
affectively by service is emptied of content, unmaking itself as the object or purpose 
of service becomes increasingly obscured. 
 
Conclusion 
The principle aim of this chapter has been to outline the argument of Ferguson’s 
Essay, underscore its central argument, and sketch a few of its implications for 
modern society. We observed first the nature of Ferguson’s militarism and the vital 
role it plays in his advocacy for local militias, which turned out to be equally 
concerned with the government’s attempt to establish a standing army. Next, with 
militarism in mind, we turned out attention to the argument of Ferguson’s Essay. The 
contours of this argument covered a wide-ranging conceptual terrain, including the 
state of nature, the union of societies, establishment of private property, the 
principles of authority, power of labour, the loosening of social bonds, and lastly, the 
movement toward political slavery. Ferguson’s conclusion seems to have been that 
the society pursuant commercial gain as its principle object will become weak and 
susceptible to domination and enslavement. He is concerned, in other words, with 
what riches do to people and the political ramifications incurred. Commerce aimed at 
multiplying wealth undermines political institutions—that is the crux of Ferguson’s 
argument. It was this political principle, aided by the fortunate position of being over 
two centuries removed that allowed us to make a contemporary application. My 
claim has been that the liberalized market bent on the pursuit of wealth has 
undermined our political institutions to such an extent that it seems now in its highly 
abstract and personified form to have itself become the tyrant Ferguson feared. Then, 
lastly, we reviewed two points alluded to briefly by Ferguson but that were left 
largely untouched until we articulated the argument concerning market tyranny. 
These were, first, that the modern market economy is adverse to democratic 
government. This adversity endures because of luxury, which drives a wedge into 
society, creating tensions and conflicts that disintegrate the political order. Luxury is 
premised on inequality and so long as luxury remains part of capitalism’s project the 
social equality required for genuine democratic order will never be reached. And this 
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is precisely why, despite the murderous efforts of the French, history has never seen 
a pure democratic government. The other implication Ferguson’s argument raised 
was the problem of late-modern slavery. Differentiating from the ancient meaning of 
“slavery” associated “service,” the aim was to show why slavery remains a 
permanent human institution and how the banality of late-modern slavery abolishes 
the conditions that make slavery meaningful.   
We are provided a partial vision of civilization’s real institutions. In a world 
comprised of errant human beings even the mightiest establishments are prone to 
crimes of ruin. Those noble authorities designated to protect us from ourselves 
cannot forever withstand the belligerent corruptions repeatedly hoist upon them. 
Ferguson was correct in seeing slavery at the heart of commercial and political life. 
In each sphere we find items to bind and possess, like people or land, just as we also 
find items that bind us, like law and families. Freedom, the great bastion of 
liberalism, is eternally relegated to the realm of ideas, never to be concretely 
actualized in its fullest expression. Until the coming of the Kingdom, that is, when 
judgment of freedom releases it from the darkness concealing its glory. Until that 
judgment humanity must live with the institutions it has been given, and be subject to 
the governing authorities (Rom.13:1). 
  






The aim of this chapter is to better define the Christian character of Adam 
Ferguson’s moral and political thought by making what has remained heretofore 
implicit, explicit. Bearing in mind that we are not dealing with a systematic 
theologian but a Christian philosopher, this essay will attempt to name moral and 
political theories against which Ferguson is most resistant and critical. Clarifying 
what he conceptually or practically opposes will share the benefit of highlighting 
what he positively favors as an alternative, his moral and political concerns being 
directed primarily at what seem to him perversions of Christian morality and politics. 
Opposition to what I describe as three modern idealistic threats—determinacy, 
universality and romanticism—will prop the canvas of this moral and political 
sketch. Precisely what is meant by each of these ideals will be treated extensively 
below, so I provide here only a few preliminary definitions. By “determinacy” I 
mean (generally) the necessary and uninterrupted forces of material cause and effect. 
“Universality” will refer to the human comprehension of reality and the application 
of universal principles to everyday existence as complete and totalizing. The type of 
“romanticism” referred to in what follows is more accurately the romantic seeds of 
freedom, sentiment, and novelty—overcoming of telos and custom in history—
buried in fertile soils of the mid to late eighteenth-century. Preliminary definitions 
carry certain limits, of course, so more flesh will need to be added to these skeletal 
definitions as the essay proceeds.     
For determinacy, a brief rehearsal of early modern natural law theory discussed 
intermittently throughout chapters two through four will furnish a starting point for 
outlining Ferguson’s response to the theory’s metaphysical implications. His critique 
of mechanistic natural law will also have direct relevance for our questions 
concerning commercial order. Similarly, for universality, the brand of determinacy 
emblazoned into modern imaginations sparked new optimism over what the mind is 
capable of comprehending. Determinacy helped established the conditions on which 
universality could kindle and enflame. Accounting for how this came about will be 
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an important goal in treating this second threat, as will its bearing on the overarching 
commercial question. Lastly, for romanticism, after we have noted the ways in which 
Ferguson is and is not a romantic, the inquiry will shift focus from Ferguson himself 
to the critiques he levels on two modern impulses: the sanctification of feeling and 
devotion to political novelty. Each of the threats has arisen before, in chapters two 
through four (history, action, and political institutions), only now the aim is to bring 
further unity to Ferguson’s complaints. If successful this will have the effect of 
synthesizing his thought and specifying how it responds to eighteenth-century 
debates. At the conclusion of this chapter, despite not having captured a 
thoroughgoing theological project, it will remain possible to point toward certain 
theological commitments and in so doing offer a few examples why Ferguson’s 
thought is relevant to contemporary Christian ethics.   
 
Determinacy 
The observation that Newtonian physics offered the eighteenth-century world a 
reinterpretation of natural law has become common to the point of axiomatic.402 Prior 
to Newton, the story goes, natural law remained an expression of divine reason or 
will (depending on one’s view) and treated most intelligibly as a metaphysical 
subject; “good,” “truth,” and “right,” for example, being terms intrinsically 
transcendent yet imposing immanently binding powers behind the natural law. Law 
was considered ‘natural’ in the sense that it corresponded essentially with the way 
things seemed to go in the natural world, describing nature while not being 
contingent upon it. Early in the seventeenth-century and several decades prior to the 
publication of Newton’s Principia, Hugo Grotius described the Law of Nature as so 
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unalterable “that it cannot be changed even by God himself.”403 The law of nature is 
permitted to authorize as it does because were God to change or alter his Law it 
would lead to contradictions implicating divine character. The Creator is a God of 
order, not of disorder. Passages from Genesis 18, Isaiah 25, and Romans 2 further 
establish this point, for God himself “suffers his actions to be judged by this rule.”404 
But surely there exists some contingency or flexibility in the Law of Nature. Must 
everything be so rigidly prescribed? No, and Grotius says as much when he contends 
that “in reality there is no change in the unalterable law of nature, but only in the 
things appointed by it, and which are liable to variation.”405 The law of nature is 
therefore conceived as an authority, not as a uniform determinate of what does and 
does not occur or what shall or shall not be performed; it sets parameters to the 
possible—where an action is performed and how far it might be carried out, for 
example—but cannot control the action undertaken. This is why, explains Grotius, 
“things are allowed by the law of nature, not absolutely, but according to a certain 
state of affairs.”406 Unalterable as it may be, then, the law of nature is at once 
resolute and permeable, generic and particular, liberating and restrictive. Specific 
states of affairs, which for Grotius are governed by the Law of Nations, illustrate 
perfectly how the law of nature authorizes jurisprudence that avoids universal 
codifications best formulated contextually according to an actual state. Before a law 
can be considered binding it must first be considered right or truthful, a “dictate of 
right reason showing the moral turpitude or moral necessity of any act from its 
original agreement or disagreement with a rational nature.”407 But that is not all. Not 
only must an act agree or disagree with the right, each act “is either forbidden or 
commanded by God, the author of nature.”408 Thus, for Grotius, the law of nature 
derives its authority from natural right, which is itself an expression of God’s 
authority as author of nature. 
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Grotius’ differentiation between what the natural law commands and what the 
natural law determines is in the latter part of the seventeenth-century, particularly 
after publication of Newton’s Principia, blended into new philosophic formulae. 
Accounting for this change, one possible explanation is that natural law became 
theoretically identified with laws of physics, and indeed Newton claimed in his 
Preface to have “cultivated mathematics so far as it regards philosophy.”409 This 
mathematical study of nature and its laws fundamentally altered the way natural law 
was understood. Language of mechanism came to replace the organic unity of the 
natural law seen in its parts and whole, in its universality and particularity, in its 
transcendence and its immanence. Focus was brought most resolutely to the 
perfections of creation, where God sent forth the world with such order, both in 
reality and in human reason, that powers generating and sustaining this order could 
be both identified and comprehensively described. From this newly erected rational 
platform humanity could scrutinize all the principles, rules, and forces establishing 
existence. Newton’s mathematical vision subsequently relegated the unseen powers 
of the world to descriptive analysis of cause and effect: such-and-such a phenomenon 
is explained by formula ‘X,’ and so therefore the variables of formula ‘X’ identify 
both the cause and rationale of the phenomenon under consideration. Determinacy 
and necessity were thus embedded within the very texture of the natural law.   
Philosophers were coming to terms with the implications of Newton’s 
mechanistic world picture as late as the mid eighteenth-century, ruminating once 
again over the perennial opposition between necessity and freedom. Laws of nature 
impose determinacy on reality by categorically disallowing states of affairs to be in 
any way other than they are, the present being simply the effect of a seemingly 
infinite chain of prior causes. This raises the obvious question of whether there is any 
room for contingency, spontaneity, newness, creativity, or basic human liberty. 
Hume famously rekindled Scottish fascination with this seasoned dilemma on 
Newtonian terms.  Both in his Treatise on Human Nature and later in the Enquiries, 
he maintains that while matter is always uniformly determined by cause and effect 
relationships, human beings remain susceptible to the determinates of nature because 
“man is everywhere the same” and “we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives 
                                                
409 Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Robert Thorp trans. (London: 
1777), see first sentence of Preface.  
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and actions as well as in the operations of the body.”410 Each person’s will is directed 
by passions that animate it. Interpreting and understanding human action requires of 
it certain degrees of uniformity and regularity. Predictability helps ensure rational 
consistency. Every will has some passion or motivation behind it rendering the 
effects of some prior cause. “Liberty,” quips Hume, is not entirely unlike “chance, 
which is universally allowed to have no existence.”411 He thus employs descriptions 
of material cause and effect to rebut metaphysical freedom. From here he applies 
determinacy to other academic subjects, like history and political economy, and 
allows for material mechanisms to describe metaphorically how each is configured 
around certain causal relationships. Add to this the determinist leanings of other 
eighteenth-century theorists and one sees that the spirit of the age tended strongly to 
support physical determinacy. 
Ferguson’s resistance to this spirit of determinacy takes several trajectories. We 
saw in chapter three that the best way to describe his account of freedom is 
dialectical: freedom is best expressed in rightful limitations and rightful limitations 
are best expressed in freedom, belonging to one another as each makes the other 
intelligible to itself. Unbounded freedom is not unlike the irrational thought of 
playing football without sidelines or field judges, or of a swim meet without starting 
guns or lane assignments—actions require a defined place and convention for 
performing something rather than anything. On the social plane, “limitations” refer to 
physical and political laws establishing concrete human domains; “limitations” 
referred to in the eighteenth-century as natural laws. For Ferguson, the jurisdiction of 
natural law (understood in the Grotian sense) sets the parameters within which every 
state of affairs cogently obtains but underdetermines what must or must not be the 
case in every such state of affairs. The law’s scope is decided by the general contours 
of nature and, most importantly, by nature’s Author. Nature is a creature, after all, 
and as a creature it expresses something about the character of its Artificer. “All of 
nature is connected,” Ferguson explains, “and the world itself consists of parts, 
which like the stones of an arch, mutually support and are supported.”412 This order 
                                                
410 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 83-84.  See also Treatise on Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978), 399-422. 
411 Hume, Enquiries, 96. 
412 Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978), 
18. 
   158
of nature “consists in movements” that counteract, disturb, regulate, and balance one 
another; appearing to humankind as though nature repeatedly oscillates between 
being a peace with itself, and being at war. Yet “what seems to be irregular is the 
perfection of order,” so any disturbance introduced to this oscillation is but part of 
nature’s exquisite form. Nature has an integrity; an internal coherence. If one wishes 
to say it is governed by “laws” that would be fine with Ferguson, so long as the 
description did not eradicate human meaning or violate the character of the Author.   
Early sections of the Principles argue repeatedly that although not everything is 
within one’s freedom to choose, each nevertheless has distinguishable options before 
him from which to decide. So, for example, although one cannot choose which 
society one is born into, one may afterward choose who one shall make friends with 
or keep as company. What sets man apart from other animals is that he possesses a 
mind “intimately conscious of itself, as it exists in thought, discernment, and will.”413 
In section thirteen of chapter II of the Principles, Ferguson criticizes determinacy by 
arguing positively for the metaphysical reality of freedom. Freedom is implicitly 
acknowledged in the fact that each is conscious of his freedom. If one is conscious of 
one’s freedom, believing it to be the case that one’s actions bear the mark of 
contingency is evidence for being free in reality. Putting even greater distance 
between himself and Hume, he asserts that “effect is correlative to cause, and they 
are inseparable, but there may be existence without any cause external to itself, as 
there may be will without any cause but the mind that is willing.”414 The mind, not 
the passions, energizes and directs the will; it is “the cause of its own determination.” 
Therefore “it is absurd,” as he sharpens the rhetoric of his refutation, “to consider 
volition as an act of necessity, not of choice.”415 Philosophical clarity on this 
question was made opaque by the employment of “mechanical imagery” to describe 
how existence formally operates. In point of fact, will is by definition the “direction 
of mind” and therefore allows only such determinacy as might allow for meaningful 
expressions of human freedom. “Discernment and freedom are essential to intelligent 
beings.”416 
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“Mechanical imagery” has also been misapplied to divine providence. “The 
consideration that infinite power must have preordained the operations of will, and 
that these operations therefore cannot be free, is an argument taken from a collateral 
subject,” says Ferguson; an idea which would seem to undermine the fact that we are 
conscious of freedom. By “collateral subject” he means (presumably) that of divine 
omniscience. Human beings cannot know with any certainty what divine 
omniscience is like or to what it ultimately extends. We do have a notion of our own 
freedom, however, and this seems more reliable of the pair. This is not to say that the 
knowledge of God is somehow limited, for it includes “whatever may result from the 
source of contingence” and “his almighty providence is sufficient to control the 
effects of such freedom.”417 Ferguson’s proposal departs slightly from Augustinian 
compatibility of divine foreordination and human freedom in its suggestion that 
necessities of divine foreknowledge would still be perfect even if that knowledge 
allowed for certain “contingencies.” God sees in the “eternal Now” but our 
consciousness of freedom must imply that we are not self-deceived. Freedom must 
therefore exist as a provision in foreknowledge itself. Were we not free, how could 
humanity be held responsible for its actions?  Determinism dissolves any form of 
moral or legal culpability into meretricious innocence. The same problem of 
culpability arises in instances where motive and will are causally identified; if 
passions empower will, then those passions motivating the will become the objects of 
blame, not the action or actor. On this Aristotelian view one can always declare after 
committing a wrongful act “I’m not yet the kind of person who can avoid X or 
positively perform Y” and escape guilt. Motive determines will to the erasure of 
fault. “How absurd,” remarks an annoyed Ferguson, “for the fatalist to plead that he 
is not accountable for having committed a bad action under pretense that his 
intention itself, which was the motive or cause of such action, was bad!”418 Therefore 
neither humanity nor the reality it inhabits is wholly determined by material causes 
or divine foreknowledge. 
Resisting the determinacy latent in “mechanical imagery” Ferguson posits a God 
of wisdom whose will is not exhausted or comprehended by the laws of nature. 
Human action contains a surplus of meaning that once performed discharges a 
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multitude of consequences uncontrollably into the world that often “discover a 
meaning as an effect discovers a cause.”419 All action emerging from divine 
government is ripe with significance and power. If semblances of ingenuity or 
innovation are detected in any human accomplishment “the wisdom of God,” not the 
person or species, is to be credited.420 God is envisaged as coming alongside the 
mind, supplying it with virtues and needed insight. So, human action upheld by 
divine wisdom would seem to open certain contingencies, suggesting a more 
“organic” and less mechanistic government of reality.421 
Ferguson rejects the idea of material determinacy on much the same grounds as 
Grotius. The laws of nature are authorities, not comprehensive physical 
determinates. In saying what is or is not the case the laws of nature also define what 
can and cannot be the case. After Newton, the laws of nature and the divine will are 
more or less equivocated and brand of determinacy contains two crucial implications 
for eighteenth-century thought. On the one hand, equivocating divine will with 
natural law enshrines any event or idea as God-breathed. Newton’s German 
counterpart, Gottfried Leibniz, had suggested that because God could do no other 
than create the best of all possible worlds, this world must in fact be the best 
possible, for “if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it 
would no longer be this world.”422 This is possible because God has “ordered all 
things beforehand once for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all 
the rest.”423 What this “pre-established harmony” means is that evils we experience 
are a necessary part of God’s original creative act. And we have seen already in 
chapter two why Scottish theorists were inclined to accept the basic material 
determinacy, or “pre-established harmony,” of western history, and parse it into four 
eras of commercial innovation. Determinacy was therefore read back into the very 
narrative of history itself, reinterpreting it as a story about material and rational 
progress.   
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When the purposes of God were conflated with the natural law and the story of 
history retold as a narrative of material progress, it is almost inevitable that God’s 
intentions would soon be considered in terms of material progress. Commercially 
speaking, as was seen in chapter four, determinacy was fundamental to market logic 
in the eighteenth-century such that the laws of nature are identified with the express 
will of God. Economic man functions in such-and-such a way, as do the patterns that 
result over a period of time, and therefore when supported by the great history of 
economic innovation, even the injustices and evils of the market are sanctified by 
ends the market pursues. Indeed, modern commercial theory is still beholden to these 
mechanistically conceived models. The study of modern economics itself has 
become in the modern age a study of models comprised essentially of variables. Use 
of the word “variable” is a bit of misnomer, of course, for economic models depend 
on conceptualizing even indeterminate signifiers to get explanatory equations off the 
ground. Modern economics dismisses indeterminacy, in other words, because as an 
essentially mathematical discipline it is premised on fixed and determined variables 
of commercial information, actions, and events.424 It is precisely this brand of 
determinacy which disallows spontaneity, uniqueness, altruism, non-consumptive 
political action, and other potential defeaters to the “triumph of determinacy” that 
Ferguson wished so adamantly to resist.425 He wished to resist it, I suggest, because 
determinacy draws upon a pagan, not Christian conception of human existence; an 
alien political theology that confuses how the world participates in the life of God. It 
is not enough to say simply that creation is given perfect license to be what it is—it 
must also give account for how it fails to exist in the right way. “Providential deism,” 
as Charles Taylor has defined the period in question, might refer to an emerging 
school of thought in the long eighteenth-century but mistakenly assumes it to be the 
dominant view of eighteenth-century philosophy and theology.426 To better 
understand how this version of determinacy found support and migrated into 
commercial theory more broadly, we turn our attention to the next conceptual 
“resistance” on which Ferguson sets his sights: Universality. 
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Universality 
What do I mean when I suggest that Ferguson resists universality? I certainly do 
not mean to claim that Ferguson rejects universals or that he is not a realist; he 
undoubtedly is. Universals are real and objects in existence refer to them—or 
depending on one’s view, are supported by them—when truth claims are under 
consideration. Belief in the existence of God, for example, is thought to be 
universal.427 “Principles” of universality, on the other hand, are truths that do not 
depend upon human conception of them in order to be authoritative. Principles 
contain ideas that operate like axioms, anchoring and integrating other ideas to which 
they relate. But their truth is not person-dependent.  He has no problem with the 
objective existence and authority of universals, indeed they are necessary; rather, his 
concern is with claims of universality, as when one presumes to have achieved 
universal scope. His critique of universality is therefore largely epistemic in 
orientation; the principles adhere in reality but the hurried claiming and application 
of unjustified principles should be resisted. The spirit behind Ferguson’s resistance to 
empirical certitude was later given a more penetrating and critical focus by Hegel, in 
whom we can see the persistence of Ferguson’s reservation. The Phenomenology 
begins by treating consciousness in much the way Ferguson has treated the more 
generic concept of mind, as something to apprehend but not to comprehend.428 
Sense-certainty, Hegel explains, might appear the richest and truest kind of 
knowledge, but on reflection we find that “this very certainty proves itself to be the 
most abstract and poorest truth.”429 Sense perceptions are not immediate truths 
chiseling the mind’s tabula rasa. “An actual sense-certainty is not…pure immediacy, 
but an instance of it.”430 For Hegel, universals are located in the particular, where 
essence and instance synthesize to open the universal door.  Sense certitude is never 
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immediate but always mediated—universals colored with a particular hue. History is 
the site of this dialectic as it tells the story of incarnate universality. Ferguson would 
affirm the historical site of this dialectic perhaps, but would resist the eschatological 
implications Hegel’s historical ‘spirit’ conveys. As we have referred to its 
eighteenth-century mode, at any rate, universality represents a perspective claiming 
rational completeness in a world teeming with incompleteness, ambiguity, tension, 
and paradox. 
Anyone who has lived long enough to grasp the balance of intelligible order and 
confounding chaos in the created order, with its seasons and vicissitudes, is aware 
“he cannot define knowledge, nor tell what it is to know, any more than he can tell 
what it is for the mind to exist.”431 In its pithiest formulation, skepticism calls into 
question certain knowledge claims on the grounds that “knowledge” is itself 
unknowable. One cannot describe adequately even what it means “to know,” and so 
one’s conception of things is described alternatively in terms of “ideas” forming 
images, types, or copies resembling originals. Challenging our understanding of what 
ideas are and how they are acquired is the limitation of language’s reliance on 
analogy and metaphor, in which representation of “impressions” of originals can 
only draw upon illustrations of how original ideas are “copied” intellectually. In 
short, “we cannot have knowledge of a subject if we have not any notion of it.”432 
Behind every piece of knowledge are notional preconditions that make knowledge 
possible—grammatical rules, linguistic customs, logic, and so forth. These 
preconditions are equal parts linguistic and conventional. In his most focused 
treatment of knowledge, “On Knowledge in General,” Ferguson seems to have a 
mind to reject the whole fledgling project we have come to call modern 
epistemology. The theoretical impetus to explain comprehensively the mind and its 
content is essentially mistaken, he thinks, “and hence the skepticism of ingenious 
men.”433 This inexplicability of mind resonates with the eighteenth-century discipline 
of “pneumatics,” which when defined by its etymological roots signifies something 
akin to “spirit of the mind.” Immaterial, intangible, and incomprehensible, the mind 
when made the direct object of study shrouds itself in mysteries. Yet, at the same 
time, there is no sense denying the reality of knowledge en toto, since all must be 
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cautious “neither to admire nor condemn what they do not know.”434 The 
complication Ferguson wishes to avoid in his consideration of knowledge and its 
applications is the claim to have explained the complexities of the mind, which 
Ferguson asserts boldly when considering his own method to “investigate and to 
apply, not to explain, the laws of conception and will.”435   
Ferguson opposes the theme of rational priority inasmuch as it is included in the 
eighteenth-century narrative and in seeking to grasp fully at the nature of Ferguson’s 
reservation, we can summarize this transition as consisting of three elements: rational 
immediacy, noetic certitude, and the exaltation of ideals.436 The first relates to 
impressions made upon the mind with each experience. Material experience leaves 
an immaterial mark on the perceiving mind. The second, noetic certitude, maintains 
simply that one’s beliefs are held naturally with complete certitude. These conclusive 
beliefs are then leveled authoritatively upon reality in ways expressed by the third 
theme, as exaltation of ideals. Certitude precipitates the eventual consecration of 
ideals, replacing the governing order of reality with the intellectual principles 
achieved through scientific evaluation of experience. The three themes are therefore 
collaborative. Ferguson’s response to this joint subordination of metaphysical 
authority to rational comprehension is most sharply addressed in his treatment of the 
“fundamental law of morality” in chapter two, part two of the Principles.437 The 
moral significance and effect of this subordination was what Ferguson found most 
problematic and helps explain his positive attempt to underscore the metaphysical, 
and indeed religious, character of morality. 
Eighteenth-century moral philosophy focused extensively on the interior 
constellation of affections causally enlivening morality. Beginning with 
Shaftesbury’s invention of the Moral Sense and continuing through Hutcheson, 
Smith, and Hume, moral authority became ever more narrowly defined by 
intellectual capacities or faculties; the moral “sense” itself becoming but a super-
added function similar to that of smelling, tasting, or touching. Moral deliberation 
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thus became a natural, inferentially immediate function; learned from birth, ingrained 
by society, and refined by attention to public perception. At the time of Ferguson’s 
appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, Smith and Hume had 
already sought to reduce morality to a conceptual singularity—“fellow-feeling” and 
“sympathy” respectively. In Smith’s case, we have but to note that his text on moral 
philosophy is cast in terms of a Theory of Moral Sentiments, which is to say that the 
subject and object of morality are one and the same. Hume’s Treatise and Enquiries, 
and to a lesser extent his Essays, make passions the central object of moral theory.  
Smith and Hume’s mistake, at least on Ferguson’s view, was to understand sentiment 
and reason as separable; one as capable of moral evaluation and the other as amoral. 
Emphasizing sentiment led Smith and Hume to devote most of their attention to 
development of a re-envisaged virtue ethic naturally framed in terms of habits and 
customs. Worrisome to Ferguson about this configuration is its extreme 
internalization of moral authority and privileging of human judgment. As will be 
seen later in this essay, affections offer the spring sunlight that nurtures a budding 
romanticism. 
For Ferguson, on the other hand, benevolence is the fundamental law of morality. 
All virtues that have ever been named, especially the classical virtues of wisdom, 
fortitude, temperance, and justice, converge at a conceptual starting-point of ultimate 
meaning—benevolence. He often refers to benevolence as though largely 
synonymous with “goodness,” or a “good-will” (its etymological root), since the 
“greatest good incident to human nature is the love of mankind.”438 This love serves 
as the prop to all the other virtues and aids each person’s attempt to observe them in 
their conduct. “Benevolence, therefore, may in some degree be considered as a 
principle of wisdom, of fortitude, and temperance; and…we cannot greatly err in 
assuming it the fundamental or primary object of moral law.”439 Establishing love as 
the chief good of humankind and the unity of the virtues, we perceive already the 
beginnings of a thoroughly Christian, and perhaps more particularly Augustinian, 
account of ethics.440 Following his revelation of the fundamental law of morality, 
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Ferguson then treats “applications” of the moral law as discerned through moral 
science. This “science” of morality “abstracts from local forms and observances” and 
“becomes in the mind a principle of extensive benevolence by which the individual 
states himself as part in the order of nature, and entirely devoted to the will of its 
Author.”441 It is worth noting that “science” is nowhere defined by Ferguson as the 
embodiment of scientific method, but rather as a lens through which to clarify 
perception of the created order. Skepticism chastens science. Nevertheless, he 
describes science as “the highest attainment of created intelligence and nearest 
approach to a communication with the supreme Creator.”442 As a discipline it 
“contemplates the form of beauty,” putting one in touch with the substance of 
creative brilliance. Moral science studies reality, for it is “more obvious to most men 
than even the qualities of mind itself.”443 If this reductive science is applied 
subjectively rather than objectively; that is, if we apply moral interrogation strictly to 
the interior moral life, then moral “science” becomes precisely what Hume insists—a 
“science of man.” Sentiments, affections, passions, and other internally non-rational 
powers are now cultivated in the scientific Petri dish. Whether such interior powers 
are “approved” or “disapproved” thus becomes a serious moral problem. What sorts 
of criteria, for example, can measure the moral worth of affective powers? Why do 
we praise or blame others for what they do? 
Accounting for moral approbation persists throughout the eighteenth-century and 
Ferguson is quick to demonstrate just how many voices have given credence to it. 
Clark, Shaftesbury, Kames, Smith, and Hume are all shown to have occupied 
themselves with this question of why we are inclined to praise or blame others, and 
for what reason. Ferguson insists that it should not matter whether we find another’s 
conduct morally pleasing or odious, but whether certain actions committed are either 
right or wrong. “Mankind are not agreed” on what actions are to be praised or 
blamed, and “they differ no less in what they admire than in what they enjoy.”444 
According to his interlocutors, virtues and the approbation resulting from them are 
reflected in an action’s congruence with excellence or perfection. Yet, Ferguson 
rejoins, “mankind are not agreed on this subject,” for “the idea of perfection no doubt 
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may be associated with subjects divested of merit.”445 His concern is that ideal 
standards of perfect virtue will be wrongly assigned to actions that are, in truth, 
largely or entirely immoral. “External actions” may result from any number of 
internal conditions of mind variously “different in different instances” and therefore 
not universal. The reason why “there is not any certain rule of approbation or 
disapprobation respecting the manners or behavior of men” is that “the same physical 
action in one instance applauded as a virtue, in another instance is reprobated as a 
crime; or rather…where the physical action is the same, the moral action is 
altogether different and is an object of approbation and disapprobation corresponding 
to that difference of the moral quality.”446 There is often an enormous difference, in 
other words, between what an action accomplishes and what one thinks an action 
accomplishes. What is in one place commended as an act of bravery might in another 
place receive condemnation for foolishness, and Ferguson gives examples of how 
widely and frequently this ethical tension can realistically occur. But the problem is 
not merely one of moral reality and faulty perceptions. The moral content of an 
action is assigned according to general customs of a people, such that what is 
“mannerly” in one place might be an “offense” in another. Context is therefore 
imperative to moral ascription. The tension introduced by this turn to contextual 
assessment vexes us because “we are not qualified to perceive in what manner the 
moral action…should be differently understood, or in what manner the same moral 
action should result from physical performances extremely different.”447 Attributes 
admirable or detestable may vary greatly from place to place and from person to 
person; people may simply have different opinions on the commendations due an 
action when many “actions of men are considered more as expressions of what they 
mean or intend, than as operations materially beneficial or hurtful.”448 In either case, 
whether considering the consequences or the intentions of an act, complications are 
induced by misinterpretation. For Ferguson, however, regardless of how intentions or 
consequences are interpreted, the truly benevolent does whatever bene-fits the world 
around him, since it is in fact “beneficient to treat every person in the manner which 
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he himself conceives to be beneficial or kind.”449 Opinion does not alter the rightness 
or wrongness of an act, which altogether overrides what any one may think of it, 
because differences of opinion “will be equally found not to affect the original or the 
essential distinction between moral right and wrong.”450 This distinction leads him to 
the interesting conclusion that disagreements over approbation are in reality 
disagreements about the “use of words, not in conceiving the distinctions of right and 
wrong.”451 The crucial issue, then, is that the principles of approbation do not assist 
in discerning the moral propriety of an action and so should be jettisoned in favor of 
the more holistic evaluative tool—rightness.   
Defending his flank against the looming charge of relativism, Ferguson clarifies 
his claim by reminding the reader that the first law of morality designates “the love 
of mankind as the greatest good to which human nature is competent.”452 Every 
society is aware of moral principles corresponding with those of other societies and 
so therefore comprise a “rule” by which each may judge the meaning or significance 
of an action. This “rule,” he suggests, is the Rule of Propriety. Its elegance as a rule 
is displayed in its allowing certain contextual distinctions while at the same time 
disallowing total rejection or ingenious recasting of moral principles. It applies 
efficiently to cases great and small; personal as well as social. Endurance of 
propriety is reinforced by its customary nature, ensuring meaningful continuities with 
history. Custom buttresses the authorial potency of the Rule. Customs illumine but 
do not determine the Rule, just as the Rule illumines but does not determine customs. 
Yet, what are we to do when customs violate the Rule of Propriety? How are the 
claims of custom and the Rule to be arbitrated? The Rule applies “wherever the 
manners of our country are dangerous to its safety or have a tendency to enfeeble or 
to corrupt the minds of men; to deprive the citizen of his rights; or the innocent of his 
security; it is our duty to do what is for the good of our fellow creatures, even in 
opposition to the fashion and custom of the times which we live.”453 When custom 
and right no longer correspond in certain particulars, the task of society becomes one 
of correcting injustices, to right wrongs.   
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Ferguson seems to have understood the biblical command to love thy neighbor, 
as have many Christian theorists, to imply a duty all are obliged to observe. This duty 
consists in the command of God as an expression of his will. Aristotle’s virtue ethic, 
for example, cannot provide the same exemplary moral guidance because the very 
idea of striking a mean between extremes is misleading: a “proper mean” is derived 
conceptually “from a previous knowledge of what is right.”454 In fact, to pursue the 
middle course between two extremes is to have chosen the course of mediocrity for 
mediocrity’s sake. Does an extreme version of justice or right exist? How might it do 
so? What are its salient features? Merit and demerit are properties rightly attributed 
to mind, which can exercise itself excellently or ignorantly but never encouraged to 
perform what is mediocre. Wisdom, goodness, temperance, and fortitude are all 
“excellences” of mind. Ferguson proximately locates merit in the mind because 
external actions “do not appear to be vested with any moral quality until the 
movement performed is traced to its connection with the disposition of the mind 
from which it proceeds.”455 One cannot judge of the conditions in another’s mind and 
so cannot ascertain whether praise or blame is due. But if others cannot decide merit, 
how then is it decided? His response points toward history and to God’s governance 
of it; thinking historically about a moral action demands that “qualities of mind” and 
“movements of the body” be “combined together in the conception which men 
mutually form in their moral distinctions.”456 As we have seen, only history can tell 
us about what man is capable of performing and what the shape of his moral 
obligations might be. Actions disclose, or “imply,” certain qualities of mind bringing 
to expression previously unseen or unknown interior powers. With this suggestion 
Ferguson also demonstrates biblical awareness, for “wherever wisdom and goodness 
exist, proper and beneficent conduct will follow as the tree produces its fruit” 
(Matt.7:17).457 Wisdom and goodness are “approved on their own account as 
constituents of perfection and happiness.”458   
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If the Moral Law is defined by its “expression of what is good,” to what does the 
moral law owe its authority?459 Obligations and sanctions of the moral law, its 
essential binding force, are derived from the command of God: “the Sovereign of the 
universe, by having made things as they are, has given his command and 
promulgated his law in behalf of morality; and in every instance of conformity to his 
law, and in every infraction of it, continues to apply the sanction of happiness and 
misery.”460 Doing moral good is an act of obedience to the divine command. It is an 
act done happily, for one can be assured that the command requires what it does 
precisely because it makes ultimate happiness possible. To obey the law of love apart 
from any sense of goodness would be to fall short of the command, because it would 
not be out of love for God that the action was undertaken. So much then for Kant’s 
call to observe duty for duty’s sake. Religion and morality cannot be separated, as 
they “share in a genuine alliance”: 
The wisdom and goodness which we perceive to be the constituents of happiness are 
likewise enjoined by the Sovereign command of God. They are presented to our 
thoughts as attributes of the Supreme being himself, and as forming in him the 
objects of reverence and love; and our own capacity attaining in any degree to a 
participation of these qualities is considered as the highest perfection or prerogative 
of our nature.461 
Humankind enjoys wisdom and goodness to the extent that it participates in the life 
of God, who reveals his character as an exemplary guide to moral deliberative action. 
From the person of God proceeds the authority of his government extending both to 
the mind and to the actions of humanity, restraining “not only the overt acts of 
iniquity, but even the thoughts, wishes or purposes which may lead to such external 
effects.”462 Indeed, asks Ferguson rhetorically, “in what is the love of God different 
from the love of goodness itself?”463 In positing this question he makes explicit the 
link between the essence of the law—goodness—and the God in whom it consists. 
Various principles, rules, and laws of morality therefore receive their authority 
exclusively from the command and person of God. 
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Universality is attributable only to God, for it is only by God’s goodness that the 
disclosure of law instructs the human mind. Judgment is a cumbersome power for 
humans to wield, simultaneously overwhelming and supportive of the moral life as 
such. Ferguson’s account of Christian moral philosophy demonstrates why moral 
authority cannot be grounded in any human faculty or force. Claims of knowledge 
prove slippery even under the first level of scrutiny, requiring that one take care with 
their claims of what is known or unknown, to be praised or blamed. “Under the 
highest measures of conviction which attend our perception of things, truth does not 
appear to be necessary, and the reality may be different from the appearance that is 
perceived by us.”464 Such contingencies invite us to relinquish our claims to 
certitude. History proves repeatedly that items cherished as most stable in the social 
order often pass into the twilight of disfavor as quickly as they arrived. Morality 
cannot be reduced to sentiment or custom—or, in truth, to the rational adjudication of 
causes—because morals, in their continuity, cannot be bound to either power. 
Sentiments and customs can be false, unjust, or even immoral, but in suggesting that 
morals are vested in the right and true as decided by God, Ferguson avoids the self-
same charge of universality. He avoids it because the universality he claims is not 
human in origin or cause. One has only to attempt a search for moral prescriptions 
within Ferguson’s writings, a sermon and invitations to love notwithstanding, to 
realize that one is dealing with a moralist who understands the uncontrollable 
relation he shares with the moral order. Each must live life in deference to the true 
and the right—to obey and to act in rightness. This is best observed by studying the 
annals of history, which is why his Essay maintains as one of its dominant themes 
the overt difference between the changeable and the unchangeable. “Rude” nations 
and “polished” nations are not rude and polished by virtue of their customs, as was 
so popularly asserted throughout the eighteenth-century, but by virtue of their actions 
in service to the public. Error remains an open possibility to which all humanity may 
succumb.  
What does a dialectical confrontation between determinacy and universality 
bestow in its synthesis? This question is not easily answered. One reason for its 
elusiveness is that romanticism contains within itself the conceptual synthesis of this 
dialectic only in part; that is, romanticism is not the product of this synthesis but the 
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descriptive heading it belongs to—romanticism envelops the synthesis. So, we 
require a rounded picture of romanticism’s eighteenth-century form. Like 
determinacy and universality, romanticism also interrogates the natural order of 
things, but it has a broader function, operating as an arbiter of the frustrated 
antagonisms between determinacy and universality. With this in mind, in the material 
that follows, I will attend procedurally to the wider domain implied by the Romantic 
impulse and turn to the question of nature itself. In what follows I will provide an 
account of the various contours of 18th century Romanticism, in order to observe the 
many respects in which Ferguson is romantic and, more importantly, the way in 
which he certainly is not romantic. A crucial question, and one which will undergird 
this look at the commercial status of nature, concerns how nature accepts or rejects 
the artifacts of man. At the crux of this question, as I will observe, Ferguson helps us 
to understand that a dialectical confrontation is being enacted here between 
determinacy and universality. We begin with an idea of what romanticism is. 
 
Romanticism 
The truth or falsity of “romanticism,” as a signifier, depends on what kind of 
“romanticism” is being thought of. If a “plurality of romanticisms” adhere in society 
(as has been suggested by scholars seeking paradigms for interpreting the romantic 
impulse) then the success of my claim that Ferguson resists “romanticism” will 
depend upon what kind of romanticism is being considered.465 What is the precise 
nature of the romanticism Ferguson finds problematic? Are there elements of early 
romanticism he finds worthy of assent? From his biography we know he adored 
poetry and participated regularly in readings; the intensity of his literary appreciation 
is also doubly reinforced by vocal support of John Home’s much maligned play, 
Douglas (more on the ‘Douglas affair’ below). Ferguson retired to the countryside of 
Peebles to try his hand at farming while still very much in intellectual form, 
presumably for no other reason than that the challenge intrigued him. He even wrote 
a seminal history of The Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic, an effort 
                                                
465 Arguments for a ‘plurality of romanticisms’ are found in A. O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Discrimination of 
Romanticisms,’ in Essays on the History of Ideas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1948).  For a more 
recent and historically attentive contemporary treatment of romanticism see Michael Löwy and Robert 
Sayer, Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity, Catherine Porter trans. (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2001). 
   173
some have interpreted as displaying certain romantic tendencies.466 In contemporary 
use, the term is thrown about as though synonymous with “nostalgia” over a long-
lost past.467 Thinking deeper about the etymology of Romanticism one might also be 
inclined to associate it with adoration of all things antiquarian and Roman. This is 
not an unattractive inference, but eighteenth-century thought contains a great deal 
more romantic potency than is attached solely to an appreciation of classicism.   
Ferguson’s thought certainly displays romantic appreciations for the moral and 
political significance of antiquity. “Rome” was a laudable and grand civic idea 
invariably lost because Roman citizens had forgotten what it meant to be Roman: “in 
proportion as the character of Roman citizens lost its consideration and its 
consequence, the name was easily communicated to all the subjects or natives of any 
province.”468 Empire building, motivated as it was by the accumulation of riches, 
created the conditions that brought the honor and glory of Rome to embarrassment 
and ruin. Personal felicities of each citizen were transferred to the grandeur of Caesar 
and state: from happiness derived from personal excellence to happiness derived 
from national fame and fortune. Ferguson is “romantic” in his view of ancient Rome 
as offering an illuminating contrast to modern principles of moral and political order. 
The idea of Rome—its blindness, ambition, structure, opulence, law, and spirit—
receives a balanced presentation mindful of both Rome’s failures and its successes. 
Antiquity teaches us something about how to live morally and politically with our 
fellow man. 
Ferguson’s defense of John Home’s stage play Douglas also reveals romantic 
partiality. His brief pamphlet The Morality of Stage Plays Seriously Considered 
responded to anxious opposition of Kirk clergy, led by Rev. John Witherspoon, by 
rebutting their claim to theatre’s morally insidious nature. His argument is almost 
comically adroit. Stage performance, he begins to tell us, has been in cultural 
currency for well over two hundred years and just how corrupting theatre has been in 
the course of these two centuries is not easily discerned. Britain is perhaps average 
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by comparison, with good and bad men being found mixed in every age and place. 
His three principal arguments in favor of the stage are as follows: if the stage is 
morally poisonous, then the effects are slow to inset; exemplary portrayals in stage 
performance may in fact correct moral missteps; and these morals can also purify 
stage production.469 Essential to all three arguments is their moral acuteness. 
Opposition to the stage cannot be wrought from scripture, for scripture does not 
denounce it. In fact, the Apostle Paul himself seems at least to have been well 
acquainted with the Greek plays, alluding to them in both Acts 17:28 and 1 Cor. 
15:33.  The parables of Jesus, too, summon similar kinds of imaginative effort. 
Parables and plays both tell stories, remarks Ferguson, and both are superior conduits 
of moral instruction. The novel artistry of theatre can awaken in the skeptical mind 
an imaginary account of how fictitious characters have failed or succeeded when 
confronted with moral challenges. Edinburgh’s stage plays are plays “which excel in 
moving compassion, which interest an audience in behalf of amiable characters, 
which give the proper applause to virtue, and treat vice with ignominy and 
reproach.”470 The stage is therefore commendable if it can in its comedies and 
tragedies re-create and encourage moral imagination. Plays offer a novel form of 
moral education, so long as license is not carried too far. Antiquity’s appreciation for 
theatre does not go unrecognized by Ferguson, for plays are but natural expressions 
of a nation’s rich civic arts—the fictitious dramatization of real political life. But 
appreciating Roman political history and Greek stage are a fairly harmless romantic 
affections; might something else complicate romanticism’s cultured decency?   
In turning to an analysis of Ferguson’s consideration of problematic romantic 
impulses one finds a more complex picture. Both biographically and theoretically he 
displays romantic commitments, but there are clearly certain tendencies of 
eighteenth-century Britain—politically, socially, commercially, religiously—that 
attract his criticism. The way he describes nature and the natural ordering of reality 
often takes the form of admiration: a nature in constant movement, conducive to life, 
intelligently balanced. He admires nature, but he does not adore it; nature is given 
prominence, but not primacy. Here, at any rate, we are concerned primarily with the 
spirits and impulses of romanticism Ferguson resists, though occasionally with 
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unconscious tension: a supposed state of nature, political novelty and rebellion, and 
the sentimentalization of morals. We will also want to capture conceptual 
oppositions generated by the elevation of nature to ultimate authority.  But before 
interrogating Ferguson’s romantic hesitancies, it is essential first to sketch 
conceptions of nature prevailing in the modern period. 
In seeking to define “nature,” modern minds tend to gravitate toward the 
scientific bastions of biological and physico-mechanical description. That is simply 
how the modern imagination has been formed. Scientific method and the atomistic 
reductionism it gave birth to and now fosters objectifies nature to the point of 
numbering its constituent electrons. Water is not nature’s life-blood, for example; it 
is H2O. Nature is reduced to a vast network of bio-electrical reactions tamed from 
oblivion by still more bio-electrical reactions. It perhaps goes without saying that 
modern naturalism is the negation of supernaturalism. But the term “nature” 
designates vastly more than the relations between electrical charges and chemical 
compounds. Philosopher Robert Spaemann has commended a double meaning for the 
term: “on the one hand, it refers to the origins of things, to what comes first; on the 
other, it refers to norms and purposes, criteria by which to evaluate our projects, 
actions and situations.”471 The meaning of the term has also been shaped by its 
adjectival opposites, like “artificial,” “voluntary,” “historical,” and “customary.” 
Eighteenth-century theories of nature had of course been profoundly shaped by the 
Newtonian and Leibnizian law-abiding cosmos—nature as all-encompassing. 
Everything that occurs is equally a result of some previous natural cause. Even 
someone like Hume, who at least hoped to retain some remnant of custom in his 
natural speculations, could not avoid (eventually) relegating nature to “patterns” of 
natural occurrences taken to be natural laws. In the eighteenth-century, therefore, 
“nature” is totalizing; “the unnatural means the same thing as the impossible.”472 
Early-modern fascination with the mythic state of nature illustrates the pervasiveness 
of this comprehensive and reductionist viewpoint. Consequently, nature was stripped 
of its intrinsic telos and assigned new goals authorized by nature’s pure empirical 
tendencies. The supposed “state of nature” was held in contrast to “civilization”—
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pure nature versus constructed artifact. The nature-artifact duality furnished 
philosophers with a comparative dichotomy for moral and political evaluation and 
thereby established the question of whether nature and artifact could be made 
compatible with one another or remain forever antithetical.  
These two romantic appropriations of the concept of nature help clarify the 
substance of Ferguson’s critique of romanticism. He addresses the “double-meaning” 
of nature and the relation of artifacts and customs to nature in the opening passages 
of his Essay, in a section entitled, “Of the Questions relating to the State of Nature.” 
As a preliminary observation it is of some relevance that he feels he must address the 
state of nature at the very outset of his Essay. Prioritizing the idea in this way he 
hints both at the dominance of contractarian political visions in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth-centuries, as well as to this own reservations about contractarian viability 
for the modern political order.473 He refers to the state of nature as a “question” 
inviting critical response. Commendation from Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson and other 
contractarians was for political philosophy to reach back into the natural origins of 
the human species, before the establishment of any artifact, state, rule, or government 
for society’s legitimate raison d'état. Against this original state of nature all other 
contemporary political states would be comparatively judged; the pure, ungoverned 
realm of necessity and passion. For Hobbes, “the condition of mere nature” is 
“absolute liberty.”474 Likewise, for Locke, to understand political power or right one 
must first understand “what state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they 
think fit within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending 
upon the will of any other man.”475 This state is also a state of equality, “wherein all 
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”476 
Rousseau’s more colorful claim that “man was born free, and he is everywhere in 
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chains” enriches the state of nature’s poetic vitality.477 Each theorist believes firmly 
that covenants constitute the binding force of social contracts—beginning with the 
family and continuing through the wider commonwealth—and that within a state of 
nature contracts are based on principles of equality as much as they are on freedom. 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all elevate the ideals of liberty and equality within 
their accounts of the state of nature and enshrine them as foundational insights to 
social order and political constitutions. 
Against this early-modern tendency Ferguson interrogates the “question” of a 
supposed historical state of nature.  He criticizes semi-romantic poets, historians, and 
moralists who consider past ages radically different from present conditions. The 
assumption seems to be that “the first state of our nature must have born no 
resemblance to what men have exhibited in any subsequent period.”478 Identifying 
original qualities of man and expressing the “limits between nature and art” are done 
simultaneously. Ferguson thus identifies what traditionally has been viewed as one of 
romanticism’s early modern tensions, between art and nature.479 Some political 
theorists have sought to exalt nature and its impulses to previously unseen 
prominence, while others have tried to represent man as merely a learning animal or 
conflicted creature predisposed to perpetual warfare. Yet, the “desire of laying the 
foundation of a favorite system” has “led to many fruitless inquiries,” explains 
Ferguson, and has ultimately led philosophers to form a theory that amalgamates a 
few admirable traits in an “imaginary” origin in bygone ages.480 History tells a 
different story: 
[in both] the earliest and the latest accounts collected from every quarter of the earth 
represent mankind as assembled in troops and companies; and the individual always 
joined by affection to one party, while he is possibly opposed to another; employed 
in the exercise of recollection and foresight; inclined to communicate his own 
sentiments, and to be made acquainted with those of others; these facts must be 
admitted as the foundation of all our reasoning relative to man.481 
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Notions of a wholly free and equal pre-political man are complete fiction. No record 
exists that has not found humankind already gathered in community, united by 
affections and in communication one with another.   
The attempt to trace an imaginary state of nature “through ages and scenes 
unknown” was Rousseau’s historiographic mistake.482 Man’s purest form, on 
Rousseau’s account, is the isolated and perfectly free man who has not yet been 
corrupted by political society and its enslaving demands. Ferguson rebuts this claim 
by reminding us that humankind has always been found in groups and has always 
been seen as radically superior to the animals. Society indeed appears to be “as old as 
the individual.”483 The idea of a pre-political man and thus the idea of a bygone state 
of nature is simply a grandly fabricated myth about an ideal man with ideal liberty 
and equality. The second, and perhaps most obvious problem with Rousseau’s 
history, is that humanity does not have the intellectual exposure or capacity to posit 
an existence radically different from present reality. When theorists attempt to fill 
holes in knowledge-gaps by crafting new stories, that tactic clues us in to certain 
practical ambiguities about our everyday experience—especially if that experience is 
overtly political—and raises the question of whether another, more superior source 
of wisdom is available to us. If we follow the logic of Rousseau’s argument we are 
inevitably deceived into thinking that certain mysteries will be opened by the 
“wisdom of nature” that discloses the meaning of human events simply by 
identifying the “operation of physical powers” that produced them.484 The impulse is 
therefore naturalistic at heart. Yet the telos of natural occurrences is precisely what 
we typically attribute to God and his creative genius, for that is the true source of 
mystery and explains why we cannot hope to solve the problem of our origins.485 
“We are no longer to search for the source of existence,” because we know that 
mysteries are latent in the creative genius of God; “we can only collect the laws 
                                                
482 Ferguson refers here to Rousseau’s early essay Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de 
l’inégalité parmi les hommes.  See Discours sur l'égalité (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1941). 
483 Ferguson, Essay, 12. 
484 Ibid. 
485 “The concept of nature is now taken to be anthropomorphic, while the essentially teleological idea 
of things in the cosmos having “movement in themselves” is understood as the usurpation of a divine 
quality.” For more exceptional contemporary engagement with the question of human nature, see 
Robert Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology, Guido de Graaff and James Mumford trans. (Eugene: 
Wipf and Stock, 2010), chapter 1.  
   179
which the author of nature has established.”486 At best, all we can hope for is some 
insight into a “mode of providence before unknown.”487 
This point on intellectual humility loops Ferguson back around to the romantic 
bifurcation of nature and art. Here he states straightforwardly, “art itself is natural to 
man.”488 From the beginning man appears to be an “artificer of his own nature, as 
well as his fortune,” and seems to set his will always on invention and contrivance.  
This occurs no matter where man dwells, regardless of climate or circumstance. 
Human beings are at once complex and simple, “obstinate and fickle,” complaining 
regularly about new innovations and yet “never sated with novelty.”489 Humanity’s 
general attitude seems always intent on improving its circumstances; to get the upper 
hand on the uncontrollable powers of human existence. As was mentioned in chapter 
two, if any general progression is detected, it is not rapid or hasty but slow, “like the 
power of a spring silently presses on every resistance.”490 Active being is likened to a 
“passing stream, not a stagnating pool.” In all cases the freedom found in active 
being is not freedom from, but always a freedom for and this because the state of 
nature, if the words can be made to mean anything at all, is defined almost entirely 
by human action. If nature were consecrated as a moral and political criterion from 
which to work out our deliberations it would be so consecrated at great expense to 
crucial deliberative categories. Virtue and vice, for example, must ultimately 
transcend nature, as must good and evil. Defining the good by its natural appearance 
results in all varieties of moral and political distortion. Ferguson then presses this 
point of dividing sharply between nature and art further by asking rhetorically if 
nature and artifact are in fact antithetical, “in what situation of the human race are the 
footsteps of art unknown?”491 From the beginning humanity can be seen to craft 
artifacts for the betterment of daily life; innovations of today are but a continuation 
of a historical theme. Art does not replace nature, but cooperates with nature as it 
emerges from nature. Art is the means nature uses to preserve itself. God has created 
the natural order in such a way that it contains within itself the means for human 
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perpetuation and flourishing. The Creator also affords humans the opportunity to act, 
but “man may mistake the objects of his pursuit; he may misapply his industry, and 
misplace his improvements.”492 In light of such errors, how then can one judge the 
rightness of any action according to its natural correspondence? The standard and 
source of action is found in the heart, where the truth about an action’s perfection or 
excellence is disclosed. In scrutinizing the ‘state of nature’ man will find that “the 
proper state of nature…is not a condition from which mankind are forever removed, 
but one to which they may now attain; not prior to the exercise of their faculties, but 
procured by their just application.”493 What one believes to be “natural” or 
“unnatural” is endlessly plastic, seeing as both terms are “least determinate in their 
meanings.”494 To Ferguson, a criterion of naturalness can clarify nothing in the moral 
or political order: “for all the actions of men are equally a result of their nature.”495 
The very best an idea of “the natural” can deliver is a tradition, convention, habit, 
routine, or custom that communicates a sense of rudimentary order or stability in 
human affairs.   
These two ways of looking at nature converge politically at the intersection of 
novelty and rebellion. Rousseau, for his part, did not invite or sanction rebellion per 
se, despite the fact his disjointed account of human nature and unrelenting emphasis 
upon the essential “rights” of freedom and equality precipitated a revolutionary spirit 
that would strangle the whole of France by gripping the neck of Paris. If recovering 
oneself means one is required to rediscover their instinctual and animalic past, then 
that could only be achieved (realistically) by removing the obstructions, whether 
institutional or conventional, mitigating the purest human expressions. Ferguson, on 
the other hand, along with other semi-romantics like Burke and Wordsworth, 
denigrates violent rebellions as categorically unjustified. His Sermon in Ersh 
Language and short pamphlet Remarks on Dr. Price’s Observations both deliver a 
poignant critique of violent rebellion.496 Recall that in the former, Ferguson takes 
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aim at the supposition that the Divine Right of Kings can serve as warrant for violent 
revolt, insisting that a good political order such as existed in Britain at the time 
(1750’s) should be viewed as a providential gift. In the latter, Ferguson counters a 
certain Dr. Price’s claim that American colonies were correct to reject the authority 
of the crown under the terms set for it as a colony with a line of argument similar to 
that of the sermon: the colonies enjoy civic order and commercial flourishing, and so 
the claims to injustice—taxation without proportionate representation—do not 
provide an adequate basis for violent rebellion.  In truth, “rebellion, if successful, 
never knows its limits.”497 Dissenters are nothing but “secret enemies of 
government.” Ferguson seems therefore to have seen the American rebellion as a 
kind of childish tantrum; the colonies had been granted a commercial and political 
order conducive to the good life and in turn the people of these colonies protest at not 
having sufficient liberty or equality. So bad was the situation that “a blush must now 
overspread the face of every Englishman if ever the Americans are mentioned in his 
presence by a stranger!”498 Edmund Burke would feel a similar embarrassment for 
the French in the aftermath of Revolution a decade later. That same Dr. Price who 
attracted Ferguson’s rebuke would receive an even stronger one from Burke. If we 
recall here the “double-meaning” of nature we will notice that for Ferguson (and 
Burke) convention is the track down which origins must travel—the mediating 
content between the present and past.  Abolishing conventions in hope of re-
establishing the original nature of freedom and equality never succeeds. “Those who 
attempt to level, never equalize,” and in the end, “the gross and complicated mass of 
human passions and concerns…undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections 
that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their 
original direction.”499 Even telos latent in the original will be mediated by the 
convention making it intelligible.   
Modern philosopher of history, Reinhart Koselleck, has stressed throughout his 
work the conceptual magnitude of politically objectified novelty in this period. The 
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kind of novelty we are considering is leavened by two historical concepts—“crisis” 
and “revolution.” It was not until the late eighteenth-century that the historical 
meaning of “crisis” (krisis), related conceptually to legal or political actions like “to 
separate” or “to judge,” was replaced by events—and a spirit encouraged by those 
events—of unavoidable “finality” or “transition.” Decision (krisis) was replaced by 
the inevitability of conflicting or changing circumstance. “From the second half of 
the eighteenth-century on, a religious connotation enters into the way the term is 
used,” and this inculcation generalizes modern experience “to such an extent that 
‘crisis’ becomes a permanent concept of history.”500 The very meaning of the word 
“crisis” come to radically redefine the real experience of everyday life. Events of the 
French Revolution bring this conceptual transition to its climax by presuming that 
“crisis” had “become the fundamental mode of interpreting historical time.”501 This 
will not surprise us—the Enlightenment itself is an intellectual precursor to the 
establishment of crisis. Where at one time crisis brought completion, the crisis of the 
French Revolution brought only newness.  
Koselleck refers to this fundamental change in our understanding of time as 
Neuzeit (new-time, or modernity), as seeking “to conceptually grasp what previously 
was not at all possible.”502 History and Neuzeit are in some sense wholly divorced. 
Time itself becomes parceled into distinct periods—ancient, medieval, and 
renaissance, for instance—or else thematized by century. Time is broken down into 
unified coefficients. The French Revolution is the political concretization of this new 
understanding of time as something to be humanly controlled. Revolution is the 
means man uses to impose himself upon time, to supersede the old for the sheer 
pleasure and spectacle of the new. Newness becomes the object of both history and 
future. This idea of modernity beginning with the French Revolution and its new 
organization of time is strengthened twice over by the fascinating attempt of French 
revolutionaries to fashion an entirely new calendar. Out with the Church calendar, in 
with the “revolutionary” calendar. The trouble, of course, is that time cannot be 
comprehended ahistorically. Calendars are themselves based first on the natural 
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cycles of the world, then framed more precisely around enculturated theological 
observances. But the revolutionaries had convinced themselves that “a rationalized 
nature should ring in a new epoch in history.”503 Calendars emphasize and 
reemphasize the constant circulation of nature, while the revolutionary insists on the 
unrelenting newness of time. The meaning of the revolutionary calendar, as an 
historical event, is in the judgment (krisis) it levels on the Christian calendar, 
pronouncing upon the past for the purpose of future prognosis. Explains Koselleck, 
“the aspiration to a just order is always already pre-given as that which is to be 
reborn. To realize a just order thus means to reestablish it.”504 Abolition of the 
Christian calendar was therefore not only an attempt to replace natural time with 
rational time, but to replace the centerpiece of time itself—the birth and death of 
Jesus Christ—in hopes of abolishing the difference between past and future. 
Meanings of the past are latent in future possibilities. Crisis in the modern age is 
permanent to the extent that it incorporates eschatology into history.505 
But revolution is simply the most radical expression of romanticism—a 
romanticism gone mad. In addition to the open possibility for violent political 
rebellion to realize the true romantic spirit of freedom and equality, there also 
subsists within the romantic ethos an interior impulse. What I have called the 
“sentimentalization of morals” found in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith 
occupies a unique place in this romantic march. The feeling—or passion—behind an 
action determines the morality of that action and as such implies that “natural” 
passions be given total expression. What matters morally and politically is the feeling 
and energy behind actions naturally undertaken. Passions are to this extent the 
fundamental content of morals and thus, to flip the argument around, morals are 
themselves susceptible to revision in light of what is naturally desired. It is one thing 
to say that an action must fit within the natural world or must not violate the natural 
order, it is quite another to say that whatever is naturally desired expresses moral 
truth. What concerns Ferguson is not the suggestion that passions have a role in 
                                                
503 Reinhart Koselleck, “The Revolutionary Calendar and ‘Neu Zeit’,” The Conceptual Practice of 
History, Todd Presner trans. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 151. 
504 Ibid., 152. 
505 Koselleck refers here to Karl Barth, quoting from his Commentary: God is “the origin of the crisis 
of every objectivity, an origin that lacks all objectivity, the judge, the non-being of the world.  The so-
called history of salvation is only the continuous crisis of all history, not a history within or parallel to 
human history.” 
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moral deliberation and upon the performance of actions, or that passions cannot be 
groomed by custom; rather, he takes issue only with internalizing moral authority. 
Translating a previously objective moral order into a subjective set of natural 
passions, an order judged according to a state of nature that makes the passions truly 
natural, marks a dangerous turn to the subjective. Passions arising from this impulse 
toward isolated individuality confuse and fragment the moral order by reducing the 
rules of civil society to principles protecting personal rights. “Moral sense,” 
“sympathy,” and “fellow-feeling” are the conceptual centerpieces of an eighteenth-
century Scottish moral philosophy that consecrates the passions and thereby 
internalizes moral authority.   
The romantic impulse would make its distinctly religious impression in the form 
of unpredictable “enthusiasm.” As a relatively new theological phenomenon, 
enthusiasm became a cheeky eighteenth-century designation for erratic emotional 
displays believed to manifest internal experience of the Holy Spirit. Field preaching 
was where this phenomenon appeared most regularly and it was enthusiasm’s 
repeated appearance at such gatherings that helped energize the pervasive spirit of 
revivalism defining the experiential undercurrent of eighteenth-century religiosity. 
That the theological roots of enthusiasm were of a pietistic genus further evinces the 
depth to which certain romantic impulses penetrated religious life. Pietism could 
serve as fertile soil for enthusiasm precisely because it had already become 
thoroughly individualistic by mid-century; enthusiasm simply broke pietism free 
from its unspeakable stoic heritage. If morals were reducible to the adjudication of 
passions, then it seemed more or less fitting that the experience of God could also be 
reduced to physically impassioned fervor. Kirk moderates were justified in remaining 
suspicious over the deliberate stress upon internal experience of God’s spirit, 
signaling as it did a severe and disturbing individualizing of genuine Christian 
faithfulness.506 Enthusiasm attempted to do religiously what other romantic impulses 
attempted morally and politically: to rub smooth the social, liturgical, and 
teleological textures of worship and to absorb present feelings of natural experience. 
The unforeseen and perhaps most detrimental effect of enthusiasm would be its 
implicit marginalizing of both the moral and political integrity of religion itself. 
                                                
506 For views of Kirk moderates on “enthusiasm,” Ferguson included, see Richard Sher, Church and 
University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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Linking romanticism and its impulses to the central inquiry concerning a moral 
commercial order would deserve its own thesis, so I will identify here only a few key 
points of connection. In some respects, romanticism positively chastens certain 
versions of industrialization that purposefully ignore the agricultural foundation of 
political economy. Ironically, sacralizing nature erects a barrier to the protection and 
preservation of habitats that sustain life. Observing custom offers another more 
historically embedded means by which to impose defensive or prohibitory standards. 
Customs tell us about the past so that our present makes sense, bringing stable 
continuity to the juncture of what was and now is. Customs do not reject newness or 
innovations out of hand; they simply discredit rapid or revolutionary novelties. 
Conservative romanticism of the mid to late eighteenth-century respected customs 
and the telos of nature they guarded. Radical romantics, on the other hand, sought to 
break the customary and teleological spine of commerce by asserting “rights” to two 
crucial political ideals: freer trade and social equality. The commercial sphere was 
believed to hold the keys for both modern portals. This brand of romanticism focuses 
more on the human experience of and engagement with nature than on nature itself.  
More broadly, it is an ideology founded on ideal impulses. Freedom and equality are 
two such impulses and to “realize” these ends the radical romantic proposes to topple 
the customs and institutions upon which political societies are founded and nurtured; 
that is, the romantic wishes to abolish all artifacts believed unnatural to human self-
expression. From the romantic starting point—the state of nature—human history is 
one painfully long story about how artifacts, especially commercial innovations, put 
further distance between human being and its natural home. Ferguson has shown us 
why this romantic insistence on overcoming artifacts remains a fiction. History 
originates with artifact. Creation itself is the making of an artifact, one that is 
necessarily political due to its logical hierarchy of Creator over the created. Just as in 
the beginning God created, so too does humankind attempt to mimic genesis by 
making and developing artifacts. History begins with creation and thus artifacts are 
part of history’s beginning. Politically, God’s providence includes institutions that 
safeguard lasting order: law, government, and economic exchange being but a few. 
The commercial order is an artifact that cannot be abolished, and even if abolished, 
its elimination cannot ensure either the ideal equality or freedom desired.   
An excellent contemporary example of romantic temptations to unmake political 
artifacts ordering civil society is that of economic de-regulation. If government were 
to remove the entangling thicket of regulatory and legal measures meant to preserve 
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a morally ordered marketplace—the assumption goes—then natural functions of the 
market when left to themselves would lead to the most efficient and profitable mode 
of general economy—the less involved is government, the more natural and virtuous 
the market mechanism. In the case of de-regulation, the romantic impulse for 
freedom is clear: instincts and natural desires of the collective Will in the 
marketplace are such that acting on what is natural and allowing the market its 
natural course does the most good by affording the most public happiness. The true 
Romantic will thus reject the prospect of commerce in the sense of commercium—
coming together—by definition. Genuine romanticism opposes true commerce 
simply by virtue of what it is. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to identify three eighteenth-century moral and political 
theologies Ferguson actively resists. Determinacy, universality, and romanticism 
have been referred to as “themes” but could also have been described as “ideologies” 
or “theological perversions.” Because Ferguson does not offer a positive or 
systematic moral or political theology I have portrayed him in his true apologetic 
light. Indeed, one might observe that it was in an age of overt theological austerity 
that the system we have come to call capitalism made its political genesis.507 Or, to 
put it another way, only in the age of natural religion could an economic system as 
morally unreliable as market capitalism receive political sanction. In late-modern 
politics, moreover, not only do Western governments sanction capital markets, they 
positively depend upon them. Hamstrung by the shallowness of natural religion, at 
any rate, moral and political reflection in the eighteenth-century could not resist the 
temptation of permitting commercial spheres or practices to take whatever structure 
or to continue whatever practice seemed most natural. On this point the careful 
reader will have noticed how Ferguson’s attention is drawn to the shadows and 
inconsistencies of the modern age. Determinacy, for example, is a pagan, not 
                                                
507 This argument is one of comparison.  Jonathan Edwards, George Turnbull, and perhaps Joseph 
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compared to other periods of theological reflection, the qualitative contrasts become all the more 
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only to say that the triumph of natural religion was in effect the crack in the political wall that when 
broken allowed for the impending surge of democratic capitalism.  Theology that acknowledges only 
natural authority is a theology without fortitude. 
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Christian doctrine, and he rejects philosopher’s attempts to draw upon “mechanistic” 
metaphors to shore-up otherwise inept arguments about the natural world. 
“Mechanism” remains the standing metaphor for modern economics and to the extent 
that the Market’s natural functions are upheld as ultimately authoritative—as was the 
case in the eighteenth-century—modern capitalism remains an ideological perversion 
of Christian metaphysics.   
Universality is the eighteenth-century conversion of objective authority into 
subjective, a movement described by Hannah Arendt as “the dissolution of reality 
into subjective states of mind.”508 When authority becomes a thing to be claimed, as 
in the case of property, the totalization of epistemology is complete. This position of 
universality—the way the world exists being the way I see and believe the world to 
exist—frees the individual to pass judgment on any state of affairs so long as he is 
armed with ideals the judged-of can measure up to. Rational immediacy then leads 
naturally to an idealizing of moral and political realities, a digression from the 
concrete to the abstract. Rational immediacy means that whatever one thinks one 
knows to be the case simply is the case and no mediation is required. If total freedom 
and equality are rational possibilities for society, then it must also be a possibility in 
reality. Universality is the elevation of the human perspective to the point of 
ultimacy and it was this subjective turn that also made determinacy and romanticism 
(ideally) possible. 
Romanticism is dependent upon both the primacy of mechanical nature as well as 
the universalized human perspective because it is premised on the breakdown of any 
obstruction between the two ideals. As it has been addressed above, romanticism 
describes a series of impulses: appeals to a state of nature, sentimentalization of 
morals, and the emphasis on political novelty and rebellion. Romanticism first arises 
from the mythic state of nature, where the human being is wholly free of 
impediment, limitation, or customary artifact. The eighteenth-century hope is for 
communion with nature, or at least synchronization with nature’s spirit. Newly 
achieved universality afforded romanticism an opportunity to internalize (previously) 
metaphysical standards of action. The sentimentalization of morals is thus reflected 
overtly in the “moral sense,” “sympathy,” and “fellow-feeling” determining what 
ought to be done; what ought be done is simply what the passions conditioned by 
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nature determine of themselves. Rebellion against form is expressed most radically 
in violent revolution that seeks to lay waste to conventions and institutions bringing 
coherence to the fabric of society. The idea of “society” is itself an eighteenth-
century obsession courting its fair share of adorers and despisers, but radical 
romantics are perhaps society’s most indignant despisers of the period and it is 
through them that the modern understanding of self-over-society in order eventually 
to be (partially) for society comes to life. Radical romantics search for pure 
expression of feeling in a state of nature. Feeling is a species of desire, and romantic 
desire reaches longingly for that natural object which raises desire to a higher plane 
of felicity—a desiring of desire. This eternally unsettled desire can find rest only in 
the Absolute, for, as Jean Yves Lacoste has put it, “what excites our joy shows up 
our impotence to institute joy, to make it the perpetual tone of our experience.”509 
Our constant anxiety is evidence that desire cannot be fully realized and thus must be 
yet to come. “Beatitude,” the fusion of heart and knowledge welded by vision of the 
Absolute, remains presently “restlessness,” since “the heart wants what it cannot 
claim.”510 Ferguson for his part seems to have perceived the frontal edge of this 
crisis. The regularity with which he refers to the Author of nature is sufficient to 
highlight what he believes to disclose the depravity of a fictitious state of nature. 
Recognizing humanity is governed ultimately by an Author of nature cripples the 
individualist energies of romanticism by upholding the truth that the heart and its 
desires are not for itself but for the Author.   
Under the modern pressures of determinacy, universality, and romanticism one 
can begin to see the wisdom in Ferguson’s concluding his Essay on the History of 
Civil Society with a treatment of political slavery. Each of these three themes 
undergirds modern capitalism in the West and it is staggering to realize Ferguson had 
already detected many of its demented goals as early as the 1760’s. The three 
political theologies Ferguson resists correspond to the threats modern capitalism 
imposes upon the meaning of history, human action, and political institutions. The 
latter three comprise the conceptual fortress within which societies thrive; the former 
three are the forces of capitalism rallying against the fortress gates. Political slavery 
is what occurs when walls crumble and the fortress falls to capitalist siege. But this is 
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as far as the martial metaphor can take us, for in actual fact, the forces of modern 
commerce thus defined—determinacy, universality, and romanticism—are always 
already integrated into the life-blood of society itself. If understood thus, political 
slavery was the consequence of jettisoning distinctly Christian moral and political 
concepts informing modern society for pagan or altogether unchristian ones. The 
descent into slavery is as rapid and thorough as the presumed escalation toward 
mastery. A morally corrupt society is susceptible to enslavement precisely because 
that society has undermined the fixtures making it “a society” as such. Determinacy, 
universality, and the romantic impulse are thus unmasked as ideals without 
substance, thrown into the light and exposed as “false spirits” actively unmaking the 
very goods that pursuing them seemed to have promised. 
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